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MACAULAY AND HIS HISTORY—A HUNDRED YEARS AFTER

FEW popular men of letters, presumably, have been indifferent to their vogue in their own day or to their reputation in the future. In the case of Macaulay there is explicit evidence of sales-consciousness and fame-consciousness. A few days after the publication of the first two volumes of his *History* Macaulay wrote in his journal, one of the most self-revealing of diaries: "Black says that there has been no such sale since the days of Waverley. The success is in every way complete beyond all hope. . . . I think, though with some misgiving, that the book will live." And later, predicting that Herodotus would still be read with delight a thousand years thereafter, he said: "We must do our best to be read too." The well-known ambition which he cherished for his *History*—that it would for a few days "supersede the last fashionable novel on the tables of young ladies"—was amply realized, as is shown by the facts and figures concerning its sales given by Sir George Otto Trevelyan, Macaulay's nephew, in his classic biography of his uncle.[1] The annual sale, according to Trevelyan, writing about 1875, often surpassed that of the best-selling novel of the current year.

The first installment of Macaulay's *History* was published in 1848, and if in this its centennial year the public in the English-

[1] *The Life and Letters of Lord Macaulay.* Because of the nature of the materials to which the author had access and of his personal knowledge of his uncle, this work, published in 1876, remains and will remain the indispensable source of information for Macaulay's career.

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speaking world were to be polled on the question, "Who is the greatest historian of England?", I believe that Macaulay would be an easy winner. He is no longer read to the same extent, to be sure, as in his own day and during the following generation. Publishers still find it profitable to reprint his *History* and his *Essays* from time to time, but his reputation today is largely traditional. To say this, however, is to say that Macaulay's writings must have made, as we know that they did make, a tremendous impression upon England and her cultural offspring. Nor should we overlook the influence of Macaulay in non-English-speaking countries. Trevelyan tells us that the *History* was translated into German, Dutch, Danish, French, Italian, Spanish, Polish, Bohemian, Russian, Hungarian and Persian. The surprising thing about it today is not that it is not read more widely, but that it is read at all. It deals with only a brief period, even though an important one, in English history; facts unknown to Macaulay have been brought to light by later investigation; literary taste has undergone changes since his day; and the belief that he held in a progress which has operated in the past, at least for many centuries, and which can be counted upon to operate in the future, has been shaken, to put it mildly.

Our principal concern here will be with Macaulay as a historian, but he was, of course, much besides that. No estimate of his work as a historian can justifiably disregard all other aspects of his personality and career, for again and again these latter would call for modifications and alterations of judgments based exclusively on his historical writings.

* * *

To begin with, Macaulay, though he never married, was pre-eminently a family man, with an all-pervading attachment to his own immediate kith and kin. Personal ambition, of which he was by no means devoid, appears to have been sublimated to a great degree by family affection. It was no affectation that led him to write in a letter to his sister Hannah (later Lady Trevelyan), referring to the praise which had greeted one of his great parliamentary speeches:

> My greatest pleasure . . . is to think of the pleasure which my success will give to my father and my sisters. . . . From my

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> earliest years, the gratification of those whom I love has been associated with the gratification of my own thirst for fame, until the two have become inseparably joined in my mind.

Devotion to his family was not a sentiment which Macaulay tended to outgrow as fame and fortune came to him. On the contrary, his domestic affections seemed to become more intense as the range of his social acquaintance widened. That they were fully reciprocated, those who were nearest and dearest to him bore testimony. "To us," said Lady Trevelyan, recalling her childhood days, "he was an object of passionate love and devotion. To us he could do no wrong." And at the time of his death she uttered this touching lament:

> We have lost the light of our home, the most tender, loving, generous, unselfish, devoted of friends. What he was to me for fifty years how can I tell? What a world of love he poured out upon me and mine! The blank, the void he has left,—filling, as he did, so entirely both heart and intellect,—no one can understand.

The contempt which Macaulay often expressed in his published writings for what he did not like does not suggest that he was blessed with an amiable disposition. Sydney Smith praised Macaulay's early articles in the *Edinburgh Review* but at the same time warned him against a contemptuous tone in controversy. Readers of Macaulay's essays well know that he was capable of biting and caustic criticism. Probably the strongest of his personal antipathies was that which he entertained toward John Wilson Croker, whose edition of Boswell's *Life of Johnson* elicited from his pen one of the most celebrated of contemptuous and vituperative reviews; perhaps the element of revenge also entered into it, for Macaulay had some parliamentary grudges against Croker. There can be little doubt that Macaulay, in his early days at least, committed literary assault and battery with relish, though, generally speaking, his bark was worse than his bite, and in later life he sometimes regretted attacks which he had made on individuals. While it would be going too far to say that he ever suffered fools gladly, the evidences that he was a likable person are unimpeachable. His sister Margaret, some

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twelve years his junior, commented in her diary on his sweetness of temper; and his love of children was an abiding trait. He was unfailingly considerate toward those with whom he came into personal contact in the everyday affairs of life, generous to those in need or other misfortune, and kind and thoughtful in his relations with his personal servants.

In early life Macaulay enjoyed controversy and was decidedly pugnacious, though never so, apparently, in family affairs. When he was at boarding school in his early teens his father, Zachary Macaulay, an exemplar of evangelical piety and a dynamo of reforming energy, fearing that " Tom " was winning distinction among his schoolfellows by loud and vehement talk, prayed that " the ornament of a meek and quiet spirit " might be given to him. Undoubtedly Macaulay mellowed and grew more tolerant with age. Thus, for example, he ceased before his death to be at heart a party man though in his earlier years he had been the most ardent of Whig partisans. He even came to be tolerant of literary malpractice at his own expense. Speaking of a writer who had plagiarized from him, he said, " A man should have enough to spare something for thieves." At no time of life, however, could his spirit be correctly described as " meek and quiet ".

A lifelong trait of Macaulay's of which his published writings give little or no hint was his emotional sensibility. The agony of grief which he suffered at the time of his mother's death, the pain it gave him to part from those he loved, and his susceptibility to the stirring and sublime in literature, as well as to the pathetic, all bespoke an acutely sensitive nature. He was often, and sometimes embarrassingly, affected to tears by his reading. When nearly fifty years of age he reread Richardson's *Clarissa* and recorded in his journal: " I nearly cried my eyes out." A letter to his niece shows him weeping over Homer. " I read the last five books [of the Iliad] at a stretch during my walk to-day, and was . . . forced to turn into a by-path lest the parties of walkers should see me blubbering for imaginary beings. . . ." The emotional side of Macaulay's nature is revealed to some extent by the marginal notes which he made in the books in his library, especially in Shakespeare's tragedies; and it may explain the superlatives in which he sometimes indulged, as in the en-

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comium he bestowed on the conclusion of Plato's *Apology* as being the most sublime thing in literature.

In the judgment of his contemporaries Macaulay was a great parliamentary orator, and his intimate knowledge of public affairs in his own day had some bearing on his outlook as a historian. Entering the House of Commons in 1830 as a staunch Whig, he was not slow to distinguish himself in the arena of national politics. His first speech in support of the Reform Bill made a profound impression. At its conclusion the Speaker told him that he had never seen the House in such a state of excitement, and Sir Robert Peel declared that parts of the speech were as beautiful as anything he had ever heard or read. This resounding parliamentary success determined the direction of Macaulay's career for the next two or three years and made him a lion in London society. Though he did not hold important ministerial office, he played a leading part in the House of Commons. In the opinion of Croker, who was not likely to exaggerate Macaulay's merits, he was " the most brilliant rhetorician of the House." " Whenever he rose to speak," said Gladstone, who entered Parliament about the same time as Macaulay, " it was a summons like a trumpet-call to fill the benches." Macaulay's prepared speeches were very carefully thought out in advance, even as to precise phraseology, but he deliberately refrained from writing them out lest they should seem too much like essays, and he habitually spoke without notes. When he was preparing for publication a selection of his speeches, years after they had been delivered, he was obliged to rewrite many of them " from memory and from the hints given by the reports." He employed certain rhetorical devices, notably that of phraseological reiteration, but his speeches owed their effect primarily to his thought, not to oratorical manner. According to the testimony of a parliamentary reporter, he spoke very rapidly, somewhat monotonously, and without much emphasis, and his action in speaking, what little there was of it, was said to have been rather ungainly.

What Macaulay accomplished in India as a member of the Governor General's Council, and especially what he did in behalf of English education and for reform of the administration of justice, entitled him to the name of statesman, broad-minded

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administrator, and jurist. In 1832 he was appointed a member of the Board of Control, which represented the Crown in its relations to the East India Company, and at once began reading extensively about India. In July of the following year he made a great speech in the House of Commons in support of the East India Charter Bill—" the best speech, by general agreement, and in my own opinion, that I ever made in my life," he wrote to his sister Hannah. Macaulay's primary reason for going to India was, as he himself very frankly admitted, pecuniary. His father, absorbed in religious and philanthropic enterprises, had fallen into grave financial difficulties, and the family fortunes were at a low ebb. His salary of £10,000 a year as a member of the Legislative Council of India would enable him, he calculated, to return to England while still under forty years of age with a fortune of £30,000. In the letter to his sister in which he asked her to accompany him to India he wrote:

> I am not fond of money. But . . . every day shows me more and more strongly how necessary a competence is to a man who desires to be either great or useful. . . . I have never made more than two hundred a year by my pen. I could not support myself in comfort on less than five hundred; and I shall in all probability have many others to support. The prospects of our family are, if possible, darker than ever.

It should be emphasized, however, that while he went to India to win a financial competence and looked upon his stay there as a period of exile, he was very far indeed from regarding his position as a lucrative sinecure. He worked hard in the interest of the people of India as he understood it—unnecessarily so, for much of his most arduous labor was voluntary. A recently published collection of the minutes in which Macaulay explained to his colleagues in the Council his views on public questions shows us a statesman applying without fear or favor, and sometimes with great courage, English principles of justice to problems of Indian government.[2] The Indian editor of this volume sums up Macaulay's purposes in these words:

[2] *Lord Macaulay's Legislative Minutes*, selected with a Historical Introduction by C. D. Dharker (London, 1946).

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> He found a people apathetic and inarticulate. He wanted to help them, by giving them better education, better laws formed into a uniform system, and better courts maintaining the spirit of those laws. He wanted to make corruption impossible, to get rid of privilege and to establish in India the principle that all are equal in the eyes of the law. This was an ambitious plan for a single man to achieve during a short term of office. . . . But Macaulay did his best, and the time he devoted to it indeed formed, in the words of his biographer, " the most honourable chapter of his life."

Macaulay happened to go to India at a critical moment in its intellectual development. All educational activity on the part of the government had been at a standstill for some time on account of a difference of opinion in the Committee of Public Instruction, which was evenly divided on the question of what kind of education should be officially encouraged. Half of the members were in favor of maintaining and extending the old scheme of supporting Oriental learning in Sanscrit, Persian and Arabic. The other half advocated teaching the elements of knowledge in the vernacular languages and the higher branches in English. Macaulay on his arrival was appointed President of the Committee, but he declined to take any active part in its proceedings until the government had finally decided on the question at issue. In January 1835, both sides of the Committee offered their opinions to the Supreme Council, and on February 2, Macaulay, as a member of the Council, presented the famous minute in which he defended the views of the English party. It settled the question at once and permanently, and a month later the Governor General, Lord William Bentinck, decided that " the great object of the British Government ought to be the promotion of European literature and science among the natives of India." Thereupon Macaulay as President of the Committee of Public Instruction took up with great zeal and energy the work of that office and, though the means at his disposal were sadly inadequate, he showed a high order of administrative ability. A letter to his father indicates his view of the beneficial religious effects of English education in India: " Our English schools are flourishing wonderfully. . . . No Hindoo, who has received an English education, ever remains sincerely attached

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to his religion. . . . It is my firm belief that, if our plans of education are followed up, there will not be a single idolater among the respectable classes in Bengal thirty years hence." Macaulay's labors in the cause of education in India were voluntary and unpaid. Macaulay may be—he has been—accused of being unfair to Oriental learning, but it cannot be seriously questioned that his educational policy was inspired by a genuine desire to benefit the people of India.

A clause in the India Charter Act of 1833 gave rise to the appointment in 1834 of a Law Commission to advise the Council on matters of law and to draft legal codes. Macaulay had been admitted to the Bar in 1826, but he never seems to have looked to the law seriously as a profession and soon gave up any pretense of practicing it. He was, nevertheless, the Law Member of the Governor General's Council, and at his own instigation he was appointed President of the Law Commission. As such he was the principal author of the Indian Penal Code, which appeared in draft in 1837. Throughout, the influence of Bentham, for whom as a philosopher of jurisprudence Macaulay had a deep respect, can be seen. In fact, Sir Leslie Stephen, in his work on the English Utilitarians, called the Indian Penal Code "the first actual attempt to carry out Bentham's favorite schemes under British rule." Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, the eminent authority on criminal law and brother of Sir Leslie, praised Macaulay very highly as a lawgiver:

> The point which always has surprised me most in connection with the Penal Code is that it proves that Lord Macaulay must have had a knowledge of English criminal law which, considering how little he had practised it, may fairly be called extraordinary. He must have possessed the gift of going at once to the very root of the matter, and of sifting the corn from the chaff to a most unusual degree; for his draft gives the substance of the criminal law of England, down to its minute working details, in a compass which, by comparison with the original, may be regarded as almost absurdly small.

Before Macaulay became distinctively a historian he had won celebrity as an essayist and a poet—or at any rate a writer of

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ballads of great merit. The first of the long series of articles which he contributed to the *Edinburgh Review,* his essay on Milton, appeared in August 1825, when the magazine was at the height of its influence. It made Macaulay's literary reputation. In acknowledging receipt of the manuscript, Lord Jeffrey, then Editor of the *Edinburgh Review,* said: "The more I think, the less I can conceive where you picked up that style." Some years later, Macvey Napier, who succeeded Jeffrey as Editor, told Macaulay that his articles were all that kept the magazine going. The booksellers reported that the issues sold, or did not sell, according as they did or did not contain articles of his. Macaulay's essays were first published in collected form in England in 1843, and they long continued to enjoy phenomenal sales for a volume of such character in Britain and in the United States. *The Lays of Ancient Rome* appeared about the same time and scored an immediate success. "Horatius" and "The Battle of the Lake Regillus" long continued to be favorite material for schoolboy declamations in England and the United States.

What Gibbon called "an invincible love of reading" was the ruling passion of Macaulay's life. It manifested itself, as is well known, amazingly early, and from the time he was three years old he was reading incessantly. When he was nearly eight his mother wrote: "My dear Tom continues to show marks of uncommon genius. He gets on wonderfully in all branches of his education, and the extent of his reading, and of the knowledge he has derived from it, are truly astonishing in a boy not yet eight years old." It was in this same letter that she spoke of what Macaulay's biographers have been fond of referring to, a compendium of universal history which the child had written, containing, according to his mother, "a tolerably connected view of the leading events from the Creation to the present time, filling about a quire of paper." It is reassuring to be informed by the same authority that the intellectual infant prodigy was at the same time "as playful as a kitten", and his nephew-biographer tells us that all the testimony is to the effect that "a more simple and natural child never lived, or a more lively and merry one." Something of Macaulay's life among books is recorded in his marginal annotations in the volumes in his own

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library. Trevelyan says that he often kept up a sort of running conversation with his author for whole chapters together and declares that these " dialogues with the dead " are the most characteristic of all the memorials of himself that Macaulay left. " His way of life ", says Trevelyan, referring to his later years, " would have been deemed solitary by others, but it was not solitary to him. While he had a volume in his hands he never could be without a quaint companion to laugh with or laugh at; an adversary to stimulate his combativeness; a counsellor to suggest wise or lofty thoughts, and a friend with whom to share them."

The tale of Macaulay's reading is one of the world's wonders. His astounding feats along this line could have been performed only by a prodigiously rapid reader. Trevelyan speaks of Macaulay's faculty for taking in at a glance the contents of a printed page and considers this as one of the two principal elements in his success in learning, the other being his amazing memory. An achievement recorded by Macaulay himself, though without any seeming realization that there was anything out of the ordinary about it, was the reading of the whole of the *Oedippus Tyrannus* at a single sitting. Turning a book over was one of his favorite expressions. " To the end," says Trevelyan, " he read books more quickly than other people skimmed them, and skimmed them as fast as anyone else could turn the leaves. . . . And this speed was not in his case obtained at the expense of accuracy. Anything which had once appeared in type . . . had in his eyes an authority which led him to look upon misquotation as a species of minor sacrilege."

After reaching India Macaulay wrote to an intimate friend in England: " I read insatiably [on the voyage]; the Iliad and Odyssey, Virgil, Horace, Caesar's Commentaries, Bacon de Augmentis, Dante, Petrarch, Ariosto, Tasso, Don Quixote, Gibbon's Rome, Mill's India, all the seventy volumes of Voltaire, Sismondi's History of France, and the seven thick folios of the Biographia Britannica. I found my Greek and Latin in good condition enough."

His reading in Greek and Latin while in India was prodigious indeed. Writing to the same friend on December 30, 1835, he said:

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> I have cast up my reading account, and brought it to the end of the year 1835. It includes December 1834. . . . During the last thirteen months I have read Aeschylus twice; Sophocles twice; Euripides once; Pindar twice; Callimachus; Apollonius Rhodius; Quintus Calaber; Theocritus twice; Herodotus; Thucydides; almost all Xenophon's works; almost all Plato; Aristotle's Politics, and a good deal of his Organon, besides dipping elsewhere in him; the whole of Plutarch's Lives; about half of Lucian; two or three books of Athenaeus; Plautus twice; Terrence twice; Lucretius twice; Catullus; Tibullus; Propertius; Lucan; Statius; Silius Italicus; Livy; Velleius Paterculus; Sallust; Caesar; and, lastly, Cicero. I have, indeed, still a little of Cicero left; but I shall finish him in a few days. I am now deep in Aristophanes and Lucian.

Commenting upon this miraculous achievement, all the more amazing when it is remembered that Macaulay at the time was busy with important affairs of government, Trevelyan says that all this mass of literature was not only read but read carefully, as is proved by " the pencil marks, single, double, and treble, which meander down the margin of such passages as excited the admiration of the student; and by the remarks, literary, historical, and grammatical, with which the critic has interspersed every volume, and sometimes every page. "

A lifelong habit of Macaulay's, at least until the severe heart attack which he suffered in his early fifties, was that of reading while walking, an occupation in which he acquired great dexterity. In fact, the only exercise in which he excelled, according to Trevelyan, was that of " threading crowded streets with his eyes fixed upon a book." The most astonishing feat of ambulatory reading recorded in Trevelyan's *Life* was performed at the age of fifty during a walk from Malvern to Worcester and back, during the course of which he read consecutively fourteen books of the *Odyssey*. Macaulay also read in bed, he read while dressing and undressing, he read while shaving, and he read at meals. Books that he found to his taste at breakfast were not necessarily satisfactory at dinner and vice versa. It would seem as if Macaulay must always have had a book in his hand or his pocket. On one occasion when it was raining hard, he was forced to resort to a covered car. " While in this detestable vehicle, " he recorded in his journal, " I looked rapidly

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through the correspondence between Pliny and Trajan, and thought that Trajan made a most creditable figure."

An unfailing memory was another gift of the gods to Macaulay. He once declared that if all copies of *Paradise Lost* and *The Pilgrim's Progress* were to be destroyed, he would undertake to reproduce those works from memory. Macaulay himself perceived that a memory like his had its disadvantages for a literary man. He wrote to a friend in 1835: "You see that my mind is not in great danger of rusting. The danger is that I may become a mere pedant. I feel a habit of quotation growing on me. . . . It is all that I can do to keep Greek and Latin out of all my letters . . . . It is a dangerous thing for a man with a very strong memory to read very much." Macaulay did not live to be an old man, and his memory remained strong to the end. When he was fifty-four years of age and after a heart attack had sadly diminished his physical vigor, he wrote in his journal: "My memory I often try, and find it as good as ever; and memory is the faculty which it is most easy to bring to decisive tests, and also the faculty which gives way first."

From his childhood days onward Macaulay's writing was characterized by meticulous precision in the use of words and perfect clarity. According to Trevelyan, "the voluminous writings of his childhood . . . display the same lucidity of meaning, and scrupulous accuracy in punctuation and the other minor details of the literary art, which characterise his mature works." It was the same in his talk. "When he came to describe to his mother any childish play," wrote one who knew him well from the first, "I took care to be present, when I could, that I might listen to the way in which he expressed himself, often scarcely exceeded in his later years." Macaulay's mother, a woman of marked intellectual power and great cultivation, was of course intensely proud of her son's abilities, but she was careful not to parade them or do anything to give him a sense of self-importance. And she gave him wise advice about his writing. "All your pieces are much mended after a little reflection," she told him, "and therefore take some solitary walks, and think over each separate thing. Spare no time or trouble to render each piece as perfect as you can . . . ." Macaulay himself is authority

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for the statement that he owed a tremendous debt to his mother in things of the mind, and few writers, surely, have worked harder over their writing than he did. He told Napier that there was not a single sentence in the latter half of his essay on Bacon which had not been repeatedly recast.

Macaulay's precision and lucidity were equally in evidence in his parliamentary speeches. Trevelyan tells us:

> His oratory had a warm, and a lifelong admirer in Mr. Gladstone, who frequently in after years discoursed to me about Macaulay. . . . On one occasion his own Chancellor of the Exchequer, speaking within three feet of us as we sat together on the Treasury Bench, expressed himself as endorsing his opponent's argument "to a certain extent." "Endorse to a certain extent!" said Mr. Gladstone, "What a phrase! We want your uncle back among us. He was a famous purist; a jealous guardian of the English language."

Precision and clarity were, in fact, part of the man. They were evidenced in the dry business of legislation in India as well as in his literary writings and his speeches. As a recent Indian student of Macaulay's legislative work in India has pointed out, Macaulay always insisted upon making the meaning of laws clear and precise.[3] In one of his minutes, in fact, he declared that legislative enactments ought to be of all compositions the most concise and lucid.

Macaulay was not a baffling character. His life did not pose incongruous elements, he experienced no "conversions", no mystery surrounded him. George Macaulay Trevelyan, his grandnephew, has remarked that he would not make a good subject for a psychological character sketch. He "was not subtle enough for such subtleties." He was assailed by no religious or philosophic doubts, he never had to wrestle with himself inwardly, and he was a stranger to the illumination that comes from questioning one's own first principles. In spite of, or perhaps partly because of, the immense range of his learning in the realm of literature, he took little interest in philosophy, and he had little knowledge of science, though he was fully aware of

[3] Dharker, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

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the revolutionary transformations in ways of living and working that applied science had effected. He was acquainted with the writings of some of the great philosophers, and he loved Plato, but rather for his style than for his thought. "I am more and more convinced", he wrote, "that the merit of Plato lies in his talent for narrative and description, in his rhetoric, in his humour, and in his exquisite Greek." Toward the end of his life he wrote in a private letter: "I often regret, and even actutely, my want of a Senior Wrangler's knowledge of physics and mathematics; and I regret still more some habits of mind which a Senior Wrangler is pretty certain to possess." The range of Macaulay's curiosity was limited; he did not stray very widely in the pastures of wonder. He was not, of course, indifferent to truth, but there is some justification for Morley's criticism that he sought truth, "not as she should be sought, devoutly, tentatively, and with the air of one touching the hem of a sacred garment, but clutching her by the hair of the head and dragging her after him in a kind of boisterous triumph, a prisoner of war and not a goddess."

* * *

It was while Macaulay was in India that the idea of writing a great historical work began to take shape in his mind. "I am more than half determined to abandon politics," he wrote to a friend at the end of the year 1835, "and to give myself wholly to letters; to undertake some great historical work which may be at once the business and the amusement of my life." The idea remained nebulous for some time, but there gradually emerged the conception of a history of England from the Revolution of 1688 to the early nineteenth century. After his return to England in 1838 he wrote to Napier:

> The first part, (which, I think, will take up five octavo volumes), will extend from the Revolution to the commencement of Sir Robert Walpole's long administration; a period of three or four and thirty very eventful years. From the commencement of Walpole's administration to the commencement of the American war, events may be dispatched more concisely. From the commencement of the American war it will again become necessary to be copious. These, at least, are my present notions. . . . How far I

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> shall bring the narrative down I have not determined. The death of George the Fourth [1830] would be the best halting-place. The History would then be an entire view of all the transactions which took place between the Revolution which brought the Crown into harmony with the Parliament, and the Revolution which brought the Parliament into harmony with the nation. But there are great and obvious objections to contemporary history.

It was not, however, until after the Whig defeat in the General Election of 1841, which terminated Macaulay's tenure of office and gave him greater leisure for research and writing, that he set to work seriously on his *History*. He had come to the conclusion that he ought to begin his narrative with the accession of James II, and his first two volumes, published by Longman and Company in 1848, constituted a detailed history of the reign of that monarch. Political and other activities prevented Macaulay from giving his whole time to what was now his chief interest, and the illness from which he never fully recovered diminished his physical vigor though it did not affect his mental powers. He came to realize that the chronological scope of the *History*, as he had at first conceived it, must be greatly reduced. It became clear in time that he would not even be able to cover the reign of Queen Anne, and in the end the *History*, which, as Macaulay announced in its opening paragraph, was to have extended to a time within the memory of men still living, did not come this side of the reign of William III.

We do not have to infer Macaulay's ideas about history and historianship entirely from his historical writings. While he was still in his twenties he wrote a famous essay on history which was published in the *Edinburgh Review* in 1828. It was soon after this that he entered Parliament, years of political activity lay ahead of him, and he could not have foreseen that the world would judge him primarily as a historian. Yet so far as I know he never retracted any of the essential views expressed in the essay. Macaulay's conception of historianship was a lofty one. "To be a really great historian", he said, "is perhaps the rarest of intellectual distinctions," and he found no practitioners of the craft who even approximated to his ideal. He paid his respects to the ancient historians but indicated in what ways they

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fell short—Herodotus, who "perpetually leaves the most sagacious reader in doubt what to reject and what to receive"; Thucydides, deficient in the power of generalization;[4] Livy, completely indifferent to truth, concerned only with "the picturesque effect of his book, and the honor of his country"; Tacitus, unrivaled among historians in the delineation of character, but carrying "his love of effect far beyond the limits of moderation." Modern historians, in general, had adhered more strictly to truth than their ancient predecessors—they had been less fictional. "Whether the historians of the last two centuries tell more truth than those of antiquity may perhaps be doubted. But it is quite certain that they tell fewer falsehoods."

It was the business of the historian, Macaulay insisted, to interpret as well as to narrate. "The writer who does not explain the phenomena as well as state them, performs only one half of his office." In the philosophy of history the moderns, in his opinion, had surpassed the ancients. The best of them "far excel their predecessors in the art of deducing general principles from facts." They had, however, fallen into a great error—they had distorted facts to suit general principles.

> They arrive at a theory from looking at some of the phenomena; and the remaining phenomena they strain or curtail to suit the theory. . . . In every human character and transaction there is a mixture of good and evil: a little exaggeration, a little suppression, a judicious use of epithets, a watchful and searching scepticism with respect to the evidence on one side, a convenient credulity with respect to every report or tradition on the other, may easily make a saint of Laud or a tyrant of Henry the Fourth.

Macaulay took Hume as an example of this kind of misrepresentation; Gibbon, too, he found censurable on this score. And modern historians had sadly neglected the art of narration, "the

[4] Macaulay later came to have a higher, an almost extravagantly high, opinion of Thucydides. In private letters written seven or eight years after he wrote the essay on history he said: "A young man, whatever his genius may be, is no judge of such a writer as Thucydides. I had no high opinion of him ten years ago. I have now been reading him with a mind accustomed to historical researches, and to political affairs; and I am astonished at my own former blindness, and at his greatness . . . there is no prose composition in the world, not even the De Corona, which I place so high as the seventh book of Thucydides. It is the ne plus ultra of human art."

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art of interesting the affections and presenting pictures to the imagination."

No history, Macaulay recognized, could present the whole truth; "but those are . . . the best histories which exhibit such parts of the truth as most nearly produce the effect of the whole." History, in other words, must needs be selective, and "he who is deficient in the art of selection may, by showing nothing but the truth, produce all the effect of the grossest falsehood." In this art of selection, Macaulay found, modern historians had been woefully deficient. They had conceived of history much too narrowly.

> The perfect historian is he in whose work the character and spirit of an age is exhibited in miniature. He relates no fact, he attributes no expression to his characters, which is not authenticated by sufficient testimony. But, by judicious selection, rejection, and arrangement, he gives to truth those attractions which have been usurped by fiction. . . . If a man, such as we are supposing, should write the history of England, he would assuredly not omit the battles, the sieges, the negotiations, the seditions, the ministerial changes. But with these he would intersperse the details which are the charm of historical romances. . . . Sir Walter Scott . . . has used those fragments of truth which historians have scornfully thrown behind them in a manner which may well excite their envy. He has constructed out of their gleanings works which, even considered as histories, are scarcely less valuable than theirs. But a truly great historian would reclaim those materials which the novelist has appropriated. The history of the government, and the history of the people, would be exhibited in that mode in which alone they can be exhibited justly, in inseparable conjunction and intermixture. We should not then have to look for the wars and votes of the Puritans in Clarendon, and for their phraseology in Old Mortality; for one half of King James in Hume, and for the other half in The Fortunes of Nigel.

This protest against the unduly restricted scope of history was written long before the Germans discovered the virtues of *Kulturgeschichte* and still longer before James Harvey Robinson began to make blueprints for what he called "The New History". Macaulay was evidently thinking of modern historians, especially of modern English historians, though as a matter of

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fact Hume had not entirely omitted social history. Macaulay knew well enough that there was nothing startlingly novel about social history, which was as old as Herodotus. But social history had undoubtedly been neglected by the moderns, though Voltaire had revived it for the eighteenth century. The third chapter of Macaulay's own *History* is one of the most celebrated pieces of social history ever written in the English language. Macaulay said that it was the hardest chapter of all to write, and this was because the social history of England had been so little studied. He made much greater use of newspapers than any of his predecessors had done, and his understanding of seventeenth-century social types, such as the squire and the parson, owed much to his reading of the contemporary drama. He devoured all the ballads, satires and lampoons of the reigns of James II and William III—the period which his *History* covers in detail—that he could lay hands on.

In his essay on history, however, Macaulay was silent regarding the most important developments that had already taken place for the study and writing of history, the beginnings of that revolution in historiography which occurred in the nineteenth century. These developments lay outside the realm of history as literature, which, for Macaulay, was always history par excellence, and while he was not wholly ignorant of them, he failed to grasp their full significance. In Germany Niebuhr was at work rewriting the history of ancient Rome on the basis of critical investigation of the sources,[5] the earlier volumes of the *Monumenta Germaniae Historica* were coming from the press, and the foundations of scientific history were being laid. In England a Record Commission had been in existence for years and had important publications to its credit; government

[5] In a letter to Napier, written in 1830, Macaulay referred to an article on Niebuhr which had just appeared in the *Edinburgh Review*. He mentioned "the school of German critics and historians" and was evidently impressed by Niebuhr's theories regarding the institutions of ancient Rome. In fact he went so far as to say that the appearance of Niebuhr's work was "an era in the intellectual history of Europe." In another letter, however, written to another correspondent five years later, he expressed a much less favorable opinion of Niebuhr: "He was a man of immense learning, and of great ingenuity. But his mind was utterly wanting in the faculty by which a demonstrated truth is distinguished from a plausible supposition." Macaulay was dependent at this time for his knowledge of German writings upon translations. He did not learn to read German till later on.

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archives and other manuscript collections had been explored and catalogued; scholars such as Francis Palgrave, Macaulay's senior by twelve years, were at work in the public records. It is a significant fact that the most popular of English historians remained throughout his life aloof from this " new " history and its practitioners—scholars like Benjamin Thorpe, whose publications included the first modern edition of the laws of the Anglo-Saxon kings, and John Kemble, ardent collector of Anglo-Saxon charters, of whom Maitland said, " Kemble's work often requires correction; but if Kemble's work had not been, there would be nothing to correct." Macaulay was not associated, so far as I know, with any collective enterprise for advancing historical knowledge. He did nothing that I have heard of to forward the training of historians. Though he was far from lacking in the faculty of critical judgment, and could attack historical writers with vigor and vehemence, not to say with vituperation, he did nothing for historical criticism as a discipline. Sir Charles Firth, who gave us the best edition of Macaulay's *History* and wrote an extensive commentary on it,[6] after remarking that the development of a more scientific method of treating historical evidence was one of the great achievements of the nineteenth century, observed that Macaulay stood quite outside this movement.

In 1840 the *Edinburgh Review* published an article of Macaulay's which bore the title " Von Ranke ". The peg on which it was hung was an English translation of Ranke's *History of the Popes,* but all—literally all—that Macaulay said about the book or the author was that the German original was known and esteemed wherever German literature was studied, that it was " the work of a mind fitted both for minute researches and for large speculations," and that it was written in " an admirable spirit, equally remote from levity and bigotry, serious and earnest, yet tolerant and impartial." This was cool praise for what has been called the masterpiece of the father of scientific history. Macaulay once met Ranke. It ought to have been a dramatic episode, this meeting of the great literary historian and the great scientific historian. But the drama was on the comic side. The story as told by the chatty Charles Greville in his

[6] *A Commentary on Macaulay's History of England* (London, 1938).

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Diary illustrates amusingly the invincible talkativeness—perhaps one should say the extraordinary conversational power—which was a characteristic of Macaulay, at any rate until his later years.[7] Ranke was on a visit to England, and Macaulay was asked to meet him. Greville writes:

> I went prepared to listen to some first-rate literary talk between such luminaries . . . but there never was a greater failure. The professor, a vivacious little man . . . could talk no English, and his French, though spoken fluently, was quite unintelligible. On the other hand, Macaulay could not speak German, and he spoke French without any facility, and with a very vile accent. It was comical to see the abundance of his matter struggling with his embarrassment in giving utterance to it, to hear the torrent of knowledge trying to force its way through the impediment of a limited acquaintance with the French language and the want of habit of conversing in it. But the struggle was of short duration. He began in French, but very soon could bear the restraint no longer, and broke into English, pouring forth his stores to the utterly unconscious and uncomprehending professor.

It is preëminently as a stylist, using that word in its broadest sense, that we usually think of Macaulay—and rightly so. That is how he thought of himself, and how competent critics, generally, have thought of him. "Where he set his stamp", said John Morley, a severe critic of Macaulay, "has been upon style; style in its widest sense . . . style, that is to say, in its relation to ideas and feelings, its commerce with thought, and its reaction on what one may call the temper or the conscience of the intellect." There are, of course, two sides to historianship—intake and outgo, research and presentation. Macaulay, conceiving of history as essentially a branch of literature and anxious above everything else to be read, was more greatly concerned with his-

[7] Lord Cockburn, writing in 1846, spoke of Macaulay's "vice of over-talking, and consequently of under-listening." Sydney Smith, speaking of Macaulay after his return from India, said that he now had "occasional flashes of silence" which made his conversation delightful. And after Macaulay's serious illness in 1852 Lord Carlisle wrote that the "flashes of silence" came much more frequently. One of Macaulay's grievances against dogs, whose company he never enjoyed, was the strange one that they interfered with talk. "How odd that people of sense should find any pleasure in being accompanied by a beast who is always spoiling conversation." He wrote this when he was fifty—and ought to have known better!

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torical composition and its problems than with historical research and its problems.

It would be a serious mistake, however, to suppose that Macaulay was indifferent to research. He thought of himself as a diligent investigator, and, compared with many of his predecessors, he was. "He reads twenty books to write a sentence," said Thackeray, "he travels a hundred miles to make a line of description." Buckle in his *History of Civilization* spoke of Macaulay's "immense research". Wilbur C. Abbott, no mean authority on seventeenth-century English history, wrote an essay on Macaulay in which he said that "contrary to a widely accepted but wholly erroneous opinion, Macaulay made few statements without evidence to back them, and the tale of his researches is an amazing chronicle." Firth, on the other hand, was of the opinion that the defects of Macaulay's *History* were mainly owing to his underestimate of the importance of the research side of historianship.

Macaulay's topographical investigations are good examples of the pains he took to be accurate as well as colorful. "I must go down into Somersetshire and Devonshire to see the scene of Monmouth's campaign, and to follow the line of William's march from Torbay", he wrote to Napier. Trevelyan informs us that Macaulay spent two days in Londonderry.

> He penetrated into every corner where there still lurked a vestige of the past, and called upon every inhabitant who was acquainted with any tradition worth the hearing. He drove through the suburbs; he sketched a ground-plan of the streets . . . he walked four times round the walls of the city for which he was to do what Thucydides had done for Platæa.

And he kept detailed records of his findings.

Macaulay's descriptions of places may not always have been accurate, though they were seldom lacking in vividness. His description, for example, of Glencoe, scene of the famous massacre in the Scottish Highlands which cast a sinister shadow on the character of Macaulay's hero, William III, distinctly has "atmosphere", but critics have denied that it is truthful. If we accept the testimony of Andrew Lang, who went prowling around Glencoe, the atmosphere is mostly a product of

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Macaulay's imagination, and we are left wondering whether Macaulay may not have had reasons other than an abstract devotion to truth for giving the clan of the Macdonalds and their glen a bad name.

With his characters, also, Macaulay took great pains. The portraits in the spacious gallery of his *History* may not all be good likenesses. Leslie Stephen said that Macaulay was fond of representing a man as a bundle of contradictions because this enabled him to obtain striking contrasts. Be this as it may, however, his portraits were based upon evidence obtained from research, even if the evidence was not always trustworthy. Macaulay, to be sure, had no gifts of psychological insight to enable him to unravel men's motives or read their hearts, but his characters are something more than the empty names we encounter in the pages of so many historians.

Macaulay, it should be remarked, did not resort to vicarious research. He had a sound appreciation of the value to the historian of delving into old journals and pamphlets for himself. It no more occurred to him to employ assistants to do his investigation for him than to hire ghost writers to write his *History*.

After the publication of the first two volumes of the *History* Macaulay, describing the work that lay ahead of him, wrote as follows in his journal, early in 1849:

> I will first set myself to know the whole subject; to get, by reading and travelling, a full acquaintance with William's reign. I reckon that it will take me eighteen months to do this. I must visit Holland, Belgium, Scotland, Ireland, France. The Dutch archives and French archives must be ransacked. I will see whether anything is to be got from other diplomatic collections. I must see Londonderry, the Boyne, Aghrim, Limerick, Kinsale, Namur again, Landen, Steinkirk. I must turn over hundreds, thousands, of pamphlets. Lambeth, the Bodleian and the other Oxford Libraries, the Devonshire Papers, the British Museum, must be explored, and notes made. And then I shall go to work.

The pith and marrow of this is in the last sentence. The historian's main work, as Macaulay conceived it, did not begin till his research had been completed. What Macaulay has to teach historians today, and what they can learn from him if they will,

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lies in the field of historical presentation. Any practiced writer, reading Macaulay, would perceive that he labored to attain clarity and to produce the effects he desired. The following extracts from his journal in 1850 leave us in no doubt about this:

> How little the all-important art of making meaning pellucid is studied now! Hardly any popular writer, except myself, thinks of it. Many seem to aim at being obscure.
>
> After breakfast I fell to work on the conspiracy of the Jacobites in 1690. This is a tough chapter. To make the narrative flow along as it ought, every part naturally springing from that which precedes,—to carry the reader backward and forward across St. George's Channel without distracting his attention,—is not easy. Yet it may be done. I believe that this art of transition is as important, or nearly so, to history, as the art of narration.
>
> My account of the Highlands is getting into tolerable shape. To-morrow I shall begin to transcribe again, and to polish. What trouble these few pages will have cost me! The great object is that, after all this trouble, they may read as if they had been spoken off, and may seem to flow as easily as table talk.

Macaulay understood the advantages of reading aloud as a means of improving the form of his writing. "He reads his works to us in the manuscript," his sister Margaret wrote in her journal, "and, when we find fault, as I very often do with his being too severe upon people, he takes it with the greatest kindness, and often alters what we do not like." When he was working on the second installment of his *History* he noted in his journal: "I read a portion of my History to Hannah and Trevelyan [her husband] with great effect. Hannah cried, and Trevelyan kept awake."

Freeman in his *Methods of Historical Study* paid a tribute to Macaulay as a writer which deserves to be quoted:

> I can see Macaulay's great and obvious faults as well as any man, I know as well as any man the cautions with which his brilliant pictures must be studied; but I cannot feel that I have any right to speak lightly of one to whom I owe so much in the matter of actual knowledge, and to whom I owe more than to any man as the master of historical narrative. Read a page of Macaulay;

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> scan well his minute accuracy in every name and phrase and title; contrast his English undefiled with the slipshod jargon which from our newspapers has run over into our books; dwell on the style which finds a fitting phrase in our own tongue to set forth every thought, the style which never uses a single word out of its true and honest meaning; turn the pages of the book in which no man ever read a sentence a second time because he failed to catch its meaning the first time, but in which all of us must have read many sentences a second or a twentieth time for the sheer pleasure of dwelling on the clearness, the combined fulness and terseness, on the just relation of every word to every other, on the happily chosen epithet, or the sharply pointed sarcasm.

Macaulay as a historian exhibited some traits which can hardly be reconciled with the austere ideals of historianship which he himself had voiced as a young man in his essay on history. One was his assurance and positiveness. Lord Melbourne, so it is told, once said that he wished he could be as cocksure about anything as Macaulay was about everything. That, it is true, was before Macaulay had become primarily a historian, and there is evidence that the cocksureness abated somewhat as the years passed by. But the old Adam in him was never entirely extinguished. Walter Bagehot, in a penetrating essay on Macaulay written toward the close of the latter's life, put this very well:

> Everything is too plain; all is clear, nothing is doubtful. . . . You rarely come across anything which is not decided. . . . This is hardly the style for history . . . it would have been a relief to the readers of Macaulay if he had shown a little the outside of uncertainties which there must be, the gradations of doubt which there ought to be, the singular accumulation of difficulties which must beset the extraction of a very easy narrative from very confused materials.

Bagehot was probably attributing his own feeling about history to the run of Macaulay's readers in thinking that they would have been better pleased if their author had dwelt more in the twilight of uncertainty. It is more likely that the brilliant sunlight of Macaulay's certainty swelled the ranks of his readers, that his garb of infallibility was one of the elements of his suc-

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cess. It would have been hard indeed to combine the doubts and cautions, the qualifications and tentativenesses, which Bagehot would have welcomed, with the style that made Macaulay the most popular of historians.

Macaulay used sources that had not been used by previous historians, and he had a much more extensive factual basis for the period he covered, especially for the reign of William III, than any of his predecessors. William's reign, as Firth observes, was comparatively untrodden ground, and it was here that Macaulay did his most original work and made his chief contribution. Many of the sources which he used for this period, including diplomatic correspondence in the French, Dutch and Spanish archives, had not been used for historical purposes before. There were, however, sources which for one reason or another, and sometimes for quite valid reasons, Macaulay did not use. Much material that is easily accessible to students of history today was not so to him. The publication of those great series of calendars of the British state papers, for example, had not yet been begun, and Macaulay did not make very extensive use of the original papers themselves, then preserved in the State Paper Office. The Historical Manuscripts Commission, with its massive array of volumes of reports on correspondence and papers in private libraries and family archives, was still in the future, and fuller acquaintance with contemporary private letters would have modified Macaulay's ideas on a number of matters. And of course Macaulay did not have the advantage of the many monographs and other secondary historical writings relating to the period of his *History* that have been published since his day. Yet he habitually wrote as if all the relevant evidence were before him. Again and again he was positive when he ought to have been tentative, definitive when he ought to have been provisional.

Nor did Macaulay invariably adhere to the highest standards for the ascertainment of historical truth. From the standpoint of the best critical historical scholarship of his day, as represented, let us say, by Ranke, he was often deficient. He did not always weigh his evidence with sufficient care, and, as Firth remarked, he was not always consistent in his estimate of the

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trustworthiness of sources, as when he deemed Jacobite pamphleteers undeserving of belief when they attacked William III but entitled to serious consideration when they attacked the Duke of Marlborough. Macaulay often pointed out defects, as well as merits, in authorities that he used, but he was not impartially critical. Firth was fully justified in saying that Macaulay's attitude toward his authorities was "a little too much that of the advocate who cross-examines hostile witnesses very severely, and tears their evidence to pieces, but is careful to ask no awkward questions of those who testify on behalf of his clients." Historians really ought not to have clients or heroes.

In a review of Macaulay's third and fourth volumes published in *Fraser's Magazine* (February 1856) Kemble did full justice to the extensiveness of Macaulay's researches and to the new evidence he had produced. He believed, however, that Macaulay had sometimes allowed himself to be deceived through failure to take a sufficiently critical attitude toward his authorities; and he called attention to what he regarded as some serious errors of omission. He concluded by emphasizing the paramount defect which, he declared, pervaded the volumes under review, namely, "the striving to exalt William at the expense of every one with whom he is brought into contact . . . the distortion of view which presents our foreign relations in so untrue a light, and, for the sake of displaying one giant, peoples all Europe with pigmies."

Macaulay was not successful in getting inside the minds of men from whose beliefs and ideals he differed. Active participation in party politics is not the best of apprenticeships for a historian, and, while Macaulay's partisanship diminished as he grew older, there is a sense in which he always remained a Whig of 1832. He never attained that catholicity of outlook that comes only to those who have questioned the accepted maxims of their day and class and party. Macaulay's mind was not easily accessible to new ideas and points of view. A conspicuous illustration of this is to be found in his attitude toward the literature of his own day. Contemporary English poetry, he wrote in 1836, had little attraction for him, and in 1850 he declared, also in a private letter, that the previous twenty-five years had produced hardly a volume that would be remembered in the year 1900.

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Few predictions could have been more infelicitous and none more indicative of a mind closed to the merits of contemporary developments in the literature of his own country. Who would guess from what Macaulay said that this quarter-century, which he found so destitute of great writing, gave to the world—to mention only a very few of its literary products—works that made Carlyle a celebrity, poems that established securely the fame of Tennyson, Dickens' *Pickwick Papers*, Thackeray's *Vanity Fair*, and Charlotte Brontë's *Jane Eyre?* Macaulay, as his nephew remarked,

> was not fond of new lights, unless they had been kindled at the ancient beacons; and he was apt to prefer a third-rate author, who had formed himself after some recognised model, to a man of high genius whose style and method were strikingly different from anything that had gone before. In books, as in people and places, he loved that, and that only, to which he had been accustomed from boyhood upwards. . . .

This lack of mental flexibility was probably related to Macaulay's habit of forming historical opinions on partial and insufficient evidence and adhering to them tenaciously thereafter, a practice which he had censured in his essay on history. Firth commented on this lack of open-mindedness in Macaulay and pronounced it to be a permanent source of weakness in him as a historian. " He formed an opinion about the character of a man from only part of the evidence, and having formed it he was unaffected by further evidence . . . he made the new evidence square with the preconceived opinion by any device which occurred to him."

Macaulay was not in sober fact the perfectly unchanging person depicted by Bagehot, yet Bagehot showed insight into Macaulay's psychology, the inexperiencing character of his mind, and it is easy to allow for some exaggeration:

> What he is, he was; and what he was, he is. He early attained a high development, but he has not increased it since; years have come, but they have whispered little. . . . He came into public life at an exciting season, he shared of course in that excitement, and the same excitement still quivers in his mind. . . . He is still the man of '32; from that era he looks on the past. . . . That was

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> the "fifth act" of the human race; the remainder of history is only an afterpiece. All this was very natural at the moment. . . . But the singularity is that he should retain the idea now; that years have brought no influence, experience no change. . . . It is the same on his peculiar topic—on India. Before he went there he made a speech on the subject. . . . It is difficult to fancy that so much vivid knowledge could be gained from books—from horrible Indian treatises. . . . Not forgetting or excepting the orations of Burke, it was perhaps as remarkable a speech as was ever made on India by an Englishman who had not been in India. Now he has been there he speaks no better,—rather worse; he spoke excellently without experience, he speaks no better with it.

Macaulay undoubtedly thought of himself as historically-minded. As has been said, he appreciated the importance of the historian's soaking himself in first-hand sources and thus transporting himself in spirit to the times of which he was treating. "After breakfast to the British Museum", he wrote in his journal while he was working on the second installment of his *History*. "I turned over three volumes of newspapers and tracts. . . . I found some curious things . . . but the chief advantage of these researches is that the mind is transported back a century and a half, and gets familiar with the ways of thinking, and with the habits, of a past generation." In a marginal comment in the beginning of his copy of Strype's *Life of Cranmer* he wrote: "I like his old-fashioned style. He writes like a man who lived with the people of an earlier age. He had thoroughly imbued himself with the spirit of the sixteenth century." Some critics of the first installment of the *History* had suggested that Macaulay had appealed to sentiments and prejudices of his own day. Macaulay himself denied this. He wrote in his journal, in October 1849:

> I have seen not less than six German reviews, all in the highest degree laudatory. This is a sufficient answer to those detractors who attribute the success of my book here to the skill with which I have addressed myself to mere local temporary feelings. I am conscious that I did not mean to address myself to such feelings, and that I wrote with a remote past, and a remote future, constantly in my mind.

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The implication seems to be that Macaulay recognized that preoccupation with the present on the part of a historian is a defect.

A confident belief in Progress seems to have been the keynote of Macaulay's philosophy of history. It is sounded at the beginning of the first chapter of the *History*, in the third paragraph:

> . . . the history of our country during the last hundred and sixty years is eminently the history of physical, of moral, and of intellectual improvement. Those who compare the age on which their lot has fallen with a golden age which exists only in their imagination may talk of degeneracy and decay: but no man who is correctly informed as to the past will be disposed to take a morose or desponding view of the present.

It is true that the writer of these words was the same person who in private expressed such unfavorable opinions of contemporary men of letters, who referred in his journal to " the general sterility, and miserably enervated state of literature," which sounds like talk of " degeneracy and decay " and a " desponding view of the present " in that phase of culture, the literary, which meant most to Macaulay. The general tone of the *History*, however, leaves no doubt that Macaulay thought of himself, and wished to be thought of, as an exponent of the doctrine of Progress.

At the beginning of his third chapter Macaulay emphasized the differences between the England of 1685 and the England of his own day. History, if it is executed in a spirit of historical-mindedness, will not exaggerate the similarities between past and present. On the contrary, it will, incidentally and implicitly, show differences as well as resemblances. But if, as in Macaulay's case, differences are always represented as redounding to the exaltation of the present and the disparagement of the past, the contrasts that are drawn do more harm than good, for they tend to obscure the principle of historical relativity, the principle, that is, that everything that existed in the past was relative to the conditions of its age and ought to be viewed in that context. Consider, for example, Macaulay's remarks about Bristol:

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> Pepys, who visited Bristol eight years after the Restoration, was struck by the splendor of the city. But his standard was not high, for he noted down as a wonder the circumstance that, in Bristol, a man might look round him and see nothing but houses. It seems that, in no other place with which he was acquainted, except London, did the buildings completely shut out the woods and fields. Large as Bristol might then appear, it occupied but a very small portion of the area on which it now stands.

Now the impression which the reader ought to get from the testimony of Pepys is that Bristol in the period of the Restoration was a large and splendid city—in relation, of course, to other English cities of that time. The fact that it would not seem large and splendid if compared with the great English cities of Macaulay's time has nothing to do with the case. Why, Bristol was actually so densely built up that one could not see the woods and fields for the buildings. Think of that! The testimony of Pepys throws a vivid ray of light upon what Maitland called the rusticity of old English towns. Macaulay, however, by his ill-advised comment, goes far to spoil Pepys's testimony for the modern reader. He casts discredit on Pepys's standard of municipal splendor for the (historically speaking) very bad reason that it was not Macaulay's standard, and he belittles the magnitude of Bristol in the seventeenth century because Bristol was still larger in the nineteenth century.

Exaltation of the present and depreciation of the past is not confined to Macaulay's third chapter, though this chapter contains more instances of it than any other. A reviewer of Macaulay's first two volumes, writing in *Blackwood's Magazine* (April 1849), did not greatly exaggerate when he declared that Macaulay's object was " to show that, in *every* respect, the present age is incomparably happier and more virtuous than those which have preceded it." In the opinion of one of Macaulay's biographers, J. Cotter Morison,[8] " Macaulay's constant preoccupation is not to explain his period by previous periods, but to show how vastly the period of which he treats has been outstripped by the period in which he lives. Whatever may be the topic . . . the comparison always made is with subsequent England, not previous England."

[8] *Macaulay*, in the English Men of Letters series.

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Yet Macaulay, I think, did not really disdain the past. His preoccupation with his *History* and aloofness from current events during his later years seem to show this. " Absorbed in his History," says Trevelyan, " he paid little attention to what was passing at Westminster." And Macaulay himself wrote in his journal in January 1855, when the second installment of the *History* was approaching completion and the Crimean War was raging: " Odd that here, within a few yards of all the bustle of politics, I should be as quiet as a hermit . . . buried in old pamphlets and broadsides; turning away from the miseries of Balaklava to the battle of Steinkirk. . . ."

Why, then, did Macaulay in his *History* so frequently draw, or suggest, contrasts between past and present so favorable to the present? Probably the desire to diminish social discontent had something to do with it. Macaulay knew, of course, about Chartism and other expressions of working-class unrest in his day, he knew about what Carlyle called " the-condition-of-England-question ", but his optimism, which remained unshaken, was strengthened by his historical studies. He believed that knowledge of the past made for content, not discontent, with the present. " It is, in some sense, unreasonable and ungrateful in us ", he wrote in the *History*, " to be constantly discontented with a condition which is constantly improving."

But perhaps Macaulay's habit of juxtaposing past and present was less the result of a belief in Progress or of a desire to lessen " present discontents " than a device to increase what would today be called " reader appeal ", like his use of analogy. Speaking of this latter, Firth says:

> The problem he had to solve, since he wished to secure the largest possible audience, was how to interest the mass of people who live entirely in the present and care nothing about the past for its own sake. What does interest such people is usually the politics of the day. Hence Macaulay never fails to refer to modern analogues to the seventeenth-century problems he is discussing.

He knew that his readers would be flattered to be informed by an eminent historian how superior they were to their seventeenth-century ancestors. It should not be forgotten that Macaulay's ruling passion as a historian was his eagerness to be read.

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How are we to account for the tremendous impression made by Macaulay's *History* and his other historical writings? It was from Macaulay that most of his countrymen derived, and perhaps still derive, directly or indirectly, their most abiding historical ideas. His influence upon the English-speaking world has been incalculable. Yet Macaulay had, it seems to me, qualities and points of view that were positive and serious disqualifications for writing history that intrinsically deserved to survive. He had strong biases which affected his handling of historical evidence, his treatment of historical events, and his estimate of historical characters; he was wanting in psychological insight; he was unduly eager to produce desired literary effects; he was given to dogmatic assertiveness; he was unable, too often, to overcome an anxiety to give the impression of being a specialist in omniscience; and he was too much disposed to view conditions of the past from the standpoint of middle-class Victorian complacency and self-satisfaction.

What, then, is the explanation of Macaulay's immense popularity? Perhaps the answer is not far to seek, after all.

Macaulay's *History* appeared at a moment that was most favorable for its success. The first two volumes, it will be remembered, were published in that year of European revolutions, 1848; and English readers could hardly fail to contrast the Glorious Revolution which their ancestors had enjoyed a hundred and sixty years before with the inglorious revolutions which foreigners were suffering at the time—to the great enhancement, of course, of English self-esteem and patriotic pride.

> All around us [Macaulay wrote] the world is convulsed by the agonies of great nations. Governments which lately seemed likely to stand during ages have been on a sudden shaken and overthrown. The proudest capitals of Western Europe have streamed with civil blood. . . . Meanwhile in our island the regular course of government has never been for a day interrupted. . . . And, if it be asked what has made us to differ from others, the answer is that we never lost what others are wildly and blindly seeking to regain. It is because we had a preserving revolution in the seventeenth century that we have not had a destroying revolution in the nineteenth. . . .

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In foreign countries, too, the success of the *History* was partly, if not principally, owing to the current interest in revolution, in the conflict between absolute monarchy and constitutional government of which the English Revolution of 1688 was an early instance.

More important, no doubt, than the timeliness of the *History* were Macaulay's literary gifts. If he was not on a level with the world's supreme literary figures, he was at any rate a first-class storyteller, with a sense for the pictorial and the dramatic such as no historian of England before him had possessed. His genius for narration was the most obvious factor in his popularity. He aroused the same kind of human interest in actual historical events that novelists aroused in fictitious events.

Macaulay was master of a style of perfect clarity, exceptional cogency, and metallic incisiveness and brilliancy. It is doubtful whether an obscure sentence could be found in all his writings. He knew how to say exactly what he meant to say, and what he meant to say his readers were glad to hear.

The great majority of them were members of the middle class, and he was thoroughly in harmony with them in his social and political outlook—" one of the middle-class crowd in his heart ", Morley called him. He confirmed their confidence in the progress of civilization in general and the beneficence of Victorian liberalism in particular.

And, finally, Macaulay never forgot his readers—which perhaps goes far to explain why readers have never forgotten him.

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REICHSWEHR AND NATIONAL SOCIALISM: THE POLICY OF WILHELM GROENER, 1928-1932

THE relationship between the *Reichswehr* and the National Socialist party has in recent years attracted the attention of many students of modern Germany. Since the end of the European war, interest has been directed primarily toward the last stages of that relationship: the growing resentment of high army officials against the domination of the army by the party, and the plots and conspiracies which culminated in the *attentat* of 20 July 1944. The material which has appeared in this connection in recent months is of the utmost historical importance; but, lest this late army resistance to Hitler be seen in false perspective, it is necessary always, as Friedrich Meinecke reminds us in his latest book, to recall the maxim *exercitus facit imperatorem.*[1] For the original success of Hitlerism, the army was in no small part responsible; the military putsches and the conspiracies of the war years were in the last analysis attempts to correct the consequences of the army's earlier attitude toward National Socialism.

The decisive period in the relations between the army and National Socialism was the period of the Bruening Cabinet from 1930 to 1932. It was in those years that the *Reichswehr* demonstrated its unwillingness to block Hitler's path to power; and it did so most emphatically when, in the early months of 1932, it cast off the one military representative who made a real attempt to oppose National Socialism—Wilhelm Groener, Bruening's *Reichsminister.* When the army chiefs forced Groener out of office after his dissolution of Hitler's Storm Troops, the *Völkischer Beobachter* noted quite correctly that this event was " the first decisive victory of National Socialist policy ", for it marked the beginning of the fatal effort of the *Reichswehr* to ally itself with the Hitler movement. The story of Groener's struggle to save the army from the domina-

[1] Friedrich Meinecke, *Die deutsche Katastrophe: Betrachtungen und Erinnerungen* (Wiesbaden, 1946), p. 76.

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tion of the party is an important part of the history of the *Reichswehr*'s rôle in the Weimar Republic; and the recent acquisition of part of the Groener Papers by the National Archives [2] makes it possible now to tell it in more detail than has been possible in the past.

I

Long before he became *Reichswehrminister,* Wilhelm Groener had performed major services for the army and the state; and in the confused days of November 1918 he had been called upon to make decisions which vitally affected the course of post-war Germany. As Ludendorff's successor to the post of First General Quartermaster, it had been Groener whose attitude had persuaded Wilhelm II to abandon any idea of armed opposition to the November Revolution. It was Groener who, on 10 November 1918, made the famous alliance between the army and the Ebert régime. And, in June 1919, it was Groener who exercised the decisive influence in preventing a hopeless resistance to the Allied peace terms, a resistance which might have involved Germany in all the horrors of foreign invasion and civil war.[3]

Groener's policy in 1918 and 1919 remained throughout his later career a subject of controversy and misunderstanding. Many of his fellow officers argued that the First General Quartermaster was an opportunist who had betrayed the emperor and the army in their hour of need.[4] Others assumed too easily that Groener's policy was actuated by republican conviction. In reality, dynastic loyalty and political partisanship had little in-

[2] These papers include a draft autobiography covering Groener's entire active army career before his resignation in 1919; memoranda for the periods 1918-1919 and 1930-1932; private and official correspondence; and several folders of miscellaneous essays and addresses. Of the private letters the most informative are those addressed to Major General Alarich von Gleich, a close personal friend. These cover the period 1930-1938 and, especially for the years 1930-1933, include valuable information on the course of domestic politics.

[3] Groener's own account of his policy in 1918-1919 will be found in his draft "Lebenserinnerungen" and in a confidential memorandum of 1 June 1922, both of which are now in the National Archives.

[4] This criticism followed Groener throughout his later career, although a military court of honor in 1922 cleared him of the charges of his more violent critics. See Maurice Baumont, *The Fall of the Kaiser* (New York, 1931), p. 237.

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fluence on Groener's course in 1918 and 1919. His policy was determined rather by considerations of *Staatsräson* beyond the comprehension of an officers' corps which, in the shock of military defeat and revolution, clung to feudal ideas of honor and loyalty to the crown. Rejecting these ideas as inapplicable to the critical state of national affairs, Groener was actuated by two simple but all-compelling convictions. He was determined, in the first place, that the thing that must and could be saved from the military collapse was the unity of the Reich. He was convinced, in the second place, that the army must be preserved as the protector of that unity, the guardian of national stability and development, and the source of "moral-spiritual strength" for future generations.[5] If these things were to be saved from the ruins, both the revolution of 9 November and the Allied peace terms would have to be accepted as *faits accomplis*.[6] At the cost of his own personal reputation in the officers' corps,[7] Groener effected their acceptance as such.

In connection with Groener's later career as *Reichswehrminister*, his policy in 1918 and 1919 is of the utmost importance, for it supplies the key to an understanding of his interpretation of the rôle of the army in the state and of his attitude toward National Socialism. Perhaps the most illuminating of his actions as First General Quartermaster was his agreement with Ebert on 10 November 1918, by which he promised army support to the Majority Socialists on condition that they devote their full energies to suppressing Bolshevism on the home front. The conditional nature of this offer revealed Groener's basic conviction that, in domestic politics, the army had the right to define the national interest and to dispose its forces accordingly.[8] Ebert's assent to Groener's terms tacitly confirmed that

[5] "Lebenserinnerungen", p. 646.

[6] E. Beckmann, *Der Dolchstossprozess in München* (Munich, 1925), pp. 109-111.

[7] Benoist-Mechin quotes a member of the Ehrhardt Brigade as saying: "None of us could stand Groener after June 1919." *Histoire de l'armée allemande* (Paris, 1936), II, 65. Groener recognized this and, once his policy had triumphed, retired from active service.

[8] "The officers' corps", Groener says in his "Lebenserinnerungen", "could only go along with a government which took up the fight against radicalism and Bolshevism." Commenting on the agreement of November 1918, Seeckt's biographer

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view and gave to the army, in the very first days of the republic, a position of virtual autonomy in the state.

In Groener's opinion, the special position claimed by the army in 1918 was justified, not only by the disorders consequent upon the November Revolution, but by the probability that the nation, once the Allies had imposed their peace terms, would enter a period of almost continuous internal crisis. As he looked to the future, he had grave fears. Life under the treaty would be hard for the German people and dangerous for the state. The inevitable economic dislocations caused by the terms of the peace would leave German youth, and the German people generally, restless, dissatisfied and susceptible to revolutionary agitation.[9] "Reason on the part of the masses [would be] a phantom and passions ... inflamed to their highest possible point."[10] The development of political parties, which Groener as a soldier distrusted, would merely reflect these passions and would be productive of factional strife which would be an omnipresent threat to national unity.

In such a future the army would have great responsibility. In an important lecture to the officers of the High Command in May 1919, Groener defined this clearly, pointing out that, while military recovery would be impossible for Germany for a long period, the main task of the army would be to make possible the future economic and moral regeneration of Germany by holding "the sixty million Germans together in one single state."[11] It must accomplish this, he believed, by standing like a *rocher de bronze* above all parties and factions, restraining their excesses and protecting the national state to

says: "Solange der Soldat sieht, dass noch zum Nutzen des ganzen Volkes gehandelt wird, wird man mit den Männern der augenblicklichen Gewalt zusammengehen. Wenn dies nicht mehr der Fall ist, wird man in angemessener Frist die Unterstützung aufsagen. Ebert muss wohl selbst den Zweifel gehabt haben, ob er überhaupt noch in der Lage war zu halten, was er zugesagt hat." F. v. Rabenau, *Seeckt: Aus seinem Leben, 1918-1936* (Leipzig, 1940), pp. 116-117.

[9] Groener's fears for the future were clearly expressed in a statement to the War Ministry in May 1919. Groener Papers: "Stellungsnahme des Ersten General-Quartiermeisters . . . bei der Besprechung im Kriegsministerium am 15. Mai 1919".

[10] Groener Correspondence: To Colonel Roddie, 10 June 1920.

[11] "Lebenserinnerungen", p. 684. See also K. F. Nowak, *Versailles* (Eng. trans., New York, 1929), pp. 280-281.

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which by its very nature it owed its devotion. Thus, it would be the one element of stability in a world of political flux.

Quite as important a function of the army of the future would be its rôle as educator of German youth; and it is doubtless Groener's views on this subject which have led Friedrich Meinecke, a close friend of Groener, to speak of him as being in the Scharnhorst-Boyen tradition.[12] In a meeting of the cabinet in April 1919, the First General Quartermaster had spoken enthusiastically of the importance of the army as a center for the physical and moral education of German youth;[13] and he obviously regarded the army as the indispensable agency for inculcating in a younger generation, made restless and rebellious by the deprivations of the treaty, those virtues of order, discipline and service which were essential to healthy state life. His official and private attempts to persuade the Allies to admit the principle of universal service in the military terms of the treaty [14] were influenced in part by his knowledge that, without such a concession, the educative rôle of the army would be seriously handicapped. But even after the Allies had insisted on a 100,000-man *Reichswehr* based upon twelve-year service, Groener continued to believe that the army, by the example it gave of selfless devotion to the state, would impress that ideal upon the minds of the youth of the future and thus contribute to the order and discipline of the nation. The army, as protector and educator, would be "the first servant of the state. . .the rock upon which the state is built." [15]

As his later career was to show, Groener maintained this idealized conception of the army to the end of his life. It was

[12] Meinecke, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

[13] Groener Papers: "Niederschrift über die Verhandlungen in der Sitzung des Reichsministeriums von 24. April 1919".

[14] In an attempt to convince the Americans of the advisability of supporting German desires for a large standing army based on universal service, Groener privately established relations with Colonel A. L. Conger, chief of the political section of GHQ at Trier. See "Lebenserinnerungen", pp. 671 *et seq.* He also sought to instruct Brockdorff Rantzau concerning the tactics best designed to win military concessions at Versailles. Groener Papers: "Besprechung mit Reichsminister Rantzau, 4. April 1919".

[15] Speech of 19 March 1931, quoted in H. Brauweiler, *Generäle in der deutschen Republik* (Berlin, 1932), p. 71.

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a conception which grew naturally from the military-bureaucratic nature of his political thinking and from his personal reluctance to commit himself exclusively to the democratic forces ruling Germany after 1918. Although he regarded the revolution of November 1918 as an accomplished fact, Groener never acquired any confidence in the parliamentary system it introduced or in the political parties which competed for ministerial power. Ideally, he believed that the new republic should be governed by professional administrators standing above parties. Since this ideal was apparently unattainable, he relied upon the army to protect the national interest and to prevent political excess and aberration.

It is clear, of course, that Groener's conception of the army's rôle never, after 1919, corresponded to political realities. Devotion to the state, which he insisted was the army's *raison d'être,* was after all an abstract, if not a meaningless, ideal; and, unless it were coupled with allegiance to the actual state form, it could be a dangerous ideal as well. Groener himself doubtless paid such allegiance; the bulk of the officers' corps did not, but regarded the republican régime as an ephemeral form of government which would one day be replaced.[16] The idea that the army would be an element of stability, firmly suppressing dissident groups in the nation, overlooked the fact that the officers' corps was potentially the most dangerous dissident group in Germany. In the new army, the dissatisfaction caused originally by the acceptance of the peace terms grew steadily as those terms were enforced and as the army was reduced to the stipulated size. Those officers who were forced to hand in their commissions and retire to civilian life became permanently disaffected; those fortunate enough to remain resented the slowness of promotion and the lack of opportunity afforded them. This resentment was expressed openly, if prematurely, in the Kapp *Putsch* of 1920; after the suppression of that rising, it took secret but more effective forms. The majority of the active officers remained contemptuous of the republic and its leaders, and they communicated this attitude to the troops under their command. Had the principle of universal short-term service been permitted by the Peace Treaty, this antirepublican indoc-

[16] See H. Rosinski, *The German Army* (Washington, 1944), p. 112.

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trination might not have been dangerous; in a small army of professional soldiers it became increasingly so.[17]

Finally, Groener's conception of *Ueberparteilichkeit*—the idea of an army standing above the parties—was jeopardized as soon as demagogues appeared who were shrewd enough to exploit the grievances of the army and to promise to correct them. In this connection, the officers' corps was always alarmingly susceptible to the arguments of groups which claimed to be "more national" than the republican parties,[18] a fact which may be explained in part by prevailing tendencies in military education in Weimar Germany. Certainly Seeckt's emphasis upon technical training at the expense of political education heightened the innate tendency of the army to think in terms of military expediency, while increasing the political naïvete of the junior officers of the *Reichswehr*.[19] This fact, as much as any, made Groener's ideal conception of the army impracticable and—as he was to discover when he sought to deal with the problem of National Socialism—constituted a grave source of danger to the state and to the *Reichswehr* itself.

II

Groener retired from active service at the end of 1919 and, in the years when Hans von Seeckt was reorganizing the *Reichswehr*, had no direct connection with the military administration. Between 1920 and 1923, he served the nation as *Reichsverkehrminister*, a post for which he was eminently qualified by his wartime service as Director of Field Railways; and in this position he actively promoted the unification of the German rail system.[20] After the fall of the Cuno government,

[17] Gustav Stresemann always maintained that the military clauses of the treaty were a fatal error which made the army "a kind of Praetorian guard divorced from and in opposition to the mass of the people." Viscount D'Abernon, *An Ambassador of Peace* (London, 1929-30), III, 56. See also Stresemann, *Vermächtnis*, ed. by H. Bernhard (Berlin, 1932-33), I, 218, 619-620.

[18] A *Reichswehr* colonel once said to Friedrich Meinecke: "Die Reichswehr wird immer da stehen wo die stärksten nationalen Belange sind." *Die deutsche Katastrophe*, pp. 68 *et seq.*

[19] See Rosinski, *op. cit.*, p. 112; Meinecke, *op. cit.*, pp. 64 *et seq.*

[20] See Brauweiler, *op. cit.*, p. 29. On the significance of his work in this position, see Godfrey Scheele, *The Weimar Republic: Overture to the Third Reich* (London, 1946), pp. 203, 315.

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he returned to private life and devoted himself to a series of critical works on the Marne campaign. From this retirement he was, however, withdrawn abruptly in 1928, when an investigation of the *Reichswehr* finances revealed such startling irregularities that the Reichstag forced the dismissal of the *Reichswehrminister,* Otto Gessler.

The appointment of Groener to the *Reichswehrministerium* was determined by two factors: the desire of the *Reichspräsident* for a professional soldier as Gessler's successor and the pronounced change in the political climate in Germany in 1928. President Hindenburg regarded the *Reichswehr* as his special preserve; he exercised much more direct authority over it than his predecessor;[21] and he had no love for civilians meddling in military affairs. That he would insist upon a soldier taking over Gessler's post was certain. His military advisers realized, however, that the selection of a new minister would have to be guided also by considerations of general politics. In the first months of 1928, it was apparent that a major shift in political power in Germany was imminent and that the long exclusion of the Social Democratic party from office was coming to an end. Debates in the Reichstag in January showed that the existing government coalition was in course of dissolution;[22] national elections were expected in the near future; and it was generally conceded that the Social Democrats would make sweeping gains and dominate the next government.

In the circumstances, it was necessary to appoint a *Reichswehrminister* who would be acceptable to the Social Democrats. This was all the more important in view of current *Reichswehr* armament plans. The military chiefs were intent upon winning Reichstag assent for the construction of a number of new heavy armored cruisers, which would give Germany mastery of the Baltic and thus enormously strengthen her defenses against Poland.[23] Violent opposition to such a program could

[21] The extension of the President's authority over the army was forecast by Hindenburg's general order to the *Reichswehr* on 28 January 1926: "Befehlsbefugnisse im Reichsheer". See Fhr. Marschall von Bieberstein, *Verfassungsrechtliche Reichsgesetze* (2nd ed., Mannheim, 1929), pp. 736 *et seq.*

[22] See, for instance, the note on the debate of 20-21 January in Cuno Horkenbach, *Das deutsche Reich von 1918 bis heute* (Berlin, 1930), p. 248.

[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 251, 262.

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be expected from the Social Democratic party, and a *Reichswehrminister* who did not inspire some respect in Socialist circles could hope for little success in promoting the necessary construction.

The *Reichswehr* officials who discussed the appointment with Hindenburg therefore urged the selection of Groener as a man whose war record qualified him for the post and who—by virtue of his reputation as a "democratic general"—would be least objectionable to the Socialists.[24] The calculation was a sound one. Groener was appointed at the end of January. Six months later, as a result of Socialist gains in national elections, the Marx government fell from office and a new coalition was formed by Hermann Mueller. No attempt was made, however, to challenge Groener's appointment and he was retained in the new ministry.[25]

In view of the circumstances governing his appointment, it is probably true that the new *Reichswehrminister* made the mistake of assuming that he had more personal authority in the *Reichswehr* than was actually the case. He knew, of course, that there were members of the officer caste who still resented the policy he had followed in 1918 and 1919 and that, in some circles, he was considered a "November criminal". But he tended to minimize this factor because of his confidence in his ability to work with the army chiefs. They were, he announced happily, "his friends, his old comrades, his colleagues";[26] they were, moreover, all men who had followed his leadership without hesitation in 1918 and 1919. Hindenburg,

[24] The full details of Groener's appointment are not yet known. According to John W. Wheeler-Bennett it was most actively promoted by Kurt von Schleicher, who canvassed the general officers on the advisability of appointing Groener and who, with the aid of Hindenburg's son, convinced the President that Groener was the best candidate. *Wooden Titan: Hindenburg in Twenty Years of German History* (New York, 1936), pp. 300-301.

[25] This might not have been true if Mueller had succeeded in building a cabinet on the basis of the original Weimar coalition. In order to retain the services of Stresemann as Foreign Minister, he was forced to attempt to revive the so-called "Great Coalition". Groener was perhaps the only *Reichswehrminister* acceptable to all supporters of the new government. On the formation of the cabinet see Horkenbach, *op. cit.*, pp. 255-256.

[26] Groener Correspondence: To Richard Bahr, 22 May 1932.

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his former chief at Spa, was now President of the Republic and Commander-in-Chief of the *Reichswehr*, and Groener confidently expected that the old marshal would follow his advice, in political affairs which affected the military, as he had done in the earlier period. The very fact that, in 1918 and 1919, Groener had assumed the responsibility for decisions which Hindenburg himself should have made seems to have strengthened the new *Reichswehrminister* in this rather unwise conclusion. As he told Heinrich Bruening on one occasion, he was convinced that "Hindenburg would always in the last instance follow his counsel, since he, in order to protect Hindenburg's renown, had sacrificed his own irreproachable reputation in the interest of the nation." [27] As for the other *Reichswehr* leaders, there seemed to be no question that they would defer to his political judgment. Heye, Seeckt's successor as *Chef der Heeresleitung*, had been on Groener's staff at Spa;[28] Hammerstein, who succeeded Heye in 1930, had also been junior to him in the service; and neither of these officers had pronounced political convictions of his own.[29] Finally, the strongest political influence among the general officers, General Kurt von Schleicher, had been one of Groener's closest personal friends since before the World War and was, indeed, considered by the new *Reichswehrminister* as his "adopted son".[30] Groener had a high opinion of Schleicher's political intelligence and, once he had taken over his post, he placed Schleicher at the head of the newly created *Ministeramt* of the *Reichswehr* Ministry, a political liaison body between the armed services on the one

[27] Heinrich Bruening, "Ein Brief", *Deutsche Rundschau* (July 1947), p. 3. Hindenburg greeted his new *Reichswehrminister* with cordiality and soon granted him the privilege of criticizing maneuvers, a concession which would never have been made to a pure civilian. See Brauweiler, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

[28] E. O. Volkmann, *Revolution über Deutschland* (Oldenburg, 1930), p. 58; Wheeler-Bennett, *op. cit.*, pp. 195, 199-200.

[29] Until April 1932, Groener generally spoke of Hammerstein with enthusiasm, although he often added that the *Chef der Heeresleitung* was incurably lazy. For other judgments, see Ulrich von Hassell, *Vom anderen Deutschland* (2nd ed., Zurich, 1946), p. 314; Bruening in *Deutsche Rundschau* (July 1947); and Wheeler-Bennett, *op. cit.*, p. 301 n.

[30] On Schleicher's early career, see K. Caro and W. Oehme, *Schleichers Aufstieg* (Berlin, 1933), and Rabenau, *op. cit.*, pp. 546-551.

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hand and the Reich ministries and the political parties on the other.[31] In this position, as Groener's "Cardinal *in politicis*",[32] Schleicher soon became indispensable to the new *Reichswehrminister,* but it seems clear that the latter always believed that Schleicher, in the last analysis, would recognize his superior authority in political matters.[33]

This confidence that the *Reichswehr* and its chiefs would follow his political leadership was not immediately challenged. It was only after he addressed himself to the problem of National Socialism that Groener had reason to doubt his earlier optimism.

During his first two years of office Groener does not seem to have concerned himself with the Hitler movement. The functions of the *Reichswehr* Ministry, embracing as it did both military and naval affairs, left him little time to think about a party which still seemed to be of minor importance. Moreover, his major task in this period was the securing of funds for the completion of *Panzerkreuzer A,* the first of the so-called "pocket battleships". On this issue, Socialist opposition to expenditure for armaments caused two major cabinet crises and led Groener, in November 1928, to threaten to resign his post if construction were delayed; and it was not until mid-1929 that the completion of the vessel—the future *Deutschland*—was finally assured.[34]

By that time, however, more serious issues confronted Germany. In the course of 1929, the solidarity of the Mueller Cabinet, never very strong, declined progressively; and the death of Stresemann in October loosened still further the ties

[31] Scheele (*op. cit.*, pp. 97-98) regards the *Ministeramt* as the first attempt in Germany to create an inter-service directive body and holds that it was the precursor of Hitler's O.K.W.

[32] The term is Hitler's own. Groener Correspondence: To General von Gleich, 4 January 1930.

[33] For Groener's views of the partnership, see Groener Correspondence: Walter Oehme to Groener, 12 January 1933, and the enclosed copy of a questionnaire which Groener had completed for the writer.

[34] Horkenbach, *op. cit.*, pp. 255-258, 260, 262, 273, 278. *Panzerkreuzer A* (the *Deutschland,* later the *Lützow*) was launched at Kiel on 19 May 1931.

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that had bound the government partners together. With the Social Democrats and the *Volkspartei* indulging in mutual recriminations, the cabinet was incapable of giving leadership to a nation now suffering from extreme economic depression. As unemployment figures began to mount, antirepublican movements received thousands of new adherents. The Communists became increasingly active on a national scale; while, in elections in Baden and Saxony, the National Socialists demonstrated that they were fast becoming a force of political consequence. Meanwhile the bitterness with which the Rightist parties conducted their campaign against the Young Plan revealed a new and ugly note in German politics.

To the *Reichswehrminister,* Germany at the end of 1929 seemed to be reverting to the chaos of 1918. In the circumstances, he felt compelled to warn the *Reichswehr* that it must be prepared to prevent a complete disintegration of the national unity. In January 1930, he issued a general order to the army, an order which is interesting, not only as a recapitulation of Groener's conception of the rôle of the army in the state, but also as his first open attack upon National Socialism.

Referring to the rapid growth and the apparent revolutionary intentions of both the Communists and the Nazis, the order stated flatly: "[The Nazis] are to be distinguished from the Communists only by the national base on which they take their footing." Greedy for power, " they therefore woo the *Wehrmacht.* In order to use it for the political aims of their party, they attempt to dazzle us . . . [with the idea that] the National Socialists alone represent the truly national idea." But, the order continued, the destruction of the present political system by either the Communists or the Nazis would be a disaster, for it would bring civil war in its train, " a catastrophe for state and economy." It is the responsibility of the *Reichswehr* to prevent such an eventuality.

> It is the sacred task of the *Wehrmacht* to prevent the cleavage between classes and parties from ever widening into suicidal civil war. In all times of need in the history of a people, there is one unshakable rock in the stormy sea: the idea of the state. The

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> *Wehrmacht* is its necessary and most characteristic expression. It has no other interest and no other task than service to the state. Therein lies the pride of the soldier and the best tradition of the past. . . . [The *Wehrmacht*] would falsify its essence and destroy itself if it descended into the party conflict and itself took party. To serve the state—far from all party politics to save and maintain it against the terrible pressure from without and the insane strife at home—is our only goal.[35]

The association of National Socialism with communism in this order is an interesting illustration of the way in which Groener identified the present situation with the crisis of 1918, when the army had been employed to fight Bolshevism. In this connection, his views were summed up in a conversation between one of his aides and the British Military Attaché in May 1930. "The trouble about the 'Brown Shirts'", this officer said, "is that their principles and theories are entirely *destructive*. They wish to destroy the present fabric of the State, but have no constructive program with which to replace it, except a form of mad-dog dictatorship. The movement is therefore, in the long run, far more akin to Bolshevism than to Fascism." [36]

At the same time, Groener realized clearly that, in the present state of Germany, National Socialism was a much more dangerous force than communism. The army would always defend the state against the Communists; of that, there was no doubt. But there had been moments in the past, in 1920 and 1923, in which the army had shown itself to be reluctant to oppose the aspirations of groups which claimed to represent the "national idea". And in 1930 Groener feared that, unless the *Reichswehr* leaders took a decided stand against National Socialism, the bulk of the officers' corps might be seduced from its allegiance to what he called the "idea of the state." That his fear was justified was demonstrated quite clearly by the so-called Leipzig Case, which stirred up such intense excitement in Germany in the latter part of the year.

[35] Groener Papers: "Reichswehrministerium, Erlass, 22. Januar 1930".

[36] *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, Second Series, edited by E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler (London, 1946), I, 478.

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In February 1930 three junior officers of the *Reichswehr* were arrested and charged with spreading National Socialist propaganda within the ranks of the army. Although he tried originally to treat this matter as a simple breach of discipline, the attitude of the officers compelled Groener in the end to have them tried before the *Reichsgericht* in Leipzig for high treason.[37] The trial, which was featured by Hitler's dramatic appearance as a witness, ended with the officers in question being sentenced to eighteen months' fortress detention. But the most instructive feature of the case was the volume of criticism directed against Groener by former high ranking military officials. Hindenburg's friend Oldenburg-Januschau, the former Major General Graf von der Goltz and Seeckt himself were particularly outspoken, the last-named accusing Groener of weakening the spirit of comradeship and solidarity within the officers' corps.[38] Groener defended himself energetically, pointing out that the essence of the officers' corps was its discipline and its *Ueberparteilichkeit*; and in a public letter to Goltz he made it clear that he would insist upon both qualities. "It must not", he wrote, "be party programs or resounding slogans drawn from them that determine the manner in which the *Reichswehr* serves the fatherland, but the will of the *Reichspräsident* and those higher leaders appointed by him."[39]

It was, however, precisely the attitude of those higher officers that concerned Groener after the Leipzig Case. He began to discern that the much-praised political neutrality which Seeckt had imposed upon the *Reichswehr* had been dangerous in its

[37] The background of the case was clearly outlined for all members of the *Reichswehr* in a number of orders prepared in the *Reichswehr Ministry*. Groener Papers: "Reichswehrministerium, Erlass (Geheim), 30. April 1930 (B. Nr. 295. WIII); Erlass, 6. Oktober 1930 (Nr. 3570. 30. WIA); Erlass, 20. Oktober (3700. 30. WI)".

[38] Oldenburg-Januschau's attack was delivered in the Reichstag on 18 October and was answered by Bruening. *Wolff's Pressebericht*, 20 October 1930. For Seeckt's attitude, see Rabenau, *op. cit.*, pp. 657, 663. In this period Groener grew increasingly critical of Seeckt and said that he expected to find him at any moment "walking arm in arm with Herr Goebbels". Groener Correspondence: To General von Gleich, 28 December 1930.

[39] Groener Correspondence: To General v. d. Goltz, 6 October 1930. See also Groener to Kammerherr von Oldenburg-Januschau, 21 October 1930.

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consequences.[40] When junior officers began, like the defendants at Leipzig, to criticize the *Reichswehr* leadership for its lack of patriotism, it was the duty of the commanding officers to correct those views, by giving them some idea of political and economic realities, by explaining the effort it had taken to build up the *Wehrmacht* to its present state and by revealing the logical weaknesses in National Socialist propaganda. Too many of the commanding officers, however, shunned all political discussion with their juniors, either because of lack of political knowledge or because they were afraid that, if they should defend the Weimar system, they would be considered "not national". "We must conclude from these events", Groener wrote, "that in the future we should appoint as leaders of the officers' corps only such persons as possess the courage of their convictions and sufficient spiritual authority to educate the youth of the present. . . ."[41]

This intimation that the officers' corps must at long last give an unequivocal sign of allegiance to the Weimar system was, in a sense, a reflection of Groener's own relationship to the civilian government which had taken office in March 1930—the government of Heinrich Bruening.

The Groener Papers currently available do not make entirely clear the part played by Groener in the negotiations leading to the formation of the Bruening government. It is apparent, however, that in the winter of 1929-1930, as the Mueller government tottered to its fall, he had become convinced that further attempts to form a coalition between the Social Democrats and the middle-class parties would be useless. Instead, he and his adviser Schleicher envisaged a radically new political combination, a cabinet composed of men unhampered by a

[40] Speaking of Seeckt's attitude toward his subordinates in political matters, Groener wrote: "er hat seinen Untergebenen Rätsel über seine eigene Ueberzeugung aufgegeben, und mancher davon wird gedacht haben, so etwas recht radikale Gesinnung ist geeignet beim Obersten Vorgesetzten gut Wetter zu machen trotz aller scharfen Befehlen, die er tatsächlich erlassen hat, die aber niemand ernst genommen hat." Nor had things improved under Heye, "weil der gute Onkel kein Kerl war und sich von den Leutnants auf der Nase herumtanzen liess." Groener Correspondence: To Gleich, 26 April 1931.

[41] Groener Papers: "Reichswehrministerium, Erlass (Geheim), 6. Oktober 1930 (Nr. 486. 30 g. WIa)".

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narrow conception of party loyalty, governing from the standpoint of the national interest alone and relying for its authority upon the support of the *Reichspräsident*.[42] Such a government, resorting whenever necessary to the use of emergency decrees, would be welcomed by a people bewildered by the bickering of the old parties. Groener and Schleicher were aware, of course, that the Reichstag could not be entirely ignored. For that very reason, they seem from the start to have favored the appointment of Bruening as chancellor; for Bruening would assure the coöperation of his own party, the Center, while his military record would commend him to the President and his sound fiscal views to the industrialists who controlled the *Volkspartei*. Aside from that, they seem to have calculated that a strong presidential government would appeal to important elements in the Nationalist party and might indeed free that party completely from the radical leadership of Hugenberg.[43] In the last analysis, they do not seem to have worried about difficulties in the Reichstag; if such developed, the new government could appeal to the nation.

The government projected by Groener and Schleicher during the winter months took actual form when Bruening assumed office in March 1930. From the start, Groener was enthusiastic about the new chancellor and was convinced that the solution to the national emergency had been found. In Bruening, he felt, the parties, whose quarrels had done so much to weaken national unity, had met their master. "He operates cleverly with the parties while keeping his real views hidden. His at-

[42] Groener Correspondence: To Gleich, 4 January 1930. In January Groener was thinking of a government which might include such men as the Nationalist rebels Treviranus and Lindeiner, Moldenhauer and Curtius of the *Volkspartei*, Bruening, and even the current chancellor Mueller, if he could be detached from his party. "I advised M. not long ago", he wrote to Gleich, "that he ought to bid his party farewell [*valet sagen*] in order to rise up to the position of a real statesman." That Schleicher was engaged in negotiations for the formation of the new combination is indicated by Groener's note that, during the Christmas vacation, "my Cardinal *in politics* . . . accomplished excellent work behind the *culisses* and prepared the ground for future development."

[43] In this connection, Groener and Schleicher strongly supported the policy of Treviranus, which was designed to break the power of "Hugendabel, the keyhole politician", and make the Nationalists *bündnisfähig*. See Groener Correspondence: To Gleich, 4 January, 21 July 1930.

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titude in parliament toward the babblers [*Quatschköpfe*] is nothing short of an aesthetic pleasure. I have concluded a firm alliance with him and, as long as the *Reichspräsident* goes along with us, we shall be through with the *Parlament* one way or another." [44] Germany at last had a civilian government which embodied those qualities of discipline and *Ueberparteilichkeit* which Groener felt so important in the army, and he became convinced that Germany's salvation depended on the new chancellor's retention of office. "Most of all," he wrote in April 1931, "I count on Bruening. . . .I have never known a statesman, chancellor, minister (or) general who combined in his head as much positive knowledge and political clarity and adaptability as Bruening." [45] To his old faith in the army as the true element of stability in the state, Groener now added a complete allegiance to Bruening, and he expected the *Reichswehr* to stand behind him in his support of the new government.

There seems to be no doubt that the *Reichswehr* would have supported the Bruening government if Hitler had been foolish enough, at any time in these years, to risk a *Putsch* on the order of his attempt in 1923. In a recent article, Bruening has written that he discussed the possibility of such a rising with the *Reichswehr* chiefs on several occasions and that they had complete plans for such an eventuality.[46] Groener himself was in no doubt concerning the willingness and the ability of the *Reichswehr* to smash a Hitler *Putsch*. "The *Reichswehr*", he said to Friedrich Meinecke, "will do what it is ordered to do, and *damit Basta!*";[47] and to his friend Gleich he predicted that, if Hitler should resort to force, he would encounter "the unqualified employment of the power resources [*Machtmittel*] of the state. The *Reichswehr* is so completely in our hands that it will never hesitate in this eventuality. Hammerstein is the man to strike with *brutality*, quite differently than Seeckt in 1923/24." [48]

[44] Groener Correspondence: To Gleich, 28 December 1930.

[45] Groener Correspondence: To Gleich, 26 April 1931.

[46] Bruening in *Deutsche Rundschau*, July 1947.

[47] Meinecke, *op. cit.*, pp. 68-69.

[48] Groener Correspondence: To Gleich, 26 January 1932.

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It soon became evident, however, that the decisive question would be not what attitude the *Reichswehr* would take if the Nazis grasped the initiative, but whether it would support an attempt on the part of the Bruening government to strike out at the Nazis. In the last months of 1930 and throughout the whole of 1931, it became increasingly apparent that the Bruening government would have to take some decision with regard to the National Socialist movement. The government had not developed the great resources of strength expected by its founders. When difficulties had appeared in the Reichstag it had appealed to the nation; but that appeal, in September 1930, had been a tragic miscalculation. The September elections made the National Socialist party the second strongest party in Germany, while leaving the government in a position of uncomfortable dependence upon the Social Democrats.[49] Now, while Bruening's policy of fulfillment became increasingly unpopular, the National Socialist party continued to grow in strength. As it did so, the excesses of its members increased, despite the professions of legality made by its leader; and the resort to violence was especially marked in the case of the *Sturm Abteilungen*, the party's private army and the backbone of its power.

III

It was the question of the S.A. which, by widening the breach between the *Reichswehr* and the civilian authorities, was to precipitate not only Groener's fall as *Reichswehrminister* but the collapse of the Bruening government as a whole. Yet on the surface there seemed to be no reason for differences between the army and the civilian leaders on this issue; for the S.A. was a source of danger to both. It was, for one thing, responsible for a good part of the disorders which characterized German life in the early 1930's. Quite apart from that, this irregular Nazi soldiery not only represented a menace to the state but threatened to be a military competitor of the *Reichswehr* it-

[49] The attempt to win over the Nationalists had failed miserably. After September 1930, the Bruening government could muster a majority in the Reichstag only so long as the Social Democrats supported them. See the election figures in Horkenbach, *op. cit.*, p. 319.

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self, a development which could be expected to arouse suspicion on the part of army leaders.

Groener himself dated the danger of the S.A. to state and *Reichswehr* from the appointment of Roehm as its commander at the beginning of 1931. Before that, the S.A. was a "relatively harmless affair"; after Roehm had begun to centralize the S.A. and improve its discipline and its coördination it became "increasingly unbearable." The S.A. became

> an absolute private army with all the signs of such an organization, which in all its parts was planned, articulated and organized in a fabulous manner and through a great propaganda was placed increasingly firmly into the hands of the Fuehrer. Thus the danger for the state became extraordinarily great, for despite all the declarations of legality . . . such an organization has its dynamic in itself and cannot simply be declared now legal and now illegal.[50]

There seems no reason to doubt that Groener, both as a soldier and as a member of the Bruening government, was firmly convinced from the beginning of 1931 of the necessity of removing this potential threat to the state, and that he regarded the dissolution of the S.A. by Reich decree as the best means of accomplishing this purpose. Yet throughout 1931, as the danger increased in intensity, he made no attempt to implement his conviction and, even after he had become Reich Minister of the Interior, he still postponed the decisive step.

For this delay there were two main reasons. The first was the legal question posed by any such project of dissolution. It would be extremely difficult to justify the dissolution of the S.A. by presidential decree, unless the decree equally proscribed organizations like the *Reichsbanner* and the *Stahlhelm*, which seemed to be similar in nature to the S.A. Groener knew perfectly well that, however great his influence with Hindenburg might be, it would not be easy to persuade the President to dissolve the *Stahlhelm*. When, in October 1929, the Prussian Minister of the Interior had issued a *Verbot* against the *Stahlhelm* because of illegal activities in the Rhineland, the *Reichspräsident* had intervened personally and had brought consider-

[50] Reichstag, *Stenographische Berichte, 62. Sitzung* (1932), pp. 2547 *et seq.* (10 May 1932).

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able pressure to bear against the Braun government.[51] The fact was—Groener admitted—that "the old man of the mountain. . .[was] the protector of the *Stahlhelm*"[52] and would resist any attack upon it.

The second reason for the delay was Groener's realization that a simple dissolution of the S.A. would not strike at the roots of the problem. Since the Leipzig affair the *Reichswehrminister* was aware that the S.A. was gradually winning support within the *Reichswehr* itself.[53] To some officers it was the living embodiment of Hitler's promise to give them a large army in which advancement would be more rapid. Others were impressed by the influence it was winning over German youth[54] and defended it on pedagogical grounds.[55] There were, moreover, many staff officers who regarded a war against Poland to regain the Corridor as inevitable and desirable,[56] and they naturally opposed the dissolution of a valuable auxiliary force. Groener was scornful of the ambitions of this last class. Writing in 1931, he described a Polish war as "a utopia", but added: "Unfortunately, strategy is a contagious disease which by preference affects heads which are not exactly filled with wisdom. . . .It has long been known that I make merry at the busy strategists. But *jedes Tierchen braucht sein Pläsierchen.*"[57] Groener knew that the planners would continue to

[51] Otto Braun, *Von Weimar bis Hitler* (New York, 1940), pp. 299 *et seq.*; Horkenbach, *op. cit.*, p. 289.

[52] Groener Correspondence: To Gleich, 1 November 1931. See also Bruening in *Deutsche Rundschau* (July 1947).

[53] Groener Correspondence: To Gleich, 21 September 1931.

[54] The British Military Attaché reported, after the elections of 1930, that the officers of the *Reichswehr* were deeply impressed by the growth of National Socialism. "It is the *Jugendbewegung*," they said, "it can't be stopped." Woodward and Butler, *op. cit.*, I, 512 n.

[55] Meinecke, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-71.

[56] See the statements of Blomberg and Blaskowitz during the Nuremberg trials. *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression* (Washington, 1947), VI, 414, 417.

[57] Groener Correspondence: To Gleich, 21 September 1931. Somewhat later Groener wrote: "Completely stupid rumors are continually circulating as if we could spirit aircraft out of the silk hat, and even instructors in the ordnance schools whisper mysteriously that Russia is crammed full of German tanks and other machines. Among us *sancta simplicitas* is not to be extirpated." To Gleich, 1 November 1931.

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plan and that all possible military resources, including the S.A., would figure in their calculations.

Determined as he was that the S.A. should be dissolved, the *Reichswehrminister* realized, therefore, that such action would arouse criticism even inside the army, unless it were accompanied by measures which would disarm the critics. Specifically, he felt that the state would have to find the means of performing the most practical of the functions now performed by the S.A. At the outset, this would involve remedying the situation that had been created by the Allies in 1919, increasing the size of the *Reichswehr* and basing it on the principle of universal service, so that the youth of Germany would turn to the army rather than to the Nazi organization. Before any action should be taken against the S.A., then, Groener and Bruening hoped to persuade the Powers to concede to Germany the right of supplementing the existing *Reichswehr* with a militia of some 200,000 men, recruited in accordance with the principle of universal service.[58] Quite apart from the effect this would have on soldiers who thought in terms of numbers, the creation of such a militia would, Groener believed, ease the domestic situation, by enabling the government to provide for "hundreds of thousands of young Germans whom the terrible unemployment leaves in the streets."[59]

As an alternative, or perhaps supplementary, plan Groener thought of bringing all existing semimilitary organizations directly under state control. This might be done, he thought, by forming a gigantic sport organization or *Wehrsportverband*. Primarily designed to advance the physical training of German youth, this organization too would have a political purpose. It would "alleviate differences and accustom the hostile *Verbände* to working together for the fatherland."[60] And it would, he hoped, offer more attractions to German youth than the Hitler organization.

Although the Bruening government in 1931 tentatively

[58] Meinecke, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-73.

[59] Interview in *Augsburger Postzeitung*, 20 October 1932.

[60] *Augsburger Postzeitung*, 20 October 1932. Meinecke says that Groener for a time considered placing this *Wehrsportverband* under the control of the *Stahlhelm*. (*Die deutsche Katastrophe*, p. 100.)

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drew up a decree directed against the semimilitary organizations,[61] nothing was done to put it into effect. Instead, the chancellor proceeded with what Groener called his *Spiel mit fünf Kugeln à la Bismarck*,[62] designed to secure, among other things, some concessions to Germany in the question of armaments. Feelers were put out to the British;[63] Bruening, in the course of his tour of the European capitals to discuss the reparations question, had an encouraging talk with Mussolini;[64] and Groener himself discussed Germany's legitimate military needs with the French ambassador.[65]

While these negotiations were proceeding, Groener was personally opposed to any action against the S.A. Officially, however, he soon found it difficult to maintain this attitude, for, in the reorganization of the cabinet in October 1931, he added the duties of Reich Minister of the Interior to those he already performed. Immediately, this duplication of function made Groener the object of criticism and pressure from the parties of the Right and the Left alike. Almost every step taken by him in his capacity of Minister of the Interior was described by opponents of the government—and by Groener's personal enemies within the *Reichswehr*—as a dangerous involvement of the army in party politics.[66] On the other hand, in his negotiations with the ministries of the *Länder*, Groener was subjected to increasing pressure from the Social Democratic government of Prussia, which demanded that action be taken against the S.A. on a national scale and which regarded

[61] Groener Correspondence: To Gleich, 1 November 1931.

[62] Groener Correspondence: To Gleich, 20 September 1931.

[63] See, for instance, Woodward and Butler, *op. cit.*, I, 556-557, 583 *et seq.*

[64] Groener Correspondence: To Gleich, 20 September 1931. "Br. und Mussolini haben sich anscheinend recht gut angenommen und gegenseitig an sich Gefallen gefunden." On Bruening's extensive tour of the capitals, see André Francois-Poncet, *Souvenirs d'une Ambassade à Berlin* (Paris, 1946), pp. 20 *et seq.*

[65] Groener Correspondence: To Gleich, 1 November 1931.

[66] When Groener assumed the functions of Reich Minister of Interior, the *Völkischer Beobachter* spoke darkly of a disguised "military dictatorship". That his assumption of the new post would arouse some criticism within the *Reichswehr*, Groener himself recognized. He wrote later that he had suggested that Schleicher become *Reichswehrminister* at this time, but that nothing had come of this. See the questionnaire cited in note 33.

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Groener's hesitation as proof that the *Reichswehr* was bent on protecting the Hitler movement.

Groener realized that failure to satisfy the Social Democrats might endanger the cabinet, which was, after all, maintained in office by Socialist tolerance. Nevertheless, he continued to oppose action that might compromise Bruening's international discussions. His chief duty in his new post, he wrote, was that of "covering . . . [Bruening's] rear in internal affairs, so that he has freedom for negotiations abroad."[67] On 18 November, in a long instruction to Zweigert, his State Secretary in the Ministry of the Interior, Groener specifically disclaimed any intention of using new police measures against the S.A. Instead, he spoke of a new spiritual and moral offensive against disturbers of the peace. "The *Reichsinnenminister* must no longer merely sit in a room, busied with documents and bureaucratic labors. He must go out before the people and speak to them without an intermediary." To facilitate this approach, he ordered Zweigert to set up a new unit in the ministry, "if I may use the customary military expression—a little Operations Section", which would map a radio and press propaganda program, gather statistics on breaches of the peace and prepare daily reports for the minister.[68]

Beyond this, however, Groener was not prepared to go. Thus, in December, when representatives of the Information Bureaus of the *Länder* met in conference at the Ministry of the Interior to discuss the Nazi problem, they were actually forced to listen to a report which expressed confidence in Hitler's intentions of holding to the ways of legality and in his sincerity in attempting to keep his party hotheads under control and which insinuated that any action against the party or the S.A. might cause worse ills to descend on the country. The Prussian representative protested hotly against this report and complained about the ministry's curious reluctance to offend the National Socialists; and the conference ended with most representatives agreed that the Reich government was demonstrating an inadequate grasp of the situation.[69]

[67] Groener Correspondence: To Gleich, 1 November 1931.

[68] Groener Correspondence: To Zweigert, 18 November 1931.

[69] Groener Papers: "Vortrag, Konferenz der Nachrichtenstellen der Länder in dem Reichsinnenministerium, 14. Dezember 1931".

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However disturbed he may have been by these protests, Groener persisted in his passive policy. He was encouraged in this by Schleicher who, already involved in negotiations with the Nazis to an extent unsuspected by his chief, held that the time had not come for action and who dismissed the complaints of the *Länder* as a Social Democratic plot to compromise Groener politically.[70] Moreover, a new factor had by this time to be considered in formulating plans of action. It was clear by the end of the year that Bruening could hope for no striking foreign success, at least until the late spring. Yet Hindenburg's term of office would expire in March and the new elections would certainly involve the nation in widespread disorders and might very well bring Hitler to power. Bruening hoped to avoid both contingencies by eliminating the elections and securing the assent of the parties to a prolongation of the presidential term. Since this would necessitate negotiations with Hitler, it was plainly inadvisable to resort to any action which might persuade him to veto the projected plan. "If our plan succeeds," Groener wrote, "it will be a great victory for the chancellor; but very delicate manipulation [*ein sehr feines Spiel*] is necessary in order, at home and abroad, to join the different pieces of weaving into the proper pattern and in order to prevent any disturbance."[71]

Groener seems to have expected Hitler to agree without too much difficulty to the planned prolongation of Hindenburg's term. In his estimation of the Fuehrer he was no wiser than many other German leaders of this period. He was amused at Hitler's habit of becoming completely drunk with words;[72] but at the same time regarded him as a man seriously worried by the demands of the radicals in his party. A note in one of his papers describes Hitler as a "modest, orderly man who

[70] As late as March 1932 Schleicher was speaking of the Nazis as a necessary counterweight to the Socialists and was writing that if there were no Nazis, "it would be necessary to invent them." Groener Correspondence: Schleicher to Groener, 25 March 1932.

[71] Groener Correspondence: To Gleich, *Christfest*, 1931.

[72] "Sachlichen Gesprächen weicht er aus und phantasiert gleich wieder durch alle Jahrhunderte der Geschichte. Er redet sich wie in einem Trance-Zustand mit weltverlorenem Blick, dann gehts los mit einem Sturzfall von Wortenphrasen und Bilder, ohne Komma and Punkt, bis er total erschöpft sich ausgegeben hat." To Gleich, 24 January 1932.

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wishes for the best." [73] When, therefore, after a series of talks in which Bruening, Groener, Schleicher and Hitler participated in early January, the Fuehrer refused to agree to the constitutional prolongation and took refuge in the argument that it would be a breach of the constitution,[74] the *Reichswehrminister* was rudely surprised and considerably cast down. "Our defeat in the question of the presidential elections", he wrote to his friend Gleich, "is *very bad*, and we must now do everything possible in order to secure Bruening's position. For he *must* remain. I fight for that for official and personal reasons."[75] And at the end of January, calculating that Hindenburg could hope at best for thirty-five per cent of the total vote in new elections, he gloomily admitted that Hitler might very well win the presidential office.[76]

Even in his most pessimistic moments, however, Groener did not lose his determination to dissolve the S.A., and the possibility of an eventual Hitler victory in Germany strengthened his feeling that the *Reichswehr* must be secured against this formidable military competitor before such victory was consummated. He made no attempt to hide his views from the Nazis. Indeed, in January, while warning Hitler not to depart from the ways of legality, the *Reichswehrminister* openly expressed his disapproval of the S.A. "The *Wehrmacht* is the highest institution in the state," he said; and it would not be replaced or even influenced by nonprofessional military organizations. The government intended at a later date to enlarge the army by a militia and absorb the best elements of the various semi-military organizations. But if Hitler dreamed of subordinating the army to his own militia, as had happened in Italy, he had better revise his views.[77] In March, when visited by Goering

[73] Groener Papers: "Auszug aus Führerbesprechung im Reichswehrministerium, 11. Januar 1932".

[74] On the January conversations, see J. Goebbels, *My Part in Germany's Fight* (London, 1935), pp. 15 *et seq.*; Wheeler-Bennett, *op. cit.*, pp. 352 *et seq.*; R. T. Clark, *The Fall of the German Republic* (London, 1935), pp. 343 *et seq.*

[75] Groener Correspondence: To Gleich, 24 January 1932.

[76] Groener Correspondence: To Gleich, 26 January 1932.

[77] Groener Papers: "Auszug aus Führerbesprechung im Reichswehrministerium, 11. Januar 1932".

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and Frank, Groener repeated these views and said that he intended to absorb the S.A.;[78] and Hitler's strong showing in the elections of that month seems to have strengthened rather than weakened his determination.[79] Still he delayed action month after month, hoping for the elusive victory abroad which would rehabilitate the government and give added weight to his action. "Really," he wrote at the beginning of April, ". . .[Bruening] should win some successes soon in the sphere of foreign and economic policy. *Darin liegt meines Erachtens des Pudels Kern.*" [80]

IV

At this juncture of affairs, however, Groener was forced into action by a new turn of events. In the last days before the March elections, a series of raids by the Prussian police upon Nazi headquarters had led to the capture of papers which seemed to be plans for a seizure of power by the S.A. in the event of a Hitler victory at the polls.[81] Groener himself doubted the genuineness of these discoveries, pointing out that, if the Nazis had such plans, they would not be so stupid as to entrust copies to local headquarters.[82] But the discoveries made by Severing's police were sufficiently alarming to increase the desire of the *Länderregierungen* for action, and in the first week of April the Bavarian government requested a meeting of representatives of the *Länder* to discuss the coördination of security measures in the forthcoming run-off elections.

This meeting was held at the *Reichsinnenministerium* on 5 April and was decisive in determining Groener's attitude toward the S.A. Led by the Prussian and Bavarian representatives,

[78] *Augsburger Postzeitung*, 20 October 1932. See also the altercation between Groener and Goering in the Reichstag on 10 May. Reichstag, *Stenographische Berichte, 62. Sitzung* (1932), pp. 2543 *et seq.* Groener claimed to have warned Goering that "es gibt keine Wehrmacht, es gibt kein Parteiheer, es gibt keine derartige Organisation, die nicht in der Hand des Staates ist."

[79] Groener Correspondence: To Gleich, 2 April 1932.

[80] Groener Correspondence: To Gleich, 2 April 1932.

[81] Braun, *op. cit.*, p. 381; K. Heiden, *Der Fuehrer* (New York, 1944), p. 447; Francois-Poncet, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-40.

[82] Groener Correspondence: To Gleich, 6 April 1932.

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the majority of the meeting confronted Groener with what was in effect an ultimatum. Sharply criticizing the lack of leadership shown by the *Reichsinnenministerium*, they insisted that immediate action be taken to remove the threat of the Storm Troops; and they hinted strongly that, unless the Reich government took the initiative, they would proceed against the S.A. separately.[83]

This threat was effective for two reasons. In the first place, as Groener said later, if the states proceeded separately against the S.A., "then, in this serious question, a heterogeneous legal situation would be produced within the area of the Reich, a situation clearly unbearable for the authority of the Reich and the cause of order."[84] In the second place, it was clear to Groener that failure to act now would involve the loss of Social Democratic support, and that that would weaken the Bruening government fatally. Although he wrote to Bruening that party considerations need not influence the government, and that the decision with regard to the S.A. must be taken "solely on the basis of *Staatsräson*",[85] Groener was aware that the party which had acquiesced in Bruening's tenure of power would no longer endure a passive policy on the part of the government. At the conclusion of the meeting on the 5th, therefore, he assured the *Länder* delegates that he was fully prepared to use the most extreme measures against the Nazis and that he would urge the chancellor and the President to agree to a dissolution of the S.A. and S.S. by emergency decree, to be issued immediately after the conclusion of the elections.

Once that promise was given, Groener went vigorously to his task, as if relieved to have his previous reasons for delay overruled. And, at the outset, his own enthusiasm was equaled by that of the army chiefs. In a meeting in the *Reichswehr* Ministry on 8 April, at which the pending action was discussed, Hammerstein announced his eagerness to support the proposed dissolution in the most uncompromising terms and Groener was gratified by the "complete agreement between me and the

[83] Groener Correspondence: To Bruening (draft), 10 April 1932.

[84] Interview in *Augsburger Postzeitung*, 20 October 1932.

[85] Groener Correspondence: To Bruening (draft), 10 April 1932.

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generals." [86] On the same afternoon, in a telephone conversation with *Staatssekretär* Pünder, Chief of the *Reichskanzlei*, Schleicher not only supported the projected S.A. prohibition but tended to assume complete responsibility for it, saying proudly that, while he had hitherto counseled Groener to delay action against the S.A., he was now convinced that the psychological moment had arrived.[87]

In view of the attitude of the army chiefs, Groener may be excused for not being seriously concerned when, on the morning of 9 April, Schleicher suddenly suggested a new procedure for dealing with the S.A. Direct dissolution of the S.A., without warning, might, he argued, enable Hitler to pose as a martyr before the country. Would it not be more effective for the Minister of the Interior publicly to outline the abuses of the S.A. and to insist that Hitler make his organization conform to a given set of conditions within a definite period of time? If Hitler complied, his position in the country and in his own party would be seriously weakened. If he refused to comply, the government could proceed to put a decree of dissolution into effect.

In this suggestion, Groener discerned no fundamental change in his aide's attitude. He assumed merely that, for direct action, Schleicher preferred to substitute "a tactical feint, in keeping with his manner of thinking." [88] Groener himself had little liking for the method advocated by Schleicher. It would merely, he thought, give Hitler a chance to write insulting replies to the Minister of the Interior, and it would lower the dignity of the government.[89] Nevertheless he was willing to have the method discussed. Schleicher's plan was, indeed, given a full hearing after Bruening's return to Berlin on 10 April, the date of Hindenburg's definitive victory at the polls.

[86] Groener Papers: "Chronologische Darstellung der Vorkommnisse, die zu meinem Rücktritt als Reichswehr- und Reichsinnenminister geführt haben", October 1932.

[87] Groener Papers: "Memorandum vom Staatssekretär der Reichskanzlei, 30. Mai 1932". Correspondence: To Gleich, 18 June 1932.

[88] Groener Papers: "Chronologische Darstellung".

[89] Groener Papers: "Chronologische Darstellung". Correspondence: To Bruening (draft), 10 April.

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In a meeting at the *Reichskanzlei,* in which the military chiefs, the chancellor, the Minister of Justice, and State Secretaries Meissner, Zweigert and Pünder participated, Schleicher argued his case, but failed to convince the group. Bruening associated himself firmly with Groener's plan for immediate dissolution of the S.A., stating that his recent election tour had convinced him that such action was imperative. At the end of the meeting it was decided that the chancellor would go to the President on the following morning and procure his assent for the necessary emergency decree.[90]

Here again Groener expected no difficulties. He had already discussed the S.A. question with President Hindenburg on 9 April and come away with the impression that the President was ready to sign a decree of dissolution. Meissner, of the President's entourage, had assured him on 10 April that the President would not hesitate to sign such a decree.[91] Nevertheless, as the government proceeded with its plans, Hindenburg's behavior became alarmingly erratic. On the morning of 11 April, he promised to sign the necessary emergency legislation. Later in the same day, however, he abruptly reversed this decision, apparently on the advice of his son; and it was necessary on 12 April for Bruening and Groener to go to him and recapitulate all of the arguments which made the prohibition necessary. After Groener had promised to assume full responsibility before the Reichstag and the public for the action to be taken, Hindenburg promised his assent.[92] After that had been procured, events moved swiftly. On the 13th, the full cabinet approved the decree of prohibition and on the following day it was promulgated throughout the Reich.

Whatever doubts Groener might have had in the past about the political expediency of the prohibition of Hitler's military organization, he had never doubted that such prohibition would be in the best interests of the *Reichswehr.* Despite all of

[90] Groener Papers: "Memorandum vom Staatssekretär der Reichskanzlei, 30. Mai 1932". Bruening has written recently (*Deutsche Rundschau,* July 1947) that he privately considered the dissolution premature. In April 1932, however, he seems to have supported Groener without hesitation.

[91] Groener Papers: "Chronologische Darstellung".

[92] Groener Correspondence: To Gleich, 25 April 1932.

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Hitler's assurances, the Hitler troops represented a threat to state security; and responsible *Reichswehr* leaders would, he thought, recognize that "the spook of the SA" must be removed.[93] Yet, at the very moment when that removal was made possible, Groener discovered to his shocked surprise that the *Reichswehr* leaders no longer supported his policy, and, worse, that his most trusted colleague, Schleicher, had set out deliberately to sabotage it.

On the day following the promulgation of the decree of prohibition, Schleicher came to Groener with the alarming news that a storm of disapproval was sweeping through the *Reichswehr* Ministry and the army as a whole. Disaffection was so pronounced, Schleicher announced, that it was apparent that the *Reichswehr* was not prepared to accept the decree, and he had grave fears for Groener's continued tenure as *Reichswehrminister*. Groener pointed out that it was not the right of the *Reichswehr* to oppose any act of state; it had merely to obey; but—as he wrote later—Schleicher "would not admit that my objection was valid."[94]

Groener was already the recipient of an angry letter from the Crown Prince, deploring the decree;[95] and he expected similar criticism from retired army officers who were attracted by Hitler's promises to increase Germany's military strength. But disaffection within the active ranks of the *Reichswehr* was something which could be prevented by the army chiefs themselves. As Groener wrote later, there was no agitation within the navy, for the simple reason that Admiral Raeder forbade any open criticism of the government's action.[96]

It soon became evident, however, that Schleicher and Hammerstein were not anxious to stamp out criticism. Ever since the defeat of his own plan for dealing with the S.A., Schleicher's conduct had been, to say the least ambiguous. When

[93] Groener Correspondence: To Gleich, 25 April 1932.

[94] Groener Papers: "Chronologische Darstellung".

[95] Groener Correspondence: Crown Prince to Groener, 14 April 1932. The Crown Prince expressed his surprise and dismay that Groener should destroy "das wundervolle Menschenmaterial, das in der SA und SS vereinigt ist und das dort eine wertvolle Erziehung geniesst."

[96] Groener Correspondence: To Gleich, 22 May 1932.

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Oskar Hindenburg had come to him on 11 April to express his concern over the pending prohibitory decree, Schleicher had said that he himself was "completely disinterested" in the S.A. question, a curious statement from one who had been so enthusiastic about dissolving the S.A. only three days earlier.[97] And now an even more questionable maneuver of Schleicher's became apparent. On 16 April Groener received from Hindenburg an irritable letter, published simultaneously in the press, complaining about the suspicious and possibly treasonable activities of the *Reichsbanner*. Coming as it did so soon after the prohibition of the S.A., this could only be regarded as a criticism of the government's policy. Aside from this, the flimsy evidence that Hindenburg cited to justify his strictures of the *Reichsbanner* Groener recognized as emanating from the files of the *Wehrmachtabteilung* of the *Reichswehr* Ministry, a section immediately under Schleicher's supervision; and further investigation disclosed that, contrary to all ministerial procedure, they had been transmitted to the President by Hammerstein.[98]

Because of his long friendship with Schleicher, Groener was reluctant to accept even this evidence of Schleicher's double game; but he was seriously worried by what appeared to be a growing antagonism between the civilian government and the *Reichswehr*. On the 17th, therefore, he suggested to Schleicher that he, Schleicher and Hammerstein, with their wives, should dine together in "one of the big hotels" as a kind of public gesture of harmony and that at the same time Schleicher should send an order to all army commands putting an end to false rumors. Schleicher appeared to agree with this, but never referred to it again; and Groener was forced reluctantly to conclude that the army chiefs had no desire publicly to support the policies of their own minister.[99]

Indeed, in the next weeks, a malicious undercover campaign was waged against Groener in the *Reichswehr* Ministry itself. Charges that he had gone over to the Social Democrats, even

[97] Groener Papers: "Chronologische Darstellung".

[98] Groener Correspondence. To Gleich, 25 April 1932.

[99] Groener Papers: "Chronologische Darstellung".

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to the extent of becoming a doctrinaire pacifist, were freely bandied about.[100] His second marriage was described as *unstandesgemäss* and much capital was made of the unfortunately premature birth of his child.[101] Feelers were put out to Admiral Raeder to secure his assent for a joint request on the part of the army and navy commands for Groener's dismissal.[102] Attempts were made even to alienate his personal adjutants, although these, like the approach to Raeder, failed.[103] Against this whispering campaign Groener had only one recourse, to go to the President and demand the dismissal of Schleicher and Hammerstein. This he refused to do for fear it would lead to a conflict which would precipitate the fall of Bruening at the very moment when his foreign negotiations showed promise of fruition.[104]

Groener's position became completely insupportable, however, at the beginning of May. On 10 May, in the Reichstag, his dissolution of the S.A. was subjected to a scathing criticism by Hermann Goering, in a speech in which the Nazi leader openly appealed to the *Reichswehr* against its civilian chief. Groener's answer was delivered to the accompaniment of an almost uninterrupted howl of abuse from the Nazi benches, a circumstance which deprived him of his customary aplomb and led him into an unwise attempt to answer his many hecklers.[105] The impression left by his speech was an unfortunate one; but, as one observer pointed out, the whole session of the Reichstag had the appearance of being staged. It seemed almost as if the Nazis were ordered to provoke Groener into indiscretions and " in this way to give the generals a suitable excuse " for urging his retirement.[106] Some validity is given to this conclusion by the fact that, immediately after the Reichstag session, a

[100] Groener Correspondence: To Gleich, 21 December 1932.

[101] Braun, *op. cit.*, p. 384.

[102] Groener Papers: " Chronologische Darstellung ". Correspondence: To Richard Bahr, 22 May 1932; To Gleich, 22 May 1932.

[103] See questionnaire cited in note 33.

[104] Groener Correspondence: To Gleich, 22 May 1932.

[105] Reichstag, *Stenographische Berichte, 62. Sitzung* (1932), pp. 2537 *et seq.*

[106] Georg Decker in *Die Gesellschaft* (June 1932), pp. 465-466.

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rumor that Groener was seriously ill was circulated in Berlin; and Schleicher blandly suggested to him that he ought to apply for sick leave.[107] The *Reichswehrminister* refused, but it was clear to him that his continued tenure in office would be a source of embarrassment to Bruening. On 13 May, after consulting the chancellor, he resigned his office.

By sacrificing himself, Groener hoped to prolong Bruening's term, but he was clear-sighted enough to recognize that there was now little chance of this. He remembered that Schleicher, once so enthusiastic about Bruening, had been suspiciously cool toward him since the previous winter.[108] He recalled that Hindenburg had of late been given to grumbling about the chancellor. "The old man", Groener wrote angrily in the first days after his resignation, "has become difficult, as became apparent in the question of the S.A. prohibition. *He*, the old one, has, curtly and without any feeling of shame, let me go, and, as things stand, he will act no differently toward Bruening. . . ."[109] It was a sound prophecy. At the end of May, Bruening was dismissed as unceremoniously as his *Reichswehrminister*.

There was no doubt in Groener's mind that the *spiritus rector* of the plot which had overthrown the government was Schleicher, and he never completely forgave Schleicher for the double game he had played since April. In November 1932, answering a letter in which Schleicher sought a reconciliation, Groener wrote: "Scorn and rage boil in me, because I have been deceived by you, my old friend, disciple, adopted son, my hope for people and fatherland."[110]

At the same time, as he reviewed the events of the last months, Groener was unable to discern the reasons behind Schleicher's conduct. In his personal correspondence in the

[107] Groener Correspondence: To Gleich, 18 June 1932.

[108] Groener Correspondence. To the Editor of the *Münchener Neuesten Nachrichten*, 5 August 1932.

[109] Groener Correspondence: To Gleich, 22 May 1932.

[110] Groener Correspondence: To Schleicher, 29 November 1932. A reconciliation was, however, effected in the latter part of 1933.

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latter half of 1932, he repeatedly expressed his bewilderment concerning Schleicher's intentions. It was understandable that Schleicher should wish to overthrow Bruening in order to take power himself; but Schleicher, after all, did not assume Bruening's post, and only with great reluctance did he consent to act as *Reichswehrminister* in the Papen Cabinet. "What", Groener asked, "is one to make of a man who will not become chancellor?" [111] Was Schleicher biding his time until he could effect a monarchical restoration? His relations with the Crown Prince were, to say the least, suspicious.[112] Or was he waiting to institute a dictatorship of the *Reichswehr*?

Groener remembered that Schleicher had often talked of abolishing the Reichstag and ruling the country with the support of the *Reichswehr*.[113] If that was his ultimate intention, however, why had he opposed the prohibition of the S.A., a dangerous counterweight to the *Reichswehr*; and why, under Papen, did he favor the revocation of the S.A. decree? It was apparent now that Schleicher's relations with the Nazis were much closer than Groener had realized; but, was he reconstituting the S.A. in order to win Hitler's support or in order, through his apparently close liaison with Roehm, to seduce the S.A. from its allegiance to the Fuehrer? On the whole, Groener inclined to the latter view. "Schleicher", he wrote, "relies upon his adroitness to lead the Nazis about by the nose. . . . His plans, which he naturally no longer confides to me, are really impenetrable, but perhaps the Nazis are even more adept than he in the uses of cunning and false representation [*Lügenbeutelei*]." [114] Perhaps after all it is true that "*er glaubt zu schieben, doch er wird geschoben.*" [115]

Whatever the purpose of Schleicher's policy, Groener was certain that its application would be disastrous for the *Reichswehr*. Schleicher had not only destroyed the Bruening government; he had also made a mockery of Groener's conception of

[111] Groener Correspondence: To Gleich, 22 May 1932.

[112] *Ibid.*, 18 June 1932.

[113] *Ibid.*, 22 May 1932.

[114] *Ibid.*, 22 May 1932.

[115] *Ibid.*, 18 June 1932.

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an army standing above party strife, devoted to the national cause. Thanks to Schleicher—and to Hammerstein, "the unpolitical soldier [who] follows his friend Schleicher like a well trained hound"[116]—"the *Wehrmacht*, after I had pulled it out of the political muck, has been thrust back into the swamp of politics again. . . .To draw it out once more will not be exactly easy, because there are parties who lay claim to the *Wehrmacht* for themselves and not for the *whole* people."[117] Moreover, within the *Reichswehr* itself there was a growing tendency to regard Hitler as the man of the future. Groener himself had always scoffed at Hitler's promises to the army as "Christmas tinsel for children,"[118] but, ever since the Leipzig Case, he had realized the dangerous effectiveness of Nazi propaganda within the officers' corps. Schleicher, by the attitude he had adopted in the question of the S.A. prohibition, had, in effect, encouraged the Nazi adherents within the *Reichswehr* to come out into the open.

The policy followed by the army chiefs in the latter part of 1932 bore out Groener's worst fears. The revocation of the prohibition of the S.A. in June and *Reichswehr* participation in the suppression of the Prussian government in July not only compromised the *Reichswehr* fatally but eased Hitler's road to power.[119] To the extent that they did so, they further increased the desire of the officers' corps to adhere to Hitler's cause. When Schleicher's Machiavellian game proved less adroit than that of Hitler, he and his friend Hammerstein sought to check the pro-Hitler tide within the army. Bruening has intimated recently that throughout 1933 and during the first months of 1934 they sought to rally the *Reichswehr* against Hitler; but it is apparent, even from his rather cursory

[116] Groener Correspondence: To Gleich, 22 May 1932.

[117] Groener Correspondence: To Richard Bahr, 22 May 1932.

[118] Groener Correspondence: To Gleich, 25 April 1932.

[119] In his letter to Schleicher on 29 November 1932, Groener wrote: "Der Versuch durch Brutalität den Dualismus Reich-Preussen zu beseitigen, ist eine Dummheit wegen der Rückwirkung auf die anderen Länder. Die Reitpeitschmanieren müssen aufhören. Das kann auch Hitler. Dazu braucht man Sie nicht."

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account, that they were defeated by forces which they themselves had set in motion.[120] Hitler had, after all, not restricted his negotiations with the army to the person of Schleicher; there were other members of the officers' corps who were willing to follow the example of their chiefs and dabble in politics. The day of Blomberg and Reichenau and Keitel was dawning.

The crisis surrounding the prohibition of the S.A. in 1932 represented the first step in Hitler's conquest of the army and the state. Shortly after his dismissal from office Groener wrote concerning the S.A. *Verbot:* "I believed that I had brought the army a sacrifice when I thrust into hell the unsuitable bride with which it was flirting. Now it will be up to the generals to see that the army does not in the end kiss Herr Schicklgruber's hands like hysterical women."[121] The generals as a class proved helpless or unwilling to prevent that feast of love.

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[120] Bruening in *Deutsche Rundschau* (July 1947). Effective resistance was hampered by the fact that Schleicher's connections with the *Reichswehr* was severed after Hitler's accession to power and Hammerstein was soon replaced as *Chef der Heeresleitung*.

[121] Groener Correspondence: To Gleich, 22 May 1932.

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SOME IMPLICATIONS OF A PROGRAM FOR FULL EMPLOYMENT AND ECONOMIC STABILITY *

SIR HENRY MAINE, in his *Ancient Law*, presents a definition of law in terms of nineteenth-century political theory. Drawing his inspiration from Jeremy Bentham and John Austin, he remarks:

> . . . Bentham, in his *Fragment on Government*, and Austin, in his *Province of Jurisprudence Determined*, resolve every law into a *command* of the lawgiver, an *obligation* imposed thereby on the citizen, and a *sanction* threatened in the event of disobedience; and it is further predicated of the *command*, which is the first element in a law, that it must prescribe, not a single act, but a series or number of acts of the same class or kind. The results of this separation of ingredients tally exactly with the facts of mature jurisprudence; and by a little straining of language, they may be made to correspond in form with all law, of all kinds, at all epochs.[1]

This definition of law is characteristic not only of Bentham and his followers but of the whole classical-liberal school, emphasizing the conscious character of the lawmaking process and viewing the lawgiver or state as essentially a formulator and interpreter of rules. Social scientists have come to refer to the type of state implicit in this concept of law as the "police state", in contradistinction to the "welfare state" which becomes a direct participant in the game in something more than the sense of the American baseball umpire or boxing referee.

Whatever the shortcomings of this definition may be, there can be little doubt of the important influence that it has wielded. Something similar to this concept of law must have been in the minds of the framers of the Constitution. Indeed, the vast bulk of contemporary American law can be brought under its purview—with perhaps "a little straining of language".

* The author wishes to express his gratitude for comments and criticisms on various sections of this article made by O. H. Brownlee and M. W. Reder.

[1] Everyman ed., p. 4.

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How far one is willing to strain language in order to preserve a definition is in part a matter of taste and convenience; but since the purpose of a definition is to clarify concepts and make it easier to formulate propositions concerning the phenomena with which we wish to deal, it hardly seems worth while to strain so far that interpretation of the definition becomes itself a major occupation.

The Employment Act as Law

There is in fact a small but growing body of law which is awkward to handle within the confines of this definition. (It is perhaps convenient to refer to this body of law as " welfare law ".)[2] The growth of this type of law, incorporating welfare clauses into the body of the statute, has been so rapid in recent years as to constitute a discernible trend, and the culmination of this trend in federal statutes to date may be found in the Employment Act of 1946.[3] At any rate this Act isolates in its purest form the basic differences between this kind of law and the more traditional types of law with which we have been accustomed to deal.

In essence, the Employment Act provides for five things: (1) It states that it is the responsibility of the federal government to secure continuing full employment; (2) it provides that this is to be done in such a manner as to promote free competitive enterprise; (3) it provides for a three-man Council of Economic Advisers responsible to the President; (4) it provides for the preparation of a national budget (Economic Report) assessing the total economy and the impact of federal programs; and (5) it provides for a Senate-House economic committee to consider this report.

The interesting thing about this Act, and it is in the very nature of welfare acts to do this, is that it strains all three of

[2] In part this type of law bears some similarity to private acts and public resolutions. It differs from the former, however, in that it does not confine itself to a particular case. It differs from the latter in that it provides within the body of the act itself a specific set of agencies and procedures to effectuate the specified purposes. It is of interest to note that private acts usually represent some departure from the established " rules of the game " in order to avoid or repair damage to some special interest.

[3] Public Law 304, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, 1946.

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Bentham's criteria beyond any reasonable interpretation. No *command* is issued by the lawgiver (unless one wants to speak of a command of the lawgiver to himself). No *obligation* is imposed on the citizen—at least in the individual sense which Bentham had in mind. No *sanction* is threatened in the event of disobedience (unless social catastrophe be recognized as a legal sanction).

The Employment Act, despite its high-sounding objectives, may do little toward providing the degree of stability and full employment so ardently desired. The Act is important and deserving of serious consideration, however, for it represents the latest step in a trend which may ultimately modify our entire political, economic and legal structure. In fact, the Act is merely the logical extension of a series of acts, and proposed acts, beginning at least as far back as the Employment Stabilization Act of 1931.[4] This trend will undoubtedly continue, and an index of the character of the trend may be found in the more vigorous wording of S. 380 from which the bill was drawn.[5] Section 2 (d) was worded:

> In order to assist industry, agriculture, labor, and State and local governments in achieving continuing full employment, it is the responsibility of the Federal Government to pursue such consistent and openly arrived at economic policies and programs as will stimulate and encourage the highest feasible levels of employ-

[4] For a partial history of some of the more important of these acts, see "History of the Employment Stabilization Act of 1931", *Report to the Committee on Banking and Currency,* Senate Committee Print No. 3, 79th Congress, 1st Session, 1945.

This trend is part of a world-wide picture. For a synoptic view of provisions similar to those found in the Employment Act of 1946 as embodied in laws and constitutions of various countries throughout the world (U.S.S.R., 1936; Germany, 1919; Ireland, 1937; Portugal, 1933; Spain, 1938; Brazil, 1937 and 1942; Cuba, 1940; Nicaragua, 1939; Paraguay, 1940; Uruguay, 1934, 1937 and 1942; Estonia, 1920; Liechtenstein, 1921; Lithuania, 1928; Britain, 1944) see "The Right to Work", statement of John R. Ellingston, member of drafting committee, Statement of Essential Human Rights in *Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Currency,* U. S. Senate, 79th Congress, 1st Session, 1945, pp. 1248 *et seq.* These objectives have also been given recognition in the United Nations Charter (art. 55, ch. IX) as well as other international documents such as the declaration of Santiago de Chile, 1942. Article 12 of the recommended Statement of Essential Human Rights reads: "Everyone has the right to work: The state has a duty to take such measures as may be necessary to insure that all its residents have an opportunity for useful work."

[5] The Full Employment Bill of 1945, S. 380, 79th Congress, 1st Session.

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ment opportunities through private and other non-Federal investment and expenditure.

Should private enterprise and initiative prove unequal to the task, Section 2 (e) of the bill states that "To the extent that continuing full employment cannot otherwise be achieved, it is the further responsibility of the Federal Government to provide such volume of Federal investment and expenditure as may be needed to assure continuing full employment. . . ."

In the indifference of prosperity it was possible to soften or delete this wording. The Act as it now stands provides little more than an orderly method of presenting Congress and the country with the results of economic studies and the reflections and opinions of a responsible group of government officials. In the crisis atmosphere of another major depression, however, one may expect both stronger wording and stronger action.

A Classification of Economic Analysis and Economic Behavior

To assess the direction of this trend and its possible implications it is necessary to take into consideration some elementary propositions about economic analysis and economic phenomena. Without indulging in invidious statements about the status of the science of economics, it seems obvious that the most intelligent solutions to the problems of economic stability and full employment cannot go far beyond the bounds of what we know; hence a knowledge of what in general can be expected from economics, at least in the foreseeable future, will serve to limit the boundaries in one direction. We shall at least know how far our knowledge will enable us to go toward a satisfactory solution of these problems. Unhappily there is no similar way to limit boundaries in the opposite direction; there seems to be no limit to man's ingenuity for adopting and executing ill-founded and malicious policies.

Clear thinking about economic phenomena and economic policy requires discrimination between three layers of analysis and activity:

(a) The economics of individuals or small groups acting as more or less isolated units within a greater economic whole. The economist has come to call this "partial equilibrium

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analysis", and it is familiar to all who have been exposed to elementary economics in the form of supply curves and demand curves.

(b) The interrelated actions of the various groups which compose the total economy. The economist refers to this as "general equilibrium analysis". Usually only more advanced students of economics encounter this branch of the discipline in systematic form since it requires a large technical apparatus for its manipulation. It deals with, for example, changes in the supply and demand curves in particular industries or segments of the economy resulting from changes in *other* industries or segments of the economy.

(c) The behavior of the total economy. In economics this branch of the discipline is labeled "aggregate analysis". It deals with such phenomena as booms and depressions, national income and total employment, and so on.

Each of these separate layers may in turn be classified into "static" and "dynamic" analysis.[6] Static analysis is primarily concerned with the ultimate position assumed by various sectors of the economy under given changes or given conditions. Dynamic analysis is concerned with the process (and the speed) of change itself. As one aspect of the process of dynamic change, the economist is specifically interested in the stability of positions assumed by the economy, or segments of the economy, at various points of time.

Courses in elementary economics (and most elementary textbooks) are generally concerned primarily with static partial equilibrium analysis. Working on the principle that firms try to maximize profits, that factors of production try to maximize their incomes, and that consumers try to get the most for their money, the student is carried through a number of exercises in economics and geometry in order to understand some of the mechanics of price formation. After he has some grasp of supply, demand and cost curves he then makes a special application of his knowledge to two general fields: (1) perfect competition and (2) varying degrees of imperfection—for example, monopoly.

[6] Further classification would be possible: for example, empirical or statistical economics and theoretical economics, etc.

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The Importance of Economic Stability

1. *Economic stability and instability on the individual level.* At the level of the elementary course nothing very much is said about stability. This is unfortunate, for stability is an important economic motivation.[7] People are frequently willing to diminish their maximizing proclivities in order to obtain stability. This has serious consequences for many economic problems. As a matter of pedagogical fact it is impossible to understand the workings of the economy without devoting a great deal of attention to the problem of instability; for the drive toward monopolistic arrangements, for example, is in great degree a product of the need that many persons and groups feel for building a bulwark against the risks and uncertainties of a shifting world. This does not deny, of course, that people are also motivated by a desire to secure ever greater economic "melons to cut". Even if the motive for stability were dominant at the outset, it is hardly likely that the monopolistic group once formed will staunchly resist the temptation to obtain a little more increase in income; but it is necessary to emphasize that from patent or tariff through steel trust or labor union the drive to achieve stability is an important economic phenomenon.[8]

Monopoly may be a valid device for achieving stability for isolated groups, but it is economically expensive and politically dangerous. In any event it is not a generally applicable solution, for an economy of monopolies would itself be unstable. A change in any sector of the economy would result in reper-

[7] This statement should not be confused with the criticism sometimes made of economics, at least as it is taught, that it does not pay sufficient attention to non-economic motivation—for example, motives of prestige, status, and so on.

[8] The definition of stability employed in the above passages is probably clear from the context. It can, however, be stated more rigorously as follows: A situation is said to be stable, if, when deviations from the path predicted from a given model occur as a result of factors outside the model, forces are set up leading to a return to the path predicted by the model at a later point in time. A plan constructed by a business firm may, for example, constitute such a model. This definition is, of course, closely allied to the concepts of statistics dealing with the stability of statistical ratios and forecasts. The monopolist may seek to extend his sphere of control in order to be able to include these (previously) unpredictable elements in his plans, even though such a course of action may result in reduction in his net income.

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cussions and uncertainty in all sectors. It seems likely that under such circumstances some authoritarian group holding (and willing to exercise) a monopoly of power would be necessary to secure "coördination" and stability.

Viewed from the standpoint of any "isolated" group, there seems to be no "practical" limit to the amount of instability that the rest of the economic system may impose. Desirable as many such outside "shocks" or changes may be for the reallocation of productive resources, they are hardly likely to be viewed with quiescence and inaction by the persons most directly concerned, the factors (or owners of the factors) of production in the affected industry.

2. *Economic stability and instability on the general and aggregate levels.* Almost nothing is said about general equilibrium analysis at the level of elementary economics. To be sure the concepts of elasticity of demand and "substitution" and "complementarity" are introduced; but they are seldom developed.[9] Yet it is in these directions that the problems of instability and an understanding of much of the problem of monopoly lie. How, for example, is it possible to explain adequately such subjects as backward (to the source of supply) and forward (to the point of final sale) vertical integration and disintegration under differing conditions as acts of entrepreneurship?[10] Profit maximization in a world of perfect certainty would, except in special cases, lead to a series of scattered investments rather than the closely related functional ties to be found in such integration.[11]

[9] Commodities may be said to be complementary when a price change in one commodity produces a price change in the *opposite* direction in the other commodity; they are substitutes when the price changes move in the *same* direction.

[10] Indeed it may be wondered what rôle the entrepreneur plays—other than terminological convenience—in the world of perfect certainty of introductory economics. The ordinary concern of the entrepreneur with agency, organization and control is replaced by the mechanical decisions of the market to which the entrepreneur passively "adjusts".

[11] These statements, with appropriate qualifications, also apply to horizontal integration. Knowledge of his agents, access to sources of information, and amenability to his control facilities explain why the wheat farmer is more likely to invest in another wheat farm and a textile operator is more likely to invest in another textile mill than in a distant—though more profitable—firm in a strange

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One reason for this lack of development is the heavy emphasis on static price and distribution theory. New questions would arise from an extended development in the direction we have indicated which would be awkward to handle within the framework of static analysis. For example, a price increase in one of two complementary commodities will result in a decrease in the quantity demanded and a price decrease in the second commodity which will react in the opposite direction on the first commodity, and so on. The question naturally arises as to how and where this process is brought to a stop, a question revolving around dynamic analysis and stability conditions. The answer depends, of course, on two things: (1) the existence of substitutes to each of the complementary commodities which can absorb part of the reaction caused by these changes and (2) the speed with which suppliers react to these changes in demand.

One consequence of this lack of development is the tendency to separate each of the three (or more) layers of economic analysis and develop them in separate compartments. Emphasis on dynamic analysis could be utilized to avoid this distortion. For example, by analogy with the partial analysis of firms and commodities it is possible to develop the notion of money as a commodity complementary to the aggregate of all other commodities in the system, and in the production of which the suppliers (banks) not only fail to adjust rapidly enough to demand changes but actually adjust in the wrong direction, thus reënforcing rather than retarding price movements.

Another consequence of the enforced separation of the various layers of economic analysis is that the apparatus developed in one section is abandoned rather than extended in the next section. This is particularly true of the aggregate analysis of price, income and money behavior. The analysis of quantitative behavior in individual price theory is replaced in aggregative analysis by qualitative description and inspection of

industry. A notable (and confirming) exception is investment in government bonds. The two processes, vertical and horizontal integration, are obviously closely related. Vertical integration cannot be expected to occur in infinitely divisible segments. As it occurs there is therefore an impetus given to horizontal integration in terms of the ordinary economics of divisibility and scale—and so on.

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oscillating curves and bank expansion formulae.[12] The result of this analysis is to give a misleading impression of symmetry in which the student is left with the impression that in a symmetric world symmetric formulae will provide the answers to problems. Such an approach is highly dangerous, for the problems of controlling prosperity and overcoming depression are asymmetrical.

Prosperity on the one hand is likely to be unstable with a tendency to spill over into inflation, while a depression is likely to be "too stable", requiring extraordinary measures for its repair. Not only the banking and monetary phenomena which have just been discussed but also the state of expectations and savings-investment relations all point in this direction.

During prosperity, with its attendant full employment, any upward price movement in one important sector of the economy is likely to spill over into other sectors and engender expectations of further upward movements. (The elasticity of expectations, in technical terms, is likely to be greater than unity.) What is required to prevent such movements, starting with the initial price rise, is a shift of demand from present to future periods and of supply from future to present periods. Under such a state of expectations exactly the opposite movements will occur. Producers in expanding for future outputs (investment), even at the expense of present outputs, and consumers in attempting to buy in anticipation of future price rises (dissavings) would both act to reënforce the initial movement. The banking and monetary mechanisms left to their own devices could be expected to intensify these movements.

During depression, with large amounts of idle resources available, the initial price movement upward would display no such tendency either to spill over into other sectors or to result in cumulative movements. If, say, as a result of a sudden shift in demand before factors could be mobilized, a sudden "bottle-

[12] One of the curious results of this separation between the various compartments is the entirely different treatment accorded banks and business firms. As soon as the subject of banking is brought into view the whole paraphernalia of cost curves, demand curves and profit maximization is abandoned. The bank is treated as an institution more or less automatically responding to variations in its reserves while the business firm is treated as though it has no problem in the administration of its liquid reserves.

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neck" price rise should occur, neither demanders nor suppliers would expect the price rise to last. (In technical terms the elasticity of expectations would be less than unity.)[13] Demanders would shift from present to future periods (saving), while suppliers would shift from future to present periods, drawing from inventories (disinvestment) so far as this was possible without expanding production, or diverting from maintenance to production, and so on. In any event suppliers could not be expected to engage in large-scale plant expansion for future production (investment) when a relative price decline in the future was expected. Even should such an attempt be made, the banking system would hardly be willing to undertake the necessary expansion credit; on the contrary the banks might well act in the opposite direction, insisting rather on the extinction of already existing loans from current profits.

Two Schools of Economic Policy

These deficiencies in the teaching and exposition of economics have resulted in much misunderstanding of the character of the problems to be dealt with. This misunderstanding has been furthered by disagreement among economists themselves. In grappling with the problem of instability two rather marked schools of economic opinion with respect to policy recommendations have arisen. On the one hand are those who may be regarded as in the direct classical-liberal tradition. This school seeks to evolve a general set of rules, mainly revolving around manipulation of the monetary, tax and borrowing programs of the government, with a general price index, or set of price indexes, to be utilized as the (more or less) automatic guides to manipulation. It seeks to build these rules into the system as part of the automatic mechanism of the pricing system (that is, extend the pricing system as a guide to government) and thus achieve general stability with a minimum of government intervention and discretion. In general, the government is not to use the expenditure side of its budget, since this may result in distortions in both present and particularly future resource allocations, and also since it carries

[13] With the third possible case, elasticity of expectations equal to unity, we shall not be concerned.

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with it the danger of an expanding sphere of government activity which, beyond its economic consequences, may have dire political effects. Economic stabilization and the maintenance of high-level employment are not well-chosen, in fact dangerous, criteria for expanding the sphere of government. Instead, each government activity should be examined on its merits in contrast to alternative means of achieving specified objectives; in all cases, however, one of the criteria for judging such extensions is the danger inherent in any expansion of government activity. For convenience we may call this school the "liberal" or "rules" school. Its point of view is perhaps most compactly expressed by Professor Henry Simons in his letter to Senator Wagner:

> (I) The maintenance of full employment is not a proper or desirable rule of fiscal policy.
>
> We desperately need definite, accepted rules of monetary-fiscal policy. But such rules should be formulated in monetary-fiscal terms. A good rule (which I would support) is stabilization of the value of money, as measured by some specified price index. Fiscal policy should aim not at full employment directly but at establishing and sustaining the monetary conditions and expectations consistent with adequate and stable employment. . . .
>
> . . . Monetary-fiscal policy should minimize monetary uncertainties, minimize delegations of power, minimize legislative opportunism or nose following, and rigidly economize and routinize the mechanisms of stabilization. . . . To illustrate, an incipient deflation (decline of index) should be promptly countered, first, by accelerating the rate at which bonds are retired and monetized and, second, by raising the level of personal-income-tax exemptions. If such actions were pursued boldly, under mandatory rules, they should suffice. . . .
>
> (II) The bill [that is, the proposed Unemployment Act] as it stands is extremely objectionable in its proposal that anticipated deficiencies in aggregate outlay be corrected by additional Federal spending rather than by reduced Federal taxation (and accelerated debt retirement).[14]

[14] Senate Committee, *Hearings*, pp. 1210-1212. For an extended treatment of this position see George L. Bach, "Monetary-Fiscal Policy, Debt Policy, and the Price Level" published in the "Papers and Proceedings of the Fifty-Ninth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association", *American Economic Review*, vol. XXXVII,

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The economists of the other major school may be called the "interventionists". Rather than selecting price stability as the major guide to government policy in the hope that this will indirectly achieve the necessary economic stability and full employment, they prefer to go directly toward the maintenance of full employment as the major guide. They are willing to use most of the instruments advocated by the "rules" school, but generally feel that the most effective force the government has at its command lies in its expenditure program. Given the magnitude of the forces to be coped with and the paramount importance of successfully solving this problem, they feel that it is unwise not to make the expenditure side of the budget a major point of departure. In the words of Professor Alvin H. Hansen: ". . .the government must make sure that public investment expands when private investment is declining. . . . Taken by itself alone, tax reduction [in a depression] would be relatively ineffective; but as a supplement to the main program it could reinforce the effect of increased public expenditures." [15]

In part at least the disagreement between the two schools rests on whether attention is being focused on the problem of maintaining stability during a period of unstable prosperity with a strong tendency to spill over into inflation or on the problem of overcoming a "too stable" depression. In part also the disagreement rests on different assessments as to the relative strength of the forces involved—on whether there is an inherent tendency for the economy to settle down into a

No. 2, pp. 228-242, May 1947. The recent publication of the Research and Policy Committee of the Committee for Economic Development, *Taxes and the Budget: A Program for Prosperity in a Free Economy* (Editor's Advance Text), November 1947, with its advocacy of built-in-flexibility in the tax structure may also be regarded as belonging to this school.

[15] "Stability and Expansion", in *Financing American Prosperity: A Symposium of Economists*, edited by Paul T. Homan and Fritz Machlup (New York, 1945), p. 207. *Cf.* also Oscar Lange, "Economic Controls after the War", POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, vol. LX, No. 1, March 1945, p. 6: ". . .The second task . . . [preventing deflation] requires more radical measures. These are of two kinds: (1) measures which encourage private spending [such as stabilizing prices of selected commodities and services by government market operations, or government guarantee of the salability of specified outputs, etc.], and (2) measures designed to close the 'gap' by deficit spending of the government."

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long and stable depression. Inextricably interwound with this latter disagreement is an estimate as to the relative importance of the solution of each of these problems for our economic and political future. The "interventionists" are generally willing to utilize the same measures for inflation control during prosperity as those advocated by the "rules" school. The "rules" school, on the other hand, is willing to admit departures from its strictures once a depression is under way. As Professor Simons expresses it in the above quoted letter: "Emergency increases of Federal spending are appropriate only in desperate situations of advanced, cumulative deflation (like 1933), which situations could never arise if other measures were promptly and ruefully [sic] pursued."[16] Professor Lange has aptly put the difference in emphasis and assessment: "The task of closing the 'inflationary gap' is much easier than that of closing the 'deflationary gap', because in our present economic system it is easier to discourage expenditure [on the part of private individuals] than to encourage it (assuming no change in the price level) . . . ."[17]

Thus there seems to be general agreement on the need for greater stability and the maintenance of high-level employment of resources. Specifically there is agreement on the means for

[16] *Cf. supra*, footnote 14. See also the numerous exceptions to their program noted in the C.E.D. report, for example, on p. 27; "The recommendations of this report are presented in the belief that, if they are combined with appropriate measures in other fields, economic fluctuations can be confined to moderate departures from a high level. Yet it would be foolhardy to ignore the possibility that we may again confront an economic crisis of great magnitude—either severe depression or major inflation. Some extraordinary action must and will be taken if such a crisis appears. An emergency Congressional reduction or increase in tax rates (perhaps with a fixed, automatic termination date) would then be one of the most effective and least dangerous of the available courses."

It seems unlikely, once a major depression is under way, that tax reduction will of itself stimulate recovery unless one is willing to go as far as utilizing negative taxes, accomplished perhaps by some such devices as the averaging of incomes, and carry-back and carry-forward provisions advocated by the C.E.D. But this device, negative taxes, essentially constitutes a turn to the expenditure side of the budget and there is no compelling reason to believe it is more effective than other forms of expanded expenditure. In fact, given the strength of the "Puritan tradition" or "savings instinct" (or whatever other name it be called) in America, there is reason to believe it is less effective than alternative measures since such returns are likely to be regarded as capital to be saved rather than income to be spent.

[17] *Loc. cit.*, pp. 5-6.

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avoiding inflation once high-level employment is achieved and on the (probable) necessity for turning to more powerful means than the tax-borrowing-monetary mechanisms, should the economy fall into a bad depression. The areas of agreement may be recapitulated in more detail as follows: First, there is agreement that the complete and free operation of the private economy under the price system cannot be relied on of itself to produce the necessary continuing stability and high level of employment. Second, there is agreement that the federal budget should be viewed primarily from the standpoint of its effects on the total economy: the traditional canons of "sound" public finance are to be largely if not entirely abandoned. Third, at least as far as the government's tax and monetary mechanisms are concerned, there is agreement that these instruments should be used primarily to achieve the necessary stability and prosperity. There is a fourth area of agreement that may, however, be more verbal than real: "if necessary", the expenditure machinery of the government may be thrown into the balance.

Despite this seemingly wide area of agreement, the differences between these two schools of thought are real. Moreover, the issues involved are of such serious import that no attempt should be made to slur over them to spurious agreement. In part the disagreement between the two schools rests on differences in emphases and in assessment of the economic forces involved. It also rests, however, on philosophical evaluations on the part of each group and hence the degree to which they are willing to risk such values as individual economic and political freedom, equality, and so on.

There can be little doubt that the expenditure side of government fiscal policy is a powerful instrument (probably the most powerful) in the government arsenal. The "liberal" or "rules" school of economics fears the use of this weapon, it will be remembered, because it automatically provides for an expanded sphere of government activity which (a) adds dangerously to the powers of government and (b) may well act to restrict private enterprise to ever narrower fields of endeavor. This is particularly true since it is difficult to devise specific rules to bind government as to fields of activity, and

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as to the conditions and extent to which it might undertake such activity.[18] This school is also averse to establishing full employment as a direct government objective. It prefers to solve this problem indirectly through stabilization of the price level,[19] since a direct "guarantee" of full employment may in effect encourage the growth of monopoly by underwriting whatever wage or price demands monopolist groups make on the rest of the economy.

[18] *Cf.* the C.E.D. report, p. 24: ". . .It will always be possible to make out a plausible case that depression is around the corner. . . ." In part this difficulty has been overcome by the "interventionists" by specifying in advance the areas in which such activities are to be undertaken—for example, urban development, health services, and so on—after examination of each case on its merits. It may be admitted that if government activity in such fields is meritorious, it should be undertaken in any event; it would scarcely be possible to do this, however, without some cognizance of the state of the economy. Incidentally, the areas involved are so wide as to make it highly probable that vigorous government activities in these fields could in all probability succeed in forcing continued high employment for many years to come. Presumably at the end of that period other fields of activity will have become "appropriate" for government activity.

[19] Of course the price level chosen would have to be the "correct" one. This may involve nice theoretical subtleties, but practically the problem is not difficult of solution with a tolerable degree of exactness. It could be achieved, as Professor Bach indicates (*loc. cit.*, p. 232), by choosing a time of relatively full employment, defining the appropriate general price index as the one which obtains at that time and then using the taxation and monetary powers of the government to assure only minor fluctuations about that level. The difficulty would come in succeeding years. Since the economy is subject to growth and change, the "correct" index would have to be revised from time to time. This should not, however, be an insuperable task.

The problem of pressure groups is forbidding. The proponents of this program feel that the rule, "Maintain this price level by these means!", would set the necessary working arrangements and delimit the sphere of government activity. If, for example, labor should exact increases in wages in important sectors of the economy, which result in a significant upward movement of the index, the power of the government's monetary machinery would be thrown in the balance against them, forcing mass unemployment if necessary, until wages were brought down. The same is true for farmers and industry. Despite the seeming impersonality of the process it would not take any of these large pressure groups, with their staffs of economists, long to find out what was happening. In such a situation they could be expected to bring heavy pressure against both the framers of the rules and the administrators.

It should also be noted that if the pressure group should remain adamant in its stand for increased wages or prices for an extended interval of time, the process of deflation might have to be of such duration and intensity as to make it difficult to ensure recovery with merely monetary measures.

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No doubt this last criticism is somewhat exaggerated, since there is no reason, technically speaking, why a program guaranteeing full employment cannot be accompanied by a vigorous antimonopoly campaign. But even the *possibility* of the *pari passu* growth of government and of monopoly under any program should be cause for hesitation and reflection. What theory would lead us to expect from this combination and what history has taught us to believe is certainly not pleasant to contemplate for anyone who cherishes the democratic system of values. On the other hand, the prospect of continuing economic instability and of extended mass unemployment (mixed with large ingredients of idle and restless veterans) is even more alarming. The solution to these problems is one of the major tasks of our age; for on the degree of success or failure we achieve in the solution of these problems will depend decisively our opportunity for solving the other important problems, legal, political, economic and cultural, with which we are confronted.[20]

Economic Analysis and Prediction

The large area of agreement between two major schools of economic thought (or, rather, policy) may seem to be cause enough for a moderate degree of optimism. Unfortunately this hope is largely groundless. In a very critical sense the basis of implementation of this area of agreement rests solely on our ability to assess and weigh what is actually happening at a given moment of time. And it is this area of economic knowledge which is perhaps the least developed of all.

[20] The achievement of economic stability and prosperity within the United States is a prerequisite to international order and stability. Since the bulk of productive capacity in most of the important economic categories is now concentrated in the United States, we have potentially become the world's greatest exporter of economic earthquakes. Only those countries, such as Russia, which do not have developed trade relations with us are likely to escape the full impact of these shocks. There is a touch of irony to the fact that it will be those forces within this country which have done the most toward developing hostility toward Russia which will contribute the most toward placing the Soviets in a position of political preëminence, when the next serious recession occurs. For, to the extent that present misunderstandings and hostilities prevent the development of economic ties with Russia, the latter country will remain immune to these economic shocks, while those countries with which we have the closest ties will suffer most.

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The essence of science, it is sometimes said, is prediction. We may distinguish between "prediction" and "forecasting". Prediction involves the ability to foretell not only what will happen but also when it will happen and in what degree; forecasting refers only to the ability to foretell in general terms what will happen. Economics is, at best, in the forecasting stage; and there is little reason to believe that it will advance rapidly beyond this stage in the near future.[21]

Alternative Economic Systems as a Possible Solution

Why not turn to other social systems? If this could be done without the loss of cherished political values it might be a feasible alternative. The advocates of socialism, for example, claim that their system can be operated in such a way as to preserve democracy. Whether this is so or not calls for more analytical ability than an economist can be expected to supply. There are several more or less economic considerations, however, which weigh heavily in favor of a capitalist economy and which cannot be lightly cast aside. Since the arguments are largely negative in character they do not make exciting propaganda for those who are anxious to prove that capitalism is the best of all possible systems; these arguments are important, however, and may be briefly considered here, in so far as they relate to the phenomena of stability and operability we have been considering.

[21] One's assessment of the situation is likely to become even more melancholy when he recalls that some of the recent economic forecasts for the transition from war to peace were so far wrong in their estimate as to lead to policy recommendations which were wrong not only in magnitude but also in direction. And it is of little use to answer that the transition period was one of violent turbulence with powerful forces acting in different directions; for all turning points, at least from high prosperity toward violent depression, will be marked by turbulence with powerful forces acting in different directions. And it is precisely at such points that accurate prediction is necessary: is a sudden fall in national income likely to be followed by a rapid rise or a further fall? What if all the important indexes point in different directions?

Given the rapidity with which movements from prosperity occur, we may well be far advanced toward depression before a decision can be reached. Thus, despite the agreement between the two schools, even as to the order in which measures should be taken, ". . .It needs to be recognized", as J. M. Clark shrewdly remarks in his letter to the Senate Committee (*Hearings*, p. 1029), "that increased public spending, while it may be a 'last resort' in point of preferences, is likely to be a first resort in point of time. . . ."

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First of all, the rules by which a capitalist economy operates are fairly easy to understand. Make the greatest income you can in the light of your available alternatives without recourse to force or fraud! If you judge correctly you will be rewarded; if you judge incorrectly you will be punished! There are, to be sure, large shadowlands of doubt concerning the areas of force and fraud. The important thing to note, however, is that these simple rules do not put excessive strain on the ordinary run of intelligence and ability that we are likely to find in our society. In short, the system can be operated by the ordinary human being. If one reflects, for example, on the recent spate of advertisements by prominent business organizations and trade associations promising lower prices on the demise of the Office of Price Administration, one can only be astounded by the success with which such a complicated mechanism can be operated by persons who understand so little about the way the economic system operates. In this connection it may be useful to think of an analogy with automobiles. Just as it is possible for the ordinary person to operate an automobile on the basis of a few simple rules and without any knowledge of the mechanics, chemistry or physics of internal combustion engines, so it seems to be possible to run a complicated economic mechanism in a tolerably satisfactory manner in almost complete ignorance of the way the machinery operates.[22]

As opposed to this system, any other system which is predicated on "more rational planning" must adduce evidence that it can quickly discover men equipped with a most extraordinary ability to see through the complicated system of prices. These

[22] One constantly hears expressions of admiration for the farsighted business "statesmanship" displayed by executives of large corporations in their price and wage policies. In fact, some schools and colleges of business have gone so far as to introduce courses in "public policy" as a requirement for students who are expected later to fill such positions of power and responsibility. The fact that these officials can actually exercise such power is itself evidence of the existence of monopoly, or at least a large degree of imperfection. Presumably if these individuals are correctly motivated, they will exercise these powers in a statesmanlike fashion. But one wonders why, if these individuals actually possess this most extraordinary insight, their decisions are allowed to proceed under the irresponsible processes of capitalism. Elementary reason would dictate the formal fixing of public responsibility on these men.

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men must be appointed to the correct places at the correct time with the necessary degree of authority. We shall leave untouched the problem of controlling these "controllers", but some idea of what is required may be seen from a relatively simple example: Should a change in the price (or production) of, say, pig iron be undertaken at a given time? A "rational" answer to this question would require an ability to foresee the consequences that such a change would have on, say, the price of textile machinery, workers' incomes in the automobile industry, and the size of the merchant marine. Whatever may be said about the deficiencies of our economic knowledge on the aggregate level pales by comparison when one enters the enormously complicated system of interrelated prices.[23]

Another advantage of the complications of the market-price mechanism is that it conduces to a sense of personal accomplishment—a feeling of having done the thing of one's self. For the great bulk of mankind under any practically conceivable form of social organization, it may not be possible to satisfy this need.

[23] Of course it is possible to point out that socialist planners could foretell more accurately since they *can* plan. They can *make* the answers come out. But this is begging the question, for what is at issue is the *adequacy* of the plan.

More sophisticated economists, such as A. P. Lerner, have spent much time in working out a simple pricing rule for managers in a socialist economy. The rule is to price at marginal cost. A footnote to an article is hardly the place to argue this problem, and the writer has no desire to brush aside the real merits and possibilities that the investigations of these scholars have shown to lie in a socialist program administered in accordance with such a rule. At a full-employment level, however, one can expect a continuing series of "bottlenecks" where the rule would have to be breached and some sort of "rationing" mechanism (presumably the price system) would have to be provided—not to mention the danger of manipulation of the price-cost structure for the benefit of special interest groups.

This is exactly the problem that the Office of Price Administration faced. Whatever one may feel about the efficacy of the program executed by the O.P.A., there can be little doubt that the persons generally to be found in positions of authority were exceedingly able and motivated by high principles. It should also be noted that O.P.A., knowing that its existence was likely to be short-lived, never really confronted one of the most serious problems that a permanently planned society would have to face: how much of today's production should be withheld in order to obtain more production tomorrow? This is the problem of investment; but it would not be sufficient to solve this problem on the aggregate level. It is not entirely, or even primarily, a problem of calculating investment "offsets" to planned saving. What is required is that this investment be directed into the "correct" channels—a problem which for rational solution would require the ability to foretell not only the "near" but also the "far" future.

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(In any event it is mostly illusion.) But in every large society there exists a small, dynamic, "practical" and able group of men, the counterpart in other societies of our American-English captains of business and industry. For this small group of men it is of the highest importance to preserve this illusion. Satisfaction of this sense of personal accomplishment—this feeling of having molded an important segment of the world—is probably more important to this group of men than the enjoyment of large incomes and great prestige. Any social organization which does not at once preserve this illusion and provide adequate avenues for the absorption of the energies of these men runs the risk of unleashing their terrible and restless ingenuity toward explosive purposes. A planned society in which these men will have to obtain the permission of others for the accomplishment of their purposes, and in which they will have to share their glory, will hardly be as successful as the mysteries of the open market in preserving this illusion of completely personal and individual accomplishment.

In any progressive economy vast social changes must constantly be in process. As technological and economic changes occur, multitudes of persons must be shifted from one occupation or geographical region to other occupations and regions. Millions of sharecroppers and tenant farmers in the South may have to be shifted to positions as porters or roustabouts in the North. It is a difficult problem to decide which persons should go (into which occupations) and which should stay. Such decisions require on a vast scale minute comparisons, both positive and negative, of skills, abilities and attitudes; and inextricably interwound in the whole process is the delicate, difficult to assess, but tremendously important problem of morale.

With respect to the great masses of people involved in these vast processes of social change the mysteries and complexities of the price mechanism foster an illusion closely related to that discussed in the preceding section with respect to the smaller group of elite. There is no doubt that these processes of change are frequently carried out under most cruel conditions of force. It may well be that the change is not "worth" the cost; but if these changes are to occur, some form of force is

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necessary, and, in the interest of social stability, it is desirable that this force be concealed as far as possible from the understanding of the people subjected to its duress. The price mechanism accomplishes exactly that. Instead of the reality of the experience of force to which the individual is subjected, the price mechanism fosters an illusion of exercise of choice in the matter.[24] If this process had to be carried out under the imprimatur of some government bureaucrat, the illusion of freedom would be destroyed and the process of brute force laid bare in a most concrete and understandable form.[25] In such a situation it would be almost universal experience that even individuals who had "wanted" to effect the change would begin to find reasons for stubborn resistance. Our recent experience with the draft provides evidence of what we would be likely to experience. It is instructive to reflect on the possible consequences, if the lives of hundreds of thousands of individuals in our society continued to be decisively determined from one situation to another by the "arbitrary" decisions of draft boards!

A final advantage of the price system is that it is in large measure impersonal. Enough has already been said to indicate the advantages of "impersonality" in the economic decision-making process. If individuals are as innately aggressive as psychoanalysis tells us they are, and as the history of Western civilization seems to confirm, it is a marked advantage to have the economic decision-making process impersonal.

The decisions of a government agency, even an agency such as the Office of Price Administration which tried and generally succeeded in doing a large measure of public good, are met by laments and criticisms. Relatively minor mistakes are carefully noted and become the cumulative basis of protest. It is a matter of common experience, however, that these same protesting individuals will abide by the most arbitrary and capricious actions of the market even though these "market

[24] It should not be necessary to emphasize the desirability of maintaining this illusion of freedom of choice in a democratic society.

[25] It should be profitable to reflect on the liquidation of the kulaks under just these circumstances.

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decisions" may drive them to the brink of ruin and suicide. People simply feel that the market process is somehow "natural".

There is, however, one important qualification to these remarks. Individuals will tolerate these seemingly erratic decisions, provided they are not too violent and frequent, or affect too many individuals simultaneously. In such situations it may easily be the case that vast social changes will be demanded and enforced. If we wait for crises to force these decisions, we are likely, in the heat of the moment when passions are aroused, to get a series of ill-considered solutions which will provide a remedy worse than the disease. If changes are to be effected, it is better to prepare for them while there is yet time to bring the processes of reason to bear, when remedies can be analyzed and risks calculated.

Somehow or other the necessary stability will have to be introduced into the economic system. We will not be able to tolerate many more experiences of one third of our labor force (including five or six million veterans) lying idle for protracted periods of time.

Full Employment and Our Structure of Government

Will the Full Employment Act accomplish this objective? Will it afford a basis for achieving the necessary level of employment and stability? I think not. The authority delegated under the Act does not even meet the minimum specifications of the "liberal" or "rules" school. Authority for action has not been delegated, but only authority for study, interpretation and recommendation; and there seems little hope that this situation can be repaired. The difficulty lies not so much with the Act as with the institution which is to administer it. The marked departure of this type of law from Bentham's definition provides a warning. A form of government based on this "classical" concept of law is not likely to prove adequate in the administration of a law so markedly different in kind. Suspicious as our founding fathers were of the powers of central government, they took great pains to hobble it and insure its inefficiency for protracted periods of positive action.

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Any large organization, no matter how monolithic in appearance, has "checks and balances" automatically built into its structure. The founders of our government went a step further. They *based* our system of government on checks and balances. It is instructive in this connection to recall Senator Barkley's admonition to the public after President Truman's veto of the revised Emergency Price Control Act, that "Congress could not be expected to act so fast. . . ." It was unreasonable to expect speedy action, even though a period during which it would be impossible to determine the character of price-control legislation might throw the economy into chaos.

It must be remembered that adequate economic controls in the area of economic stabilization will involve speedy action with respect to the government's tax, monetary and expenditure programs. These areas of government activity, so vitally affecting the lives of individuals and the structure of social classes, will always be focal points of political activity. The greatest opportunity of avoiding the necessity of heroic interference in the private economy lies in speedy, coördinated action. One cannot be sanguine, however, as to either the speed or the character of the action, as one visualizes the necessary stream of measures going through committee hearings, debates and cloakrooms in two separate legislative bodies. One cannot even be sure of the absence of interfering issues of relatively minor importance. The very fact of pressing need for speed on major legislation offers an excellent opportunity for bargaining delays by special interest groups. The picture becomes even darker when to the possibility of committee, House or Senate deadlock is added the possibility of presidential veto and court review.[26]

[26] Some of the so-called more backward countries such as Brazil, Haiti, Ecuador and Chile seem to have turned to government corporations as a device for promoting economic progress and stability. The device is reminiscent of our R.F.C. although the powers are somewhat broader than those granted to R.F.C. during the emergency following 1929. The Chilean Corporacion de Fomento de la Produccion, for example, is given "the responsibility of increasing production of both manufactured goods and raw materials, with a view to augmenting and stabilizing the national income. It not only plans projects but provides funds. Various state departments may be given authority and funds to carry out plans made by the Fomento Corporacion. . . ." (Quoted from Gardner Patterson, "The Export-

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The differing character of the aggregate and other layers of economic activity provides a natural division of responsibility for private and government institutions. Responsibility for maintaining the level of aggregate economic activity has not been and never will be suitable or attractive to private enterprise. Although the area of aggregate activity can be separated to some extent from the interconnected price and production structure, for purposes of both analysis and practical action, it would be folly not to recognize the close relationships between all layers of economic activity. If we wait too long and give the gathering forces of recession or inflation time to accumulate, the type of action needed will be so strong as to blur all distinctions and make it necessary for the government to move far into the field of economic operations.

We are faced with a dilemma. If the government is to cope effectively with the problem of economic instability, it will have to be given powers which, when exercised to the full, may result in the destruction of political democracy and private capitalism. Our best chance of avoiding extensive use of these powers lies in granting them on so broad a scale as to make it unnecessary to use them to more than a limited degree. If these powers are not granted, resulting economic crises may bring an even more speedy and destructive end to these institutions.

The economists of the liberal school have warned of the danger of increasing the powers of government. It would be folly not to heed their warnings. To these dangers must now apparently be added a reform of the governmental system which will add further perils. In view of the strength of the economic forces involved and the shortcomings of our economic skills and understanding, it does not seem wise to restrict gov-

Import Bank", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. LVIII, 1944, pp. 73-74.) Even these broad grants to some government corporation would be insufficient in the United States, however, unless its programs were effectively coördinated with the taxing, monetary and expenditure programs of the rest of the government. In view of the importance of the powers involved it is to be hoped that we do not adopt our characteristic emergency device, the government corporation, for administering such a program without long and sober thought on the implications for our governmental structure and our way of life.

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ernment activities in accordance with rigid rules which would also eliminate the possibility of using the expenditure mechanism —the most effective instrument in the government arsenal. Inability of the government to meet its openly announced obligations in this important economic area because of the rigidity of the limitations imposed on it would be dangerous. It would be regarded as a confession of impotence; at least a clever man could easily persuade a desperate people that it was such a confession.

If we can by speedy action reverse the state of economic expectations, it may be possible to keep at a minimum the use of weapons such as the expenditure mechanism. If we can, for example, maintain a stable price level for a long enough period of time and with powerful enough guarantees so that people will come to regard this level as "normal", there is a good chance we may succeed. If this level is regarded as "normal", then any rise or fall in prices will be met by the necessary shifts in supply and demand which will in large measure serve as a self-corrective.[27] Stability at a level of full employment can be obtained by providing the necessary "offsets" to private saving and investment by unbalancing the government's budget both negatively and positively. Until this attitude of "normalcy" can be developed, however, it will probably be necessary to use every weapon at the government's command with enough flexibility to meet the dictates of the situation. In the meantime we face a most dangerous period of transition.

What is involved is delegation of the taxing, the spending and the borrowing powers of the government—the very powers that in our government have with scrupulous care been reserved to the legislature. Can this be done with safety? There is no denying the dangers of such delegation to an administrative authority. Such delegations have, it is true, been effected, to some degree at least, during periods of war; and the device of Congressional investigating committees has proved a powerful check on the possibilities of executive abuse. But these

[27] For example, if people regard this price level as normal, then any rise in prices will be met by a fall in demand and increase in supply since people will expect future prices to fall relative to the rise in present prices.

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were emergency measures adopted for relatively short intervals of time; and the character of the delegation has always been such as to mark a definite end to the delegation at reasonably well-defined intervals of time determined in advance. It hardly seems likely that these sorts of protective measures will prove as effective for the protracted and vaguely defined periods of time involved in the solution of the problem of economic stability and full employment.

More drastic reform of the federal structure may have to be undertaken. Perhaps something akin to the British cabinet system with the executive appointed by the legislature and dismissed at its pleasure may prove more satisfactory. Perhaps the legislature may have to be reduced to a single small body for more speedy and effective action. This may entail changing the whole system of representation from a local to a national basis. Certainly the function of court review of executive and legislative action would have to be seriously restudied. These are, however, questions for students of law, politics, sociology and administration rather than economics.

John Stuart Mill, in his *Essay on Representative Government*, provides a wise precept for all who are interested in governmental reform.[28] "Governments must be made for human beings as they are, or as they are capable of speedily becoming." Only a foolish man or an incurable revolutionary would disregard this dictum. But the dictum is not a static one. It is a responsibility of the scientist and scholar in particular and the intellectual generally to clarify issues and explore alternative solutions in order to furnish at least a partial guide to prepare men for the moment of crisis.

The task is not a hopeless one. There seems to be no reason why a small compact Congress, equipped with broad investigatory powers and with the power to appoint and remove the executive, should not prove adequate in the preservation of our democratic values even though prevented from taking initiatory action in broad areas of policy. And there seems to be no reason why the Court should be removed from its rôle as guardian of civil liberties, in so far as this area can be clearly

[28] Everyman ed. p. 253.

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demarcated. Having begun by quoting Maine on Bentham's and Austin's definition of law it is perhaps appropriate to close by quoting John Stuart Mill on the proper functions of a representative assembly:

> Instead of the function of governing for which it is radically unfit, the proper office of a representative assembly is to watch and control the government; to throw the light of publicity on its acts; to compel a full exposition and justification of all of them which anyone considers questionable; to censure them if found condemnable, and, if the men who compose the government abuse their trust, or fulfill it in a manner which conflicts with the deliberate sense of the nation, to expel them from office, and either expressly or virtually appoint their successors. This is surely ample power, and security enough for the liberty of the nation. . . .[29]

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[29] *Ibid.* p. 239.

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ALBANIA WITHIN THE SLAV ORBIT: ADVENT TO POWER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

I

THE international rôle of Albania, since the end of World War II, has been a turbulent one. She has been found guilty of aid to the Greek guerrillas in their fight against the Greek government. It has been charged that the mines placed in the Corfu Channel were put there " with the knowledge " of her government. She has accused the American mission to Tirana of having organized sabotage and plots. In each instance she has been defended and supported by the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

It is not a new thing to see the Slavs interested in non-Slavic Albania. They have been so in the past. The difference is that today they have taken up Albania's defense, whereas before they tried to invade or partition her. What is new is their change in policy. The aim has remained the same: the control of Albania.

In the Balkan War of 1912, when the Ottoman Empire collapsed, the desire of the Serbs for expansion grew and they pushed as far as the shores of Albania. They would have remained there, had it not been for the opposition of Italy and particularly of Austria-Hungary. The latter Power feared that, if Serbia occupied the coast of Albania and fell under the influence of Tsarist Russia, she might threaten Austria's position in the Adriatic and thwart her *Drang nach Osten.*

After World War I Yugoslavia favored the partition of Albania. When that became impossible, because of President Wilson's strong opposition, Yugoslavs tried to get control by backing Ahmet Zogu (later King Zog) in his return to power. For more than a year Zog followed a Serbophile policy, but in 1926 he signed a treaty of " friendship and security " with Italy, and Yugoslavia's hopes were frustrated.

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During World War II, however, there were no Balkan or extra-Balkan states to oppose Yugoslav expansion; and the control of Albania by a Slav satellite fitted well into Soviet Russia's plans. In the Balkan peninsula the Soviet Union had added to her sphere of influence another territory which might become for her an outpost in the Mediterranean and a base for expansion.

It is precisely because of Albania's key position that the Slavs have taken such a great interest in her. This small country, approximately 11,500 square miles in area and with a population of a little more than 1,100,000, is situated at the northwest edge of the Balkan peninsula, opposite the heel of Italy; and a channel only 47 miles wide separates the two shores. The Power which has control of this strait has control of the Adriatic Sea; but this control is impossible without the possession of the Albanian coast. The most strategic point on it is Valona, a large bay protected all around by mountains and hills and at the entrance by a rocky island, Saseno.

A little south of Valona is the coast of Himara, and still farther down the port of Santi Quaranta with the hills which join Cape Stylos, on the Greek frontier. This littoral opposite Corfu serves to make out of the channel between that island and the shore a large and strong base.

In order to get hold of this strategic position in Albania, Tito, as leader of the Yugoslavs, used methods different from those of World War I. He did not invade the country by military force, nor did he support a single strong man there. He created a party and helped establish a communist régime which would be closely connected with his own and willing to execute his orders. The process was long but successful.

II

The régime of King Zog had been a personal dictatorship. In the top positions in the government were placed officials who had served in the corrupt Ottoman Empire, and who conceived of politics in terms of intrigues and personal interests. They were servile to the master and tyrants to the people.

In opposition to them a new generation arose. Many were not satisfied with the education received at home and continued

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their studies in European universities. When they returned to Albania they tried to bring about changes, but their efforts were frustrated because every new and liberal tendency was feared by the régime. But their democratic ideas could not be suppressed. Liberalism spread over the country and at times emerged with force against the dictatorial régime, as in the revolution of Fieri, in south central Albania, and later in the uprising of Argyrokastro (1938), in southern Albania.

In such an environment one would naturally think that many of the younger generation might become Communists. In fact, however, they did not. They realized that their country needed a more efficient government, better educational facilities, improved methods in agriculture and greater social justice—in short, a lifting up of the Albanian people. They also felt the desire for independence, which had been jeopardized by the way King Zog's régime had opened the country to Italian penetration. As a consequence, they had grown more nationalistic. They had too much to do in their own country to think of transforming the world.

Nevertheless, there were a few communist groups in Albania, when the country was occupied by Mussolini's armies. Three were especially important. One was the group of Korcha, in the south. Its members were workers, who had formed a society called *Puna* (the Work) and its program was widespread propaganda. To this group belonged the present Premier of Albania, Enver Hoxha, while he was still an unimportant teacher at the Lycée of Korcha and played a secondary rôle in the local communist movement. The second group was that of *Zjarri* (the Fire), and its seat was Tirana. Its members thought that in a half-colony or an occupied country like Albania the Communists should support nationalism, which was a force against imperialism and fascism. The last group was that of Scutari, in the north. Its program was to train the leaders for the movement and to win new recruits from the Gymnasium of Scutari or among the government employees. All these groups were small, however, and frequently worked at cross purposes. Their contacts with communist elements outside the country were extremely tenuous.

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Some months after the attack upon Russia by Hitlerite Germany two emissaries of Tito, Miladin Popovich and Dushan Mugochi, arrived at Tirana. For the insignificant communist groups they wore the aureole of a party recognized by Moscow. In a short time the two Yugoslavs succeeded in uniting the groups and forming the Albanian Communist party (November 8, 1941), only the group of *Zjarri* refraining at the outset from joining it. They also chose the members of the Central Committee of the party, of whom the present Premier, Enver Hoxha, was one. It was natural that the new party should be dependent on the Yugoslav Communist party. In fact, it was a branch of it; and the newly elected members of the Albanian Central Committee informed the Yugoslav party that they would carry through the task which had been assigned to them.[1] The two emissaries of Tito stayed in Albania during the whole period of the war, and they were the real "bosses" of the Albanian Communist party. Miladin Popovich was the political organizer, and Dushan Mugochi, better known under the pseudonym *Sala*, was the military organizer.

The Communists resorted to a political stratagem which had proved successful in neighboring countries. On September 16, 1942 they organized a conference at Peza, a village near Tirana, to which were invited Communists representing various paper organizations and non-Communists who were favorably disposed toward them. A resolution was prepared, which proclaimed the National Liberation Front. The people were told that the union between the Communists and the Nationalists "had been cemented", and that they would fight the invader together. In reality only a few nationalist groups had been represented at the conference, and they had not adhered to the resolution which effectively gave the direction of the whole revolutionary movement to the Communist party. With the emergence of the National Liberation Front, the Communists had another advantage, for the undesirable term "Communist" disappeared, and they could prepare their own civil revolution under the guise of national revolution. The new front was the counterpart of the Greek EAM, with the great difference that

[1] From the archives of the Albanian Communist party, seized by the government early in 1943 and made public during the trial of Communists in Tirana, May 1943.

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in Albania the Communist party was not only the chief but the sole party in the movement, the rest of the participants being persons of leftist tendencies, or of no political tendencies at all, who joined in order to fight the Italian armies.

The Communists in Albania now enjoyed a unique position: they controlled the only political party in the country. King Zog's dictatorship had not allowed the formation of political parties, nor had it encouraged political leaders. Members of parliament were appointed, not elected. King Zog had to give his approval for each candidate, and no other tickets than those of the government were permitted. The king was also careful to exclude from these tickets young Albanians who, because of their liberal and democratic tendencies, might cause trouble in the parliament. This accounts for much of the ascendancy of the Communists in Albania.

There were, however, nationalist groups which offered active or passive resistance at the outset of the Italian occupation, and which later formed an organization called "The National Front". At its head was Midhat Frasheri, a veteran of the Albanian nationalist movements and a well-known writer, who had represented his country at several international conferences. As the main goal of the organization was to free the country and create a democratic régime, it was joined by many different groups with center or left of center tendencies. Although its leaders enjoyed considerable prestige as patriots, they did not possess the required revolutionary qualities.

The National Front had a large following, and the Communists, as long as they did not feel themselves strong, had to reckon with it. Efforts were made to bring about an agreement, but the obstacles were great. The National Front saw in the Communist party an organization which by its very nature was international and depended on a foreign Power. They could not trust it, as its activity was likely to change according to orders received from outside. Besides, they were suspicious that it had become a tool in the hands of covetous Slav neighbors. The Communists, on the other hand, pretended that they could not rely on the National Front for close collaboration, because their own policy was for strong action against the invader without regard to damages to the country, and they

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considered the National Front inactive and inclined to make compromises with the enemy in order to save the country from destruction. In reality, however, the Communists did not desire a sincere understanding. Their aim was to seize control of the country; and the nationalist organization was a rival which had to be destroyed. Consequently, while the discussions for an agreement were going on, they made use of every possible kind of propaganda among the people to undermine the position of the National Front.

When the Americans landed in Sicily, however, a great attempt was made at collaboration between the National Front and the National Liberation Front (the camouflage of the Communist party). The reason was public pressure and the possibility of an Allied landing in Albania. On August 2, 1943 representatives of both organizations met at Mukaj, a village near Tirana. The discussions were long and hot. The point at issue was the question of Kossovo. Kossovo is that part of present Yugoslavia, adjacent to Albania, which was occupied by old Serbia during the first Balkan War. It is a very fertile region and is inhabited mostly by Moslem Albanians. At the time of the Mukaj Conference it formed part of Albania, since Italy had annexed it after the collapse of the Yugoslav state in the spring of 1941. The National Front stood for reintegration of Kossovo into Albania and proposed to fight for it. The Communist representatives objected strenuously. At last a compromise was reached: the question of Kossovo would be decided at the end of the war by a plebiscite of its people. When this obstacle was removed, the two parties agreed on unity of action and on the formation of a common committee, which would correspond to a revolutionary government, called " The Committee of National Salvation ".

The agreement, however, remained merely a document. The Communist representatives had apparently gone beyond the instructions of their leaders. In the secret directions given by the Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party to its provincial committees early in September 1943, it was stated: " You know that the agreement with the National Front . . . has been to the detriment of the National Liberation movement and to our Party, and as such it has been dis-

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approved by the Central Committee." Then followed the reasons:

> This agreement has placed us in a difficult position; at the moment when the National Front should have been put against the wall . . . at the moment when the National Front should have been presented to the Albanian people as an organization which desires divisions and systematically sabotages our efforts, we handed to it the Charter of agreement in the form it desired, in order to make a better show before the people.[2]

It would also have been folly for Tito's emissaries to agree that Kossovo, regarded by the Yugoslavs as part of old Serbia, might go to Albania with or without a plebiscite. Furthermore, Italy was on the verge of capitulation, and the German collapse did not seem far off. The Communist organization was disciplined, aggressive and unscrupulous, and Tito's forces were growing stronger from day to day, while the victorious Russian armies were approaching. As time passed, the hopes of an Allied landing in Albania vanished. When the Germans entered Albania after the Italian armistice, the Communists declared war on their rival. Caught between two fires, the heterogeneous and undisciplined National Front passed through a serious crisis: great confusion reigned in its ranks. On the one hand, the Germans had declared that their occupation was only military, as distinguished from the Italian domination, and that they recognized the independence and neutrality of Albania. They even permitted Mehdi Frasheri, the President of the Council of Regency, to protest to the German government against the occupation of Albania by the German armies. On the other hand, whole districts had been devastated during the five years of resistance, and thousands of people were in the mountains without food and shelter. Their bands had been disorganized and were too weak to oppose German military operations and resist at the same time the attacks of the Communists. Besides, Allied help had been very limited, and there was no hope of an early landing.

[2] "The Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party to all the Provincial Committees", 10 P. M., September 9, 1943, signed by Shpati. This circular fell into the hands of the bands of the National Front in September 1943. It was published in the newspaper *Albania*, August 15, 1947, Rome, Italy, pp. 2-3.

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All these considerations made the National Front cease the struggle against the Germans. Some members and groups even joined the Germans in their fight against the Communists; but the truly democratic groups, after having recovered from the first confusion, resumed their resistance to both the invaders and the Communists.

Everywhere the object of the Communist party had been to remove all obstacles to its political power. In Albania the job of the Communists was easy. The National Front had been eliminated as an opposition partly because of its disintegration and partly because of the propaganda favorable to the National Liberation Front broadcast over the radios of the Allies. Furthermore as early as September 1943, the Communists had given instructions to the provincial committees:

> . . . . with relentless work to discredit the National Front before the people, to detach the people from it and to unite them with us . . . to present it as striving for division and as an instigator of fratricidal fighting, to make the people see that the policy of the National Front will lead us to armed conflict, to make it (so look) that the whole people will revolt because of it, and in this way the historical responsibility for the disunity of the Albanian people and for the armed conflict will fall . . . on the National Front.[3]

Later, the ruin of every village burned by the Germans was attributed to the National Front. The same fate was reserved for the unimportant Legality Organization, composed of mountaineers of the district of Kruja, in central Albania, and of some former officials of King Zog's régime. On the other hand, Albania had no government in exile, like Greece or Yugoslavia, nor were there any Allied forces in the country. Thus, for the National Liberation Front the path was clear in politically disorganized Albania, and, what is more, it had the support of Tito's forces and of the Greek EAM. When the German armies withdrew from Albania, its revolutionary government, which had withstood all the military operations of the

[3] In the circular of the Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party, mentioned in footnote 2.

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Germans, installed itself at Tirana, on November 29, 1944 as the government of Albania under Enver Hoxha as Prime Minister. It was the triumph of the Albanian Communist party and the victory of the Slavs.

III

Once in power, Hoxha's Communist government used every means to consolidate itself. Many of its most bitter opponents, leaders of the National Front or the Legality Organization, had fled to Italy. Those it could arrest in Albania it brought before the People's Court to be judged as "war criminals" or "enemies of the people". The object of the trials was not so much to punish the collaborators as to eliminate those persons who had influence over the people and might oppose the communist régime. The government also persecuted the Catholic clergy, whose hold on the mountaineers of the north is strong. In the days of King Zog's régime the Catholic clergy was the only well-organized force in Albania. Of course, the government did not neglect the drive against the remaining guerrillas, who were resisting in the mountains. But in a country like Albania, when frontiers are closed and the régime is supported by the neighbors, every resistance is doomed to failure.

The National Liberation Front had done its job; but conditions now required that it should be known as "The Democratic Front". Premier Enver Hoxha and other responsible men made speeches, promising that the basis of the new front would be broadened. Soon it became clear, however, that all this was a bluff. Members of the front, who truly favored an enlargement, like Dr. Gjergj Kokoshi, Minister of Public Instruction in the first Hoxha cabinet, were ousted and later condemned for plotting against the régime. The Communist party was careful to keep the newly baptized front as closely in the hands of the Communist party as possible. It was interested only in having its appearance democratic. Its purpose was twofold: at home, to make the people believe that the government was ready to collaborate with the democratic elements of the country and so strengthen its position; abroad, to persuade the world that the government established in Albania was "Democratic" and should be recognized.

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Hoxha's government, however, had not received the stamp of constitutionality. Therefore, elections were held on December 2, 1945. With no organized opposition and with the prevailing terror, it was natural for the Democratic Front (the peacetime camouflaged Communist party) to score a triumph. It was the only ticket in the elections. Soon the Constituent Assembly convened at Tirana and abolished the monarchy, proclaiming Albania a Popular Democratic Republic. The Assembly was changed to the People's Assembly, the parliament, which chose the members of the Presidium of the state. This was similar to what had previously happened in Yugoslavia, which in turn had followed a Soviet pattern.

This post-war government of Albania has been impatient in carrying out the radical changes which would bring about a communist society. It first confiscated the lands of the landowners and redistributed them among the farmers. According to the Agrarian Act of 1945, every farmer with a family of 5 members is allowed the use of 5 hectares (approximately 12.35 acres). That is all the land allotted to him. In case he has a larger family, he receives ½ a hectare for each additional member. But the farmer gets only the produce from the land. Ownership is vested in the state. At times the farmer cannot even retain what he produces. If production exceeds the amount fixed by the government, it has to be sold at a low price to the state agricultural coöperative.

It is obvious that this is not an agrarian reform. A reform, in general, means a change without breaking with tradition. An agrarian reform, in particular, is an expropriation or confiscation of the superfluous land, beyond a limit fixed by law, with recognition of the private ownership of the land. What has taken place in Albania is not a "reform" but a "revolt" in land: abolition of private agricultural property.

The main concern of the Albanian régime has been the youth. The Communists first exploited their enthusiasm and spirit of sacrifice against the Fascist and Nazi armies and, then, in the course of the strife, they organized them. Today thousands of young men are kept in the disproportionately large Albanian army. Others have been regimented in the Youth Organizations. Everywhere the hold of the Communist party is kept

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fast by a spying system characteristic of all totalitarian régimes. Great importance has also been given to the education of the youth in the new ideology. This job was entrusted until some months ago to a veteran Communist, Professor Sefjulla Maleshova. He had left Albania in 1924 and had gone to Moscow, where he became versed in Communist propaganda and worked with the Comintern. He was regarded in Albania as the theoretician of the Communist ideology. Immediately after the liberation he became Minister of Popular Culture and Propaganda, and later he took up the Ministry of Public Instruction. He prepared the new programs of the schools in which the new ideology was, of course, the guiding principle.

The towns, as well as the more numerous villages, have been fitted into the communist system. Albania had relatively few industries to be transformed—some cigarette factories, six or seven power plants, three alcohol industries, a small number of tanneries, and a few olive oil mills. These were all nationalized, not by any sort of expropriation, but by simple government confiscation. The mines and the important oil wells of Kuchovo were easily nationalized. They belonged to Italian companies, and they passed over, by the Allied treaty with Italy, to the Albanian state. Thus everything that can be classified as a " means of production " has become the property of the Albanian government.

In a communistic régime the merchants, being intermediaries, are considered parasites, and it is believed they should be eliminated as a class. Consequently, they became the next victims. Unlike the landowners, they were not deprived of their property by outright confiscation. Instead, the government levied taxes so excessive that, even if they sold everything they possessed, they could not pay. If any merchants miraculously were able to pay their taxes, the government imposed a second tax. When they were unable to meet their obligations, the government confiscated their property. But as this seldom covered the required taxes, the merchants were imprisoned and their families were evicted from their homes. There remained only a few small shopkeepers, who depended on the merchants, and who naturally were doomed to elimination. The state then took over the rôle of the merchants: a class disappeared.

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Such radical changes provoked some resistance. The government has used every means of suppression. It has executed its most dangerous opponents and has imprisoned many others. But the resistance is still there.

In the outside world, Hoxha's government has established close relations only with Russia and her satellites. With Yugoslavia particularly the ties have been so strong that the government has not hesitated to betray the Albanians of Kossovo. When the Germans retreated, Tito's forces tried to occupy Kossovo but they met with strong resistance. The brave Kossovars had decided that their country should remain part of Albania, however communistic the latter might turn out to be. At that difficult juncture for the Yugoslavs, Albanian brigades of the National Liberation Front entered Kossovo in order to appease the inhabitants and later to open the way to Tito's army. Thousands of opponents were executed, and Kossovo today forms part of Yugoslavia.

In the meantime nothing weakened the relations of new Albania with Yugoslavia. In all the Albanian schools, the study of Serbo-Croatian has become obligatory, and many young Albanians have been granted fellowships to study in the University at Belgrade or Zagreb. An economic treaty has been signed between the two countries, and the Yugoslav dinar and the Albanian currency have been made interchangeable, while a customs union is in force. Late in June 1946, Premier Hoxha visited Marshal Tito. The outcome was the conclusion of a pact of friendship and mutual assistance, confirming the resolution of Albania and Yugoslavia to defend jointly their freedom and independence. Allusion was recently made to this pact in connection with the drive of the Greek army against General Marko's guerrillas: a threat on the part of Yugoslavia that raids across the Albanian border and attacks on Albanian troops would invoke its military clauses.

With Bulgaria, another Russian Balkan satellite, relations have also grown closer. On December 16, 1947, during Premier Hoxha's visit to Sofia, a treaty of friendship, collaboration and mutual aid and a cultural convention were signed by him and Prime Minister Dimitrov, and the question of a Balkan or East European Federation seems to have been dis-

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cussed. The unexpected rebuke by *Pravda* appeared on January 28, 1948.

There has been much talk, before and after the war, about a Balkan Federation. For small Albania, whose lands are coveted by neighbors, that would be an ideal solution. But there cannot be any Federation without truly democratic régimes [4] in the federated states. Although governments within the Russian orbit still repeat slogans of independence and sovereignty, they have lost them both. Therefore, the Federation advocated by Premier Dimitrov could only be a union of totalitarian governments.

Most of the control of Albania has passed over to Russia. The port of Valona and the Linguetta (the promontory which protects the bay of Valona) have been fortified. There are Russian advisers for the ministries and Russian organizers in the Albanian army. The Albanian government refused to take part in the Marshall Plan, in spite of the great need for outside help. But Prime Minister Hoxha and members of the cabinet went to Moscow, when summoned there, in order to adhere to the Molotov Plan.

For the Soviet Union Albania is an ideal place from which to exert pressure on Greece. Every movement on the borders can be justified on the ground that Greek claims threaten the integrity of Albanian territory. Of this there has been ample proof. The United Nations Special Committee concluded in its report that "aid in the form of logistical support is being furnished from Albania to the guerrillas operating on Greek territory." [5] Not having signed treaties of collaboration or mutual assistance with Albania, the Soviet government thus avoids formal responsibility for any complications which may arise between Albania and Greece during the current struggle.

After the elections of 1945, both Britain and the United States were inclined to recognize Hoxha's régime. America had set as its only condition that the government should recognize the Albano-American treaties concluded before the

[4] By democratic régime is meant that kind of régime which accepts legal opposition to the ruling class through freedom of press, liberty of association, and free elections for the representatives in parliament.

[5] *The New York Times*, January 18, 1948, 22:1.

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war. These were pacts of an international character, which did not jeopardize any Albanian interests. Hoxha's government, however, refused any recognition. It is interesting to note that the same treaties had previously been recognized by Tito's government. The growing tension between the Soviet Union, on one hand, and Britain and America, on the other, has made little Albania intensify her hostile attitude toward the Western Powers.

The first country to be attacked by the present Albanian government was Great Britain. It was charged that her military mission in Tirana had established contacts with members of the Democratic Front and other Albanians and had organized a plot for the overthrow of the régime. Later the Corfu incident came before the United Nations Security Council, which decided, 7 to 2, that the mines "had been placed with the knowledge of the Albanian Government." Now that case is being heard in the International Court of Justice at the Hague. The Albanian government has maintained that Britain's application was illegal, as there was no special arbitral agreement between the two countries, and that the International Court of Justice was incompetent, since Albania has not signed its statute.

The attack against the United States started later with propaganda in press and speech. Prime Minister Hoxha, on his return from the Paris Conference of 1946, addressed the Albanian youth, accusing the United States of being the principal obstacle to Albania's rights. Meanwhile, the movements of the unofficial American mission at Tirana had been restricted. Next came the staged "plot" in connection with the drainage project of Lake Maliq, in southern Albania. The Albanian government had announced that the works of the lake would be finished on November 29, 1946. When it became evident that a great blunder had been committed, for the drainage could not be completed at the announced date (the works are continuing even to this day) the government of Tirana accused the American Mission and some American members of U.N.R.R.A. of having organized sabotage by subsidizing Albanian engineers. It is significant that the trials in connection with the two mentioned plots began after Britain and America

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had decided to withdraw their missions, when it had become obvious that the Albanian régime did not represent the people and repressed every human liberty.

Dissatisfaction is now manifest in the Albanian army. Officers and soldiers realize that their struggle against the invaders has brought only a change in masters: Albania has passed from Axis to Slavic domination. Some army men have gone into the mountains, while others have crossed the Greek frontier. A majority of them had been members of the Communist party. Any of these deserters who have been apprehended in Albania have been brought before the court and condemned to death as conspirators against the government. One of the condemned was Colonel Kadri Hoxha, a hero of the National Liberation Front and its representative with the Allies in Italy during the war. But of still greater importance were the trials in September 1947, when nine deputies, former members of the Communist party, and a number of intellectuals were accused of plotting the overthrow of Hoxha's government. Some of the defendants, like Koste Boshnjaku, general director of the National Bank, had been veterans of communism. During the war some purges had taken place in the ranks of the Communists. They were primarily directed against members of the group of *Zjarri* and the so-called group of *Te Rinjte* (The Young).

These staged plots in Albania are not unique. They have been seen in all Balkan states within the Russian sphere. The aim is to eliminate every sort of opposition, however democratic it may be, and to justify before the people the government's policy of hostility toward the United States and Britain. The difference has been only in the particular conditions in each country. In Albania, where there are now no American or British representatives, the government is free to choose any accusation it pleases and give it the crudest form. As there are no political parties in Albania—like the Agrarian in Bulgaria or the historical ones in Rumania—which could become targets of the government, the plotters are often accused of having ties with the headquarters of the National Front, which are in Italy. This organization has been the chief opponent of the present régime.

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IV

Communism in Albania has not sprung from the conditions of the country. It is an imposition from outside. As such it is resented by the inhabitants, whom experience has taught: "Offer your hospitality to the foreigner, but be careful not to trust him."

You cannot expect a mountaineer of north Albania to give his support to a régime which tries to destroy the clan system and the patriarchal family so dear to him. Nor is it possible for the peasant of south Albania to back a system which has deprived him of the fields he owned and loved and has lowered him from the position of a master of the land to that of a slave of the state. It cannot be expected that the townsman of Albania, whether in the north or in the south, who has been robbed of his business—small, but his own—will support a régime which has paralyzed the economic life of the nation.

Hoxha's government has not been able to replace what it has destroyed. First, it has not the means. Albania has never been a self-sufficient country; it is even less so after the devastation of the war. Today the doors of emigration are closed on both sides. The Slav protectors cannot aid her, because they have their own economic troubles. Powerful Russia has promised Albania only a little help, and that as a reaction to the Marshall Plan. Secondly, the government lacks capable persons. The honest and more competent Albanians are in the prisons, in foreign lands, or outside the confidence of the Communist party. Thirdly, the changes of the régime run against the very nature of the inhabitants. The Albanians are great lovers of liberty and their song is: "Liberty! Thy banner torn but flying." They cannot stand repressive systems. Their past is full of examples of revolts against oppression.

It is natural to ask, then, in what lies the strength of Hoxha's government. One answer is the terror. The Minister of the Interior, Koci Xoxe, perhaps the most powerful man in Albania, a former tinsmith coming from one of the Albanian villages of Macedonia and a member of the former Korcha Communist group *Puna*, is an unscrupulous person. He has created a wide system of spying and by his staged plots and ruthless persecution

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has terrorized the people. Furthermore, the government has the backing of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. If a revolt should break out in Albania, Tito's armies would march in and suppress it, and Soviet Russia would defend the action before the other great Powers.

In one matter, however, the Albanian government has the complete and unreserved support of the people: the fight against Greece's demands on northern Epirus. This region is that part of southern Albania which includes the prefectures of Korcha (Koritza) and Argyrokastro. It has an area about one fourth of that of all Albania and a population of 292,000, of whom 167,000 are Moslems and 125,000 Orthodox Christians (Albanian census of 1930). Of the latter only 35,000 are Greeks, according to the statistics of the League of Nations, that is, a minority of 12½ per cent. Greece's claims are therefore unfounded and can be labeled expansionist. On the other hand, for mountainous Albania this region is fertile and has been " the cradle of nationalism " and the center of progressive forces. It was there that the fight against the Axis Powers by both the Nationalists and the Communists began and grew. Without it there cannot be an Albania. For it, the Albanians are ready to endure an even more tyrannical government than that of Hoxha and to make supreme sacrifices.

The Tirana government has well appreciated the importance of the northern Epirus question and has exploited it to the full. From the very outset it was ready to fight in order to prevent Greek encroachments on Albanian soil. It appeared then before the people as a government determined to defend the national interest. In this way, the maintenance of 70,000 men under arms finds a justification. Greece's claims have also been used to justify the hostility of the present régime toward Britain and America; for Great Britain has supported the Greeks, and the United States Senate two years ago passed a resolution that northern Epirus should be given to Greece. The same claims serve today as a justification for the support given to the Greek guerrillas, since an extreme leftist government in Greece would give up all demands for southern Albania. Northern Epirus is the key to the inner strength of

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Hoxha's government. It is used as a panacea for all the ills the government has inflicted upon the people. Deprive it of that, and you have stripped it of all popular support.

If Greece abandons her demands on southern Albania, it is certain that she will find across the Grammos Mountains a very friendly people. Greeks and Albanians have many things in common. They fought together in the days of the Greek war of independence against the Turks. There are Albanian settlements in Greece—in Attica, the Aegean Islands, Peloponnesus—dating from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, whose people still speak Albanian in their homes and feel a love for the land of their forefathers.. They are valuable links. Both countries are Mediterranean, and each is more secure if the two people are friendly and allied. Though today the Albanian people are in the grip of a totalitarian régime servile to the Soviet Union and unable to move, tommorow they may be free and able to stretch a friendly hand to Greece. Why not prepare the ground? On the contrary, if Greece continues to claim southern Albania, she will make it easier for the Albanian government to use the country as a military base for General Marko's bands and she will force the Albanian people to go on enduring the preposterous union with Yugoslavia.

Despite the strong anti-American propaganda, Hoxha's government has not succeeded in alienating the people from the United States. They are grateful to the American government for the defense of Albanian rights at the Peace Conference of 1919, when their country ran the risk of being partitioned. They remember that America never recognized Mussolini's occupation of Albania, and that America, and not Soviet Russia, was the first country which, as early as 1942, praised the fight of the Albanian people and reaffirmed their right to enjoy freedom and independence.

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REVIEWS

Kingship and the Gods: A Study of Ancient Near Eastern Religion as the Integration of Society & Nature. By HENRI FRANKFORT. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1948.—xxv, 444 pp. $5.00.

This is a most ambitious attempt to apply the method of phenomenology to the study of a broad cultural, historical pattern: the ideology (more properly, the theology) of kingship in ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia. As such, it merits careful consideration not only for its specific content, narrowly conceived, but also because of its implications for the social sciences as a whole.

Frankfort's approach is set forth very explicitly. "Our treatment", he writes in the Preface, "will be phenomenological in that it will be a 'systematic discussion of what appears'" (p. vii). Further, it "will be unhistorical; but it will be so only because it disregards, not because it violates, historical truths." Chronology is disregarded in order to avoid the trap of "dealing with insignificant modifications of a basic conception" (p. vii), and the findings of comparative anthropology are not considered because the "danger lies in the temptation to force analogies and to forget that each culture is an integrated whole" (p. 382, note 5).

Despite the title, there is no discussion of kingship as a political institution, of administration, royal powers and prerogatives, law, struggles for power and the like. What Frankfort analyzes is the theology of kingship. By a minute study of the available texts and works of art, he documents in the greatest detail the concept of the Egyptian Pharaoh as a god incarnate, through whom the harmonious integration of nature and society was achieved in a cosmic order that had been established once and for all at the time of creation; and of the equally indispensable Mesopotamian king, human and not a god (with exceptions to be noted below), whose central function was to be the servant of the gods in an unstable, basically fearful and dangerous cosmic order. The result is a vast panorama of rites and ceremonies, beliefs and myths, revealing the cosmology of the peoples of Egypt and Mesopotamia in its many facets.

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Frankfort has mastered a prodigious amount of material, and he has brought together in one compilation documents of the greatest value for every student of history and comparative religion. His use of the plastic arts as documentation, aided by reproductions for which one can have nothing but the highest praise, is a particularly noteworthy contribution to methodology. If this work will lead to a better realization of the potentialities of works of art as historical and sociological source materials, that alone will have justified its publication.

The broad general concepts of kingship, Frankfort believes, were static throughout the respective histories of ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia. Here we encounter our first difficulty with his phenomenological approach. That the priests and royal scribes of Egypt went to inordinate lengths to project the notion that nothing changes is well known. Frankfort is perfectly justified in insisting on this point, even in using it as the *leitmotif* of his discussion if he so chooses. But has he the right to accept this ideology as the true picture of Egyptian theology and political theory?

It is unnecessary to consider that question abstractly, for, in the reviewer's opinion, the very evidence Frankfort offers demands an answer in the negative. On the surface, Egyptian theology, with its virtually impenetrable jungle of gods and goddesses, each with many functions and manifestations, is filled with contradictions. Most scholars have acknowledged these contradictions and tried to explain them partly as the product of social and political developments (shifting power relationships among the several priesthoods, for example) and partly as the necessary result of the irrationalism of primitive mentalities. Frankfort rejects absolutely the idea that religious beliefs may be the product of secular developments (on page 356, note 20, for example, he speaks of the "unrealistic and sterile nature of the fashionable 'explanation' of religious phenomena by postulated developments in other spheres such as politics"). More than that, he denies that the seeming contradictions are in fact contradictions at all.

This is the point at which phenomenology is decisive for him. Our mistake, he says over and over again, is in seeking to understand primitive religion with the tools of modern language and modern rationalism, in failing to see (p. 41) that "religious teachings are attempts to put into the conceptual form of language notions which cannot be entirely rationalized—'truths' which are sensed rather than known." By seeking only "what appears"—and, we may add, by

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the exercise of remarkable persistence and ingenuity—Frankfort takes one apparent inconsistency after another and converts it into just one more "aspect" of a single unified doctrine. By emphasizing the idea that such "'truths'. . .are sensed rather than known," he blocks criticism, even disagreement, in advance.

But there comes a point at which even Frankfort's skill is unavailing. Near the end of his final discussion of the innumerable manifestations of the god Osiris, he confesses (p. 196) that

> there is no denying that to us this spreading net of associations and identifications seems to destroy the significance of the symbols involved, and the limit of the meaningful is well passed when we meet in the New Kingdom texts such compounds as "Osiris-Apis-Atum-Horus in one, the Great God." But if we disregard such extremes, we shall find that much that appears senseless at first sight is not without meaning.

The clause, "if we disregard such extremes," is an immediate confession of weakness. To achieve and maintain his picture of a static whole, Frankfort must disregard not a few documents and occurrences in Egyptian history, including, incredible as it may seem, the attempt by the Pharaoh Akhenaten (or Ikhnaton), one of the towering figures in the history of ancient religious thought, to drive religious doctrine into monotheistic channels. Merely to pin the label "extreme" on disturbing phenomena is, to my mind, evasion. In the second place, the particular extreme just cited appears in New Kingdom texts. Obviously, then, chronology is not as dispensable as Frankfort would have it. Why in the New Kingdom, but not in the Old or the Middle? This question, which can legitimately be raised with reference to nearly every text Frankfort quotes, is not only not answered; it is not even raised. He skips at will over 3,000 years of history with but one justification, the axiom of a static culture.

Still another question requires answer: who wrote these "extreme" texts? Frankfort never defines such generalizations as the Egyptians, the Mesopotamians, the community. We are left to assume that all the Egyptians, all the Mesopotamians, or the whole community held a particular belief, for any differentiation would at once introduce diversity, possibly even conflict, which are nonexistent by presupposition. Of course, it is self-evident that any particular text was written down by someone, a concrete, real, actual person. Presumably, who that person was, whom he represented, and how representative he was are irrelevant, for such problems are generally ignored in the book. In at least one case, however, Frankfort is impelled to a startling reversal of attitude. Chapter 2, "The Theoretical Founda-

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tion: The Memphite Theology", presents in detail a text which Frankfort holds to be the oldest Egyptian cosmological formulation. In essence, he argues, we have here the "peculiarly Egyptian" conception of the divine king and his rôle within a static cosmic order. In chapter 13, however, the idea of the monotheism of Ptah expressed in the Memphite Theology contradicts Frankfort's account of the power of Re, the Sun, whereupon he informs us in a note (p. 382, note 59): "But the universalism which the Memphite Theology propounds did not find acceptance outside the circle of Ptah's devotees, for it ran counter to the fundamental Egyptian belief that the sun was the primary source of creative energy." In his original exposition of the Memphite Theology, however, there was no discussion of a special "circle of Ptah's devotees" capable of propounding, though not of disseminating successfully, a doctrine contrary to another "fundamental Egyptian belief".

On page 197, finally, the whole structure that has been built up for Egypt collapses suddenly and without warning. Until this point Frankfort maintained silence about a fact which some scholars consider one of the keys to the understanding of the entire history of Egyptian religion, namely, the appearance in the Middle Kingdom for the first time of the doctrine (and corresponding ritual) that all men after death become the god Osiris. In the Old Kingdom only the king enjoyed eternity as a divinity. For such a tremendous change to have occurred, even Frankfort admits, the "barrier which separated kings and commoners" had to be weakened, and he goes on to speak (p. 209) of "the usurpation of royal prerogatives and funerary usages by the common man." But for 200 pages all this had been proved impossible. Not only could there be no change in essentials, but the king was a transcendental divinity, unapproachable by mere humans. Now we learn that the common man even usurped the royal prerogatives of this transcendental god.

When it comes to Mesopotamia, Frankfort faces a serious difficulty from the outset. On the surface, the political history of that area is the very opposite of unity and uniformity, with its independent city-states engaged in continual conflict, its rapid rise and fall of "empires", and its subjugation by external Powers. To discover a unified, stable pattern of kingship requires first that Frankfort present as axiomatic Jacobsen's recently propounded thesis that Primitive Democracy (always capitalized in the book) was the first form of government in Mesopotamia. This thesis, however, has not found universal acceptance among Semitists by any means, and we should at least

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have been given the evidence. Such a foundation for Frankfort's study, further, denies the view already cited that religious phenomena cannot be explained by "postulated developments in other spheres such as politics."

Then it is necessary for Frankfort to apply a double standard of criteria, one for Egypt, the other for Mesopotamia. He finds it "peculiar" with reference to the Mesopotamian gods Anu and Enlil "that there should have been two kings" of the gods (p. 231), but not at all peculiar that the Egyptians had nine gods prior to the creation. Hammurabi's statement in the preamble to his Code, "I am the sun of Babylon who causes light to rise over the land of Sumer and Akkad," is only a metaphor (pp. 307-8), whereas in the case of Egypt, "when we read over and over again that the king is like the sun, we remember that in the coronation ritual this thought, far from being a mere metaphor, determined the form which part of the rites assumed" (p. 148).

It is precisely on this question of the deification of Mesopotamian kings that Frankfort's method fails him most. He has stated his theory: first, that kingship was a fundamentally unified concept throughout the history of Mesopotamia; second, that here the king was not a divinity but only a divinely sanctioned ruler among men. Against this theory stands a complex of undeniable facts which proclaim that some Mesopotamian kings, at least, were represented as divinities and spoke of themselves as such. Frankfort makes no effort to conceal these facts. What he does is to reduce them to the barest possible minimum, and then to seek an explanation in the ritual of the marriage between the mother-goddess and the divine bridegroom that marked the rites of spring. We know that at times the king performed the part of the divine bridegroom in the ceremony (the sources fail to reveal who played the rôle of the mother-goddess). Perhaps, Frankfort suggests, "only those kings were deified who had been commanded by a goddess to share her couch" (p. 297). But unless one is a worshipper of Ishtar, this is hardly an adequate explanation. How was the goddess' command made known? What were the earthly implications, outside the realm of sexual psychology, in the choice of some kings and not of others? And in any event, what remains of the theory of a unified concept of kingship if some kings were divine and others not, regardless of the basis for divinity?

The root error, I think, behind all the specific contradictions and evasions lies in Frankfort's concept of the "integrated whole". For all his insistence that in human society "the whole determines its

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parts" (quoted from Ruth Benedict on p. 405, note 1), he asks us to accept as axiomatic that Egypt and Mesopotamia were each wholes in this sense (cultural unity and spiritual unity are his most common synonyms) and that kingship constituted the "heart" of the culture.

Thus he finds but two genuinely integrated wholes in the ancient Near East. About Egypt he is especially positive. Even in prehistoric times, he says flatly, "the population of the Nile Valley was as homogeneous, both physically and culturally, as such a large group can ever be" (p. 16). Very much later in his discussion (p. 355, note 8), he introduces a slight qualification: "a corresponding community of beliefs must be postulated (it cannot be proved, of course)." So powerful was this homogeneity that nothing could break it, not even successful invasion. "Foreigners could rise to power in Egypt, but on condition that they were completely assimilated" (p. 337). About Mesopotamia he has a few doubts, some of which have already been suggested, but he ultimately resolves them in his own mind and grants its people similar spiritual unity. For the rest—Palestine and Syria, Anatolia and Persia—they were mere "peripheral regions. . .where autochthonous civilization was feeble." They "lacked cultural individuality, and once immigrants had asserted their power their mastery was complete" (p. 337).

Why should these areas have had such sharply contrasting destinies? Frankfort never puts the question too distinctly nor offers a clear-cut answer. For Egypt, at least, race makes up a large part of the implicit answer. There is repeated reference to the "Hamitic substratum" of Egypt, and analogy with so-called Hamitic and half-Hamitic peoples in contemporary Africa is the one departure from his eschewal of comparative anthropology that he permits himself. Yet race obviously cannot supply the explanation for Mesopotamia, where race mixture is undeniable from earliest times. "The contrast between 'Semites' and 'Sumerians,'" says Frankfort correctly (p. 225), "does not present an answer to any Mesopotamian problem." Geography and physiography prove equally inadequate.

Nor does the book present clearly demarcated beginnings and endings. The unity of Egyptian culture is predynastic (before the political unification of about 3100 B. C.), of Mesopotamia comparably ancient. Frankfort's articulate assurance on this point is paralleled by complete silence about the other end of the chronological scale. Alexander the Great does not appear in this book, nor is there any consideration of how and why the Greeks were able to violate the rule already quoted that "foreigners could rise to power in Egypt, but on condition that they were completely assimilated."

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I suggest that it is the unbreakable link between wholeness or integration and absence of change on the one hand, and the characterization of kingship (in its theological aspect) as the heart of the culture on the other, that have led Frankfort down a road that ended in contradiction and confusion. Cultural unity (I prefer historical unity) is complex and dynamic. Its roots are historical, so are its development, manifestations and ultimate cessation.

In concluding, I must repeat that this book offers a mass of valuable materials, presented and analyzed with great skill and often with remarkable insight and penetration. Yet even the details are often affected, harmfully so, by the underlying theory. Even so able an exponent of phenomenology as Frankfort cannot divorce a "disregard" for history from "violation" of historical truth.

M. I. FINLEY

NEW YORK CITY

Speaking Frankly. BY JAMES F. BYRNES. New York and London, Harper & Brothers, 1947.—xii, 324 pp. $3.50.

It is rare, indeed, that the citizen, worried about the faltering search for peace, has at his disposal so full and frank an account of recent policy as this. To his many notable public services Mr. Byrnes has added that of providing a catalyst to public thinking about our relations with the Soviet Union. In his book he has given an account, the fullest to date, of the crucial conferences at Yalta and Potsdam. His account of the breakdown of the Yalta agreements between Yalta and Mr. Roosevelt's death is a story which has long needed telling. The struggle over the peace treaties with Italy and the satellites is retold with new and important details.

Because this honest book has been summarized and recommended so often, it may be more useful here to consider a few of its omissions. Only rarely, as in his analysis of the Soviet rejection of the proposed forty-year treaty for the disarmament of Germany, does the author attempt to analyze the motives and reasoning back of the words of his Soviet antagonist. For most of the period covered in his account the author assumed that Soviet policy was directed primarily, like American policy, to the settlement of specific differences at issue. Thus, the drafting of the peace treaties appeared to him a desirable end in itself, rather than merely one further stage in a continuous and unavoidable struggle for power.

The assumption that policy is merely the sum of many specific policies led him in turn to underestimate the high degree of coördination

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in Soviet or British policy. A dispute with the Soviet government over Rumania may be felt within a few days in a stiffer attitude in Korea or in louder accusations of rearming Germany, while American negotiators are usually left with little knowledge of issues outside the area of their immediate responsibility and are therefore at a loss in attempting to explain changes of Soviet policy in terms of immediate issues. Thus, Mr. Byrnes appears honestly not to have grasped the connection between the Soviet acrobatics on the question of treaty procedure, at London in September 1945, and his own refusal to discuss the question of control of Japan (pp. 97, 102, 108). The connection of these issues with Soviet aims would have been clearer if the author had not omitted mention of the Soviet government's demand of August 1945 that it be given an equal share in the control of Japan.

In reviewing his policies Mr. Byrnes has done considerably less than justice to his own efforts to promote agreement with the Soviet government. It is only human, after the disappointments which befell these efforts, to underestimate the spirit of accommodation and compromise in which he himself had set about negotiating what he hoped would be an early and stable peace settlement. The final attitude of firmness had been preceded by many and substantial concessions. In all essentials the satellite treaties had been written in accordance with the Soviet recipe. Several of the compromises of the Italian treaty, as in the questions of Trieste and the colonies, were agreements to postpone, rather than to settle, the issues. The steps of American concessions are exemplified in the handling of the question of the Hungarian-Rumanian frontier. At first Mr. Byrnes had to argue, against Soviet opposition, for the need to consider this problem at all; later the American delegation suggested as alternatives direct negotiations between Rumania and Hungary and submission of the question to the peace conference without recommendation by the Big Three. In the end, in order to reduce by one the number of points in dispute, Mr. Byrnes accepted the Soviet proposal to leave the boundary unchanged without even persuading the Soviet delegation to grant a hearing to the two governments, and still later committed himself to uphold this decision in the Conference of Paris.

Hoping to reduce the size of occupation forces and hence Soviet claims for occupation costs, Mr. Byrnes repeatedly sought agreement on this issue. In the end he agreed to balance withdrawal of American and British forces from Italy against Soviet evacuation of Bulgaria, leaving the Soviet government free, until the evacuation of

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Austria, to decide for itself the size of "line of communication" forces which it would maintain in Hungary and Rumania. By playing down his persistent search for agreement through compromises which were often unilateral concessions, Mr. Byrnes has obscured in the readers' minds the process by which he was driven from his original attitude of "give-and-take" to one of standing firm against Soviet pressures.

An excursion, necessarily incomplete and one-sided, into the period of Nazi-Soviet coöperation (pp. 284-292), detracts from the dignity of Mr. Byrnes's book. Similarly, the proposal for making a separate peace with German zonal governments and then appealing to the Security Council to bring about the withdrawal of Soviet forces from eastern Germany seems singularly frivolous, coming from Mr. Byrnes's pen (pp. 200-202).

In 1945 the weakening of British power and the prostration of France were seen but not fully felt. After Potsdam it was clear that only American power, purposefully applied, could set a limit to Soviet ambitions. The readjustment of American policy from over-optimistic, unilaterally held confidence in Allied coöperation to an acceptance of new responsibilities in a bleak post-war world became the painful task of Mr. Byrnes's secretaryship. His sincere efforts to understand and to cope with this task have been told with admirable candor and humility.

PHILIP E. MOSELY

THE RUSSIAN INSTITUTE OF
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Cold War: A Study in U. S. Foreign Policy. By WALTER LIPPMANN. New York and London, Harper & Brothers, 1947.—62 pp. $1.00.

In the July 1947 issue of *Foreign Affairs* there appeared an article on American-Soviet relations inappropriately signed "X", inappropriately since in a short time "X" became as known a quantity as yesterday's weather. The author was George Kennan, head of the policy planning staff of the Department of State, and his article presumably had the cachet of that department. Shortly thereafter there appeared a series of articles in the New York *Herald Tribune* by Walter Lippmann in refutation of "X". These articles have been brought together in the book under review.

The issue in dispute is clear. Mr. X advocates a policy of containment of Russia, of checking the Russians at every point where

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they seek to extend political or military influence. By successive and, of course, successful checks Russia can be held in suspense over a period of years, during which it can be assumed (or by Mr. X it is assumed) that decay will develop and spread in Russia, and its whole system, both political and social, will be eaten away from within. Thereafter both we and the world will be safe. A kind of inverse Marxist reasoning; in other words: it is Marxism, not capitalism, that carries the seeds of its own destruction.

Mr. Lippmann objects on two main grounds. First, the premise is invalid. There is no ground for believing there is any sign of weakness in Russia today, no ground for believing that weakness will develop into decay and decay prove fatal. "Do we dare to assume," he asks, "as we enter the arena and get ready to run the race, that the Soviet Union will break its leg while the United States will grow a pair of wings to speed it on its way?" Second, Mr. Lippmann challenges the conclusion drawn from the false premise. Checking Russia at every point from which it means to debouch gives to Russia the initiative as to time and place and circumstance, an advantage in both political and military contention. Russia will choose the arena and naturally choose it where it itself has the best opportunity, geographically, socially and psychologically. ". . .Moscow, not Washington, would define the issues, would make the challenges, would select the ground where the conflict was to be waged, and would choose the weapons." The United States would be ever on the defensive. It would be perforce a passive agent. It would be driven to one recourse, namely, to recruit, subsidize and support "a heterogeneous array of satellites, clients, dependents and puppets"—Chinese, Afghans, Kurds, Iranians, Turks, Arabs, etc., feeble, unstable, disunited and sometimes elusive. It would be driven, also, to periodic interventions in the internal affairs of the members of the pseudo-coalition. For this as a bastion against Russian power Mr. Lippmann can say little, and this, he holds, is the best Mr. X can offer.

Thus far it is difficult to conceive any effective counter-rebuttal by Mr. X. His case does stand or fall on his premise that there are internal forces in Russia that must weaken it. Unless Russia does weaken from within, each episode of attempted containment by America will drain more heavily on America, since Russia is closer to the areas into which it desires to expand. And if there is any evidence of innate weakness in Russia which must become progressively worse, it is visible to Mr. X alone. It is in the alternative that Mr. Lippmann proposes that he on his part is unconvincing. To him the source of

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Russia's power in Europe, and therefore its threat to the whole of the West, is the presence of the Red Army in eastern Europe. It is only where the menace of Red troops looms directly over a land that a coup can be executed, for otherwise purges, cabinet changes and terrorism of opinion could not be carried out as preliminaries to and accompaniments of a coup. (This is only doubtfully supported by events in Czechoslovakia, but Mr. Lippmann was writing months before.) Without the presence of the Red Army, therefore without purges and terrorism of opinion, Communists, who are in a minority everywhere outside Russia, could not have their way. Therefore a more practical step for the United States is to bring about the evacuation of Europe by Russian troops—and British and American as well, of course. Then each country in Europe could determine its destiny autonomously, and on such a determination, Mr. Lippmann holds, the Communists would not win. A poise would thereby be established in eastern Europe.

Practical? Perhaps. But practicable? At this moment or even in 1947, hardly. If that could have been brought about in 1947, there would be little to worry about now, and there would have been little then. Essentially what Mr. Lippmann is saying is that if there were no situation there would be no situation. The chasm between America and Russia was not dug by the continued maintenance of Russian forces in eastern Europe. Russian forces were maintained in eastern Europe because there was a chasm.

In short, Mr. X and Mr. Lippmann cancel each other out. Neither the American government nor the student of world politics can get much light from either.

NATHANIEL PEFFER

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

America's Destiny. By HERMAN FINER. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1947.—vi, 407 pp. $5.00.

Since the title of Professor Finer's book is also the key to his thesis, he is quick at the outset to disclaim its Kiplingesque ring. "Destiny" for him in this context, he assures us, is "neither a preachment of duty nor the call to a crusade." It is simply the recognition of a political void in the world, a possibility for a world rôle that only America is capable of filling. The heart of the author's views is expressed in the following: "The bitter truth is, that in the absence of a common world superior and a common world morality, peace and justice can be sustained only by intimidatory force supplied by individual nations.

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For our time, the application of mingled persuasion and force devolves in the first place upon the strongest power, America" (p. 367).

This conclusion the author reaches after a developmental analysis of the most painstaking, informed and responsible kind. Professor Finer's textual documentation itself serves as a useful index of a kind to recent political history. Of particular importance are two protracted studies of the political and historical bases of Great Britain and the Soviet Union. For his analysis of the former, the author has drawn on the knowledge gained as a member of the Senior Staff of the University of London's School of Economics for more than two decades, his rôle as a governmental consultant, and his life-long interest and acquaintance with the British political and social scene. His grave concern regarding the policies of the U.S.S.R., and its rôle in the current world situation, has caused him to study diligently the recent diplomatic, ideological and social history of that country, particularly since the February and October revolutions. This purview includes critical analysis of the philosophical and political views of the revolutionary and post-revolutionary Bolshevik leaders.

The author's findings are characteristically nonevasive, and therefore are as disconcerting as reality boldly faced usually is. Of the preventive value of atom-bomb disarmament, he is pessimistic. "The gravest truth of all is that it is known that such bombs can be made, have been made, have been used, and promise self-defense or world mastery" (p. 13). About world government: "Complete world government, taut and comprehensive, is not to be sought" (p. 61). So long as national differences are so great, verbal international government—even if formally achieved—would hardly settle present fears growing out of national rôles.

The crux of the present political impasse, as the author sees it, is the rôle of the Soviet Union. The indictment of the U.S.S.R. is based in the main on its expansionistic and terroristic activities in Europe and elsewhere, its veto-filibuster in the UN, its saber-rattling, and its totalitarian government that internal distress may keep forcing outward. The peace of the world is threatened; and only the United States, acting in concert with its allies, is capable of stopping this trend. Professor Finer's advice is to carry a big stick, and when necessary speak loudly. In more specific terms, he means that the Soviet Union has not responded to measures of appeasement; the only remaining hope for peace is the use of force, if necessary, in the cause of self-preservation and the maintenance of some semblance of international morality.

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Written in the main in advance of the formulation of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, this book anticipates some of their provisions. The time lag that has elapsed since the writing and the publication of this account undoubtedly has injured the appropriately urgent tone of some of the author's formulations. His arguments, so painstakingly marshaled, are in a number of cases already in the public political domain; his analytic approach and herculean documentation, however, are not. And it seems likely that the more lasting value will be attached to these.

JULIEN STEINBERG

NEW YORK CITY

The Great Rehearsal. By CARL VAN DOREN. New York, The Viking Press, 1948.—xxix, 336 pp. $3.75.

The American people rarely require of an author any justification for a laudatory book on the Constitution of the United States. The long-established tradition of "canonizing the Constitution" which Von Holst pointed out seventy years ago in the opening chapters of his voluminous *Constitutional and Political History of the United States* has been sustained vigorously to the present day by the annual literary pilgrimages of scholars, judges, lawyers, politicians, journalists, antiquarians and, more recently, the skillful public relations men of business organizations. In consequence, the stacks of free public libraries even in small country towns are fairly sagging with the accumulations of one hundred and sixty years under the innocent-looking subject heading, *U. S.-Constitution.* Nevertheless, according to American popular belief, competition is supposed to beget enterprise and there is an apparently unlimited reservoir of venture scholarship pressing to enter the various channels of constitutional study.

A noteworthy addition to the history of the making and ratifying of the Constitution of the United States has been offered by Dr. Van Doren under the title of *The Great Rehearsal.* This title will probably puzzle the uninitiated who have had no experience with the ingenuity of the title-makers for books on the Constitution or, for that matter, on any subject these days. For this reason, perhaps, the publishers have placed conspicuously on the book jacket and the title page the clarifying subtitle: *The Story of the Making and Ratifying of the Constitution of the United States.*

For the less imaginative reader who would fail to see any rehearsal tendencies in the making and ratifying of the Constitution, the sub-

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title might be more mystifying than clarifying. The mere turning of the title page will solve the mystery for such a reader because Dr. Van Doren, in three and a half pages of preface, not only explains the meaning of the title but also advances the underlying thesis of the work. That thesis, in a few words, is that the experience of the men in the Federal Convention of 1787 "might be, though of course no one then ever used the term, a rehearsal for the federal governments of the future" and an encouragement to the "friends of world federation in 1948" (p. x).

For millions of Americans beset by terrible anxieties over the world situation, Dr. Van Doren's historical insight will have a compelling attraction. They can at least take comfort in the knowledge that our own sacred constitutional tradition offers a beacon light for the darkness ahead. It must be emphasized, however, that Dr. Van Doren states this rehearsal thesis with commendable caution, pointing out that "the parallel between 1787 and 1948 is naturally not exact" (p. viii). As a matter of fact the rehearsal interpretation, after being explained in the preface, does not have any further explicit development in the main body of the work.

Yet, it would be a careless reader indeed who would say that the rehearsal thesis is merely a prefatory rumination on Dr. Van Doren's part. Although the rehearsal theme is never sounded again explicitly in the book, it controls the entire structure and development of the work. In his orderly and thorough "story" of the making and the ratifying of the Constitution, Dr. Van Doren emphasizes particularly the debates over the Virginia Plan and the New Jersey Plan and the resulting compromise as one means of pointing up the argument between the large-minded supporters of a federal government, or "super-state", and the narrow-minded supporters of an ineffectual league of sovereign states. Similarly, in his treatment of personalities, Washington and Franklin acquire overpowering greatness and wisdom, while the critics and opponents of the Constitution were petty men with low motives and selfish prejudices. Richard Henry Lee, for example, is disposed of with a quotation from Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut as a man of "factious spirit" with an "implacable hatred to General Washington" (p. 190).

Dr. Van Doren's particular pattern of interpretation is woven with no new materials. His book is based upon the well-known collections of original records such as Farrand's *The Records of the Federal Convention* and Elliott's *Debates*, as well as the standard monographs and biographies dealing with the Convention and ratification. The more

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important of these are duly acknowledged in a short bibliographical note at the end of the book. There are practically no footnote citations of sources in the book but none are really needed by those familar with the sources and none would be desired by popular readers.

It remains for us to ask ourselves as citizens, just as concerned with the state of the world as Dr. Van Doren is, whether the rehearsal interpretation is a useful one for our generation. In this connection it would be ungenerous not to commend the author for the nobility of his hopes for a world government and for reminding us that fatalistic despair is as senseless now as it would have been in 1787. Nevertheless, Dr. Van Doren is offering a pretty thin soup to a peace-hungry world. Impressive as the story of the making of the American Constitution is, the history of European federalism and federalist experiments would, in the opinion of this reviewer, probably be more instructive to mankind.

AMHERST COLLEGE EDWIN C. ROZWENC

Our Enemy, the State. By ALBERT JAY NOCK. 2nd Edition. Caldwell, Idaho, The Caxton Printers, Ltd., 1946.—x, 209 pp. $2.50.

The Individual, the State and World Government. By A. C. EWING. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1947.—ix, 322 pp. $4.00.

This is not the place to decide whether or not the author of *The Memoirs of a Superfluous Man* was fortunate in the selection of his title. Though most opinions advanced by Nock in *Our Enemy, the State* call for disagreement, one point is indisputably correct: namely, that this book is not only " useless " as he puts it, it is also superfluous (notwithstanding the publication of a second edition in 1946, a fact which would normally make a reviewer hesitate to utter so strong a statement). Its defects do not result from the author's thesis which, regardless of its scientific soundness, would lend itself to a stimulating presentation of original material. As the title indicates, the central theme is the wickedness of the " state " as contrasted with " government " and " society "; hence Nock rebukes Laski for his distinction between the state and officialdom.

In Nock's words, " the State is not . . . a social institution administered in an anti-social way. It is an anti-social institution." Echoing Oppenheimer, he asserts that " the State invariably had

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its origin in conquest and confiscation." Quoting Ortega y Gasset, he predicts that "the State, after sucking out the very marrow of society", will be left dead. Obviously Nock's basic assumptions are in the tradition of individualistic anarchism as initiated by Godwin and Proudhon, Stirner and Nietzsche, although the author seems to be unaware of his spiritual forbears. His knowledge of the political and economic theories critical of the state appears to be confined to the works of Paine, Spencer, Henry George, Oppenheimer and Ortega. Oversimplified summaries of their ideas constitute large portions of Nock's book. Wherever Mr. Nock strikes one as original, his statements fall into the realm of fiction. Thus he discovers that Switzerland "has nothing worth stealing". True, his book contains a few interesting episodes from America's economic history—yet on closer scrutiny they turn out to be adaptations from Beard, Sakolski, and so on, seasoned with numerous quotations from the writings of a certain "Mr. Jefferson". In view of the exploits of the totalitarian states, Mr. Nock's indictment of the state is antiquated and, above all, makes dull reading.

Fortunately, Ewing's study goes to show that even to the character of the state there is once in a while another side. It also illustrates that a writer can be original without the risk of being called a "crackpot". Dr. Ewing, Lecturer in Moral Science in the University of Cambridge, feels it the philosopher's duty to contribute to the solution of the great problems of our day—"individualism versus totalitarianism, democracy versus dictatorship, nationalism versus internationalism, and militarism versus pacifism." Being a political philosopher, he is concerned with the ends rather than the means of political action. In the last analysis his ethical values are the expression of a rejuvenated and refined utilitarianism, which, as the author stresses, is not necessarily identical with hedonistic utilitarianism. With this scheme of values in mind, Ewing undertakes to discuss thoroughly and judiciously the various conventional theories put forward either to glorify the inalienable rights of the individual or to buttress the absolute sovereignty of the state. In his view, the individual does enjoy ethical as distinguished from legal rights "which must not be set aside except in very unusual circumstances and for very stringent reasons, and which need not be justified by a consideration of the general good, though they would have to be set aside if they conflicted too much with that good." In other words, Ewing agrees with Kant that the individual should never be treated as mere means.

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The middle-of-the-road position taken by the author with regard to civil rights is paralleled by his attitude toward democracy. Weighing anew the traditional and current arguments in the case of democracy he arrives at its acquittal for want of a better type of government: "Perhaps in the last resort the main argument for democracy as we know it is only the impossibility of finding a less unsatisfactory alternative. . . ." The author is at his best when dealing with "International Government and the Prevention of War". His criticism of the ethics and practicalities of collective punishment for Germany is as sound and ingenious as his demolition of the fetish of national sovereignty. His deduction that international government provides more national independence than legal state sovereignty is a masterpiece of logical reasoning.

As is perhaps inevitable, the author's emphasis on ethics and logic leads him to neglect at times the historical, sociological and economic aspects of political phenomena. When he refuses to treat the problem of socialism versus capitalism—a subject reserved, in his opinion, to the economic expert—he overlooks the incidence of capitalism upon fascism. The question remains whether or not traditional capitalism with its recurrent crises furnishes the basis for fascism, which in turn seems inseparable from war and incompatible with effective international government.

Ewing also fails to discuss the concept of the state in its proper historical and sociological setting. Though at times correctly distinguishing between state and society, he tends to include in his concept of the state also a central authoritative organization which does not make use of force. Much confusion can, however, be avoided if the state is seen as that type of authoritative organization which specializes in the application of legal sanctions. It will then become clear that the state constitutes a transitional type of social organization characteristc only of the world-historical age of civilizations, an institution replacing the organizations based upon the authority of custom, which were typical of the primitive societies, and possibly foreshadowing a social organization based exclusively upon the authority of "reason" ("intuition" as well as "reasoning", as Ewing has put it). These and a few other shortcomings notwithstanding, it is gratifying to see that present-day England can still produce a thinker so "Benthamite" and still so "un-Hobbesian" as A. C. Ewing.

Ossip K. Flechtheim

Colby College

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The United Nations. By HERBERT VERE EVATT. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1948.—154 pp. $2.50.

Today, two years after the end of hostilities, peace has not yet been made with the major enemy states. In the interval, Great Power relations have so deteriorated that the threat of another war is beginning to cast its shadow across an anxious world. In these unhappy circumstances, it is only natural that the United Nations, upon which the hopes of mankind have been so hopefully fixed, should now be the object of discouraged and disparaging comment. Now, more than ever, it is imperative to examine the limits and the capacities, actual and potential, of the United Nations. For such a task, Dr. Evatt, Australia's energetic Minister for External Affairs, is admirably fitted, and it was a happy thought which led the Harvard authorities to ask him to deliver the 1947 Holmes lectures on "The United Nations". They merit wide and careful reading.

Those who regard the UN as a Great Power conception which was forced, willy nilly, upon the lesser states at San Francisco will profit from reading Dr. Evatt's version of the drafting of the Charter. Understandably, the author does not minimize the changes in the original Dumbarton Oaks text which the smaller Powers, often under Australian leadership, persuaded the sponsoring Powers to accept. The difficulty is that, while the Australian proposals and their outcome are fully stated, the important contributions to the final Charter which were the product of some of the other smaller Powers are insufficiently discussed. Even so, however, the analysis does go far to put the drafting process in its proper perspective.

As viewed from the Foreign Office of one of the smaller states, what are the prospects for the United Nations? The author is experienced enough in the field of international affairs to know the future of the organization depends upon Great Power political relations far more than they depend on it. At the same time, he is fully aware that the organization, through the mere fact of its existence, can have a beneficial influence upon the general climate of international relations. Therefore, while he inveighs against the iniquities of the Security Council veto with arguments which are now timeworn, he directs attention to the General Assembly as the organ which contains the best hope for the development of the UN as an effective agency to assist in the maintenance of international peace. He points out cogently that the Assembly is not precluded from discussing any topic, whatever its nature, just because it happens to be on the Security Council agenda, and he makes a strong argument for the position that

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the Charter authorizes the Assembly to take any action relating to peace except that which would fall clearly within the category of "enforcement action". The same line of reasoning leads him to give his full blessing to the United States-inspired "Little Assembly" as a proper and legally correct development.

As of last fall, Dr. Evatt felt that the two things most urgently necessary for the most effective functioning of the United Nations—assuming that the veto could not be changed—were the early conclusion of the remaining peace treaties and more effective pledges given by the members to the UN to take drastic steps to curtail all propaganda favoring any type of aggressive action or policy. The first is undeniably important. The second now seems to be less fundamental, considered as a practicable and effective measure, than it was even six months ago.

GRAYSON KIRK

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

A Wandering Student: The Story of a Purpose. By SIR BERNARD PARES. Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, in cooperation with Howell, Soskin, Publishers, 1948.—xv, 448 pp. $4.50.

Fifty-four years ago Sir Bernard Pares set out to study western and central Europe to prepare himself for his lifework, the study of Russia. He had reached the conclusion that the Germans were bent on keeping Russia and England apart, and he was determined to see for himself and ultimately for England whether this was logical. His memoirs are the chronicle of a rich experience, in which he tells us that his goal was achieved. Russia sided with England in two world wars against Germany.

Sir Bernard is so thoroughly accepted as the dean of writers in English upon the Russian Empire and the U.S.S.R. that he needs no introduction. His *A History of Russia* is used everywhere and his lighter books have been sold by the tens of thousands. His friends and those interested in the color of events which have stirred Europe in the past half-century will delight in this new volume. It is the tale of a raconteur at his best, providing insights into the student life of England, France, Germany and Russia before the First World War. Intimate glimpses of eminent men fill the pages—Nicholas II, Leo Tolstoy, Kitchener, Lloyd George, Milyukov, Guchkov, Witte, Sir Edward Grey, Stolypin and Ambassador Maisky. Readers are treated to such revealing comments as Witte's, "I have a constitution in my head, but as to my heart, I spit on it"; Stolypin's, "I am a constitu-

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tionalist, but I am not a parliamentarist"; Kitchener's lament regarding his Russian allies (which was echoed again and again a generation later), "But I can't get any details out of them"; and Maisky's, "I don't think diplomatists do very much. In my opinion a good diplomatist is one who reduces the unfavorable factors to 40 per cent and makes 100 per cent of the good ones!"

Sir Bernard is at his best in recounting his experiences in old Russia. To read of this academic figure—organizing for his government the first visit of Duma leaders to England in 1909, representing his government at the Russian front during the first war because the Russian Minister of War would not permit a British officer to go to the front, and lecturing across Siberia on the value of staying by England when Russia was being consumed by the Bolshevik revolution not far behind him so that he had to escape through the Artic Ocean—provides a thrilling portrait of the indomitable Englishman determined to do the necessary for king and country. Sir Bernard gives his own conclusion of the Russians in 1904 when he states: ". . . the Russians were not the enigma that every one seemed to suppose. It was not that they had some extra 'dimension' which was lacking in us, but that, if anything, they were short of a dimension."

Those who know Russian history will find the book filled with detail to fill gaps in the standard accounts. Intimate glimpses of peasants on the estate of a landlord whose manor house was burned, as Sir Bernard lay on the grass with the peasants; the arrival of a Bolshevik delegation led by a spectacled woman at the front to tell the soldiers to stop saluting officers; the reception of a speaking team of the Provisional Government trying to sell the war loan—all of these glimpses fill in the official accounts. Sir Bernard became so much a part of the Russian side that he refers to it throughout as "us", and even calls his native British army, which he also visited, the "British".

A smaller part of the book is devoted to the U.S.S.R. and Sir Bernard's findings on his various trips. Perhaps the most valuable part of this section is to be found in the report of conversations with Ambassador Maisky at the time of the Soviet-German Pact of 1939 and after. Maisky seems to have found Sir Bernard a good weather vane of British opinion and a channel for his own messages to England and even America. He told Sir Bernard in 1942, when the latter was sailing for America, "I wish you could get out of their heads that we want to make a revolution there."

A life such as this is always varied, and there is much in the book besides Russia. Sir Bernard gives in some details England's experience

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with area studies, such as those now popular in the United States. There are sage comments about Americans. The story of a boyhood at Harrow and Cambridge is mindful of *Tom Brown's School Days*.

The whole story is told with a warmth of human understanding and with charm. The book can be commended to those who seek good relaxation on a day off among events and people who are a part of their professional lives as historians, political scientists or Russian area specialists.

JOHN N. HAZARD

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Germany—Bridge or Battleground. By JAMES P. WARBURG. New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc., 1947.—xi, 386 pp. $3.50.

James P. Warburg, international banker in the 1920's, financial adviser at the London Economic Conference of 1933, and Director for Propaganda Policy in the Office of War Information in World War II, is obviously fascinated by the subject of our foreign policy. He brings to it the lucid mind of the expert and the zeal and enthusiasm of the amateur. He believes that "no democratic government can be expected to develop a wise foreign policy, unless that policy is rooted in the soil of informed public opinion." Europe, he feels, is the focus of the foreign problem and Germany is the key to a European solution. Like many others he has thought long and seriously about what to do with Germany.

Mr. Warburg has organized his material well. The opening section traces the details of the Four Power failure, with discussions of Germany two years after Hitler, pre-surrender planning, post-surrender confusion, and the attempt to make Potsdam work. In the second major section he gives a competent survey of Germany under Potsdam, with descriptions of the Soviet, French, British, and United States zones. Then, on the assumption that there are too many doctors handling the patient, he presents a fifty-page "basis for diagnosis", in which he sketches in broad outlines the causes of the German disaster found in certain aspects of German history, cultural traditions, and in the psychological, political and economic structure of German society. He warns that the germs of the disease which has afflicted the German people are latent in all human beings but that "these germs have flourished with particular virulence and vigor in the German body political largely because the German way of life became a culture peculiarly qualified to nourish their growth and to kill off their anti-bodies."

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In his final major section Mr. Warburg offers a set of yardsticks for the future, by which the reader may reach an independent judgment as to whether our policy is tending to make Germany a bridge between East and West or a battleground. The essence of the twofold problem is how to make the present poorhouse and plague-center of Germany into a powerhouse for the reconstruction of Europe without letting the powerhouse ever again become an arsenal. The author then describes the long and arduous process of cultural revolution which must take place if a " new, peaceful, and mature German nation is eventually to emerge under Allied guardianship."

Mr. Warburg is certain that the Morgenthau idea of " de-industrialization " is all wrong and that the Sumner Welles (and French) reliance upon partition will not do. With considerable polish and subtlety he presents what may be termed the " Warburg Plan for Germany ". Some of it is hazy but these concepts emerge:

1. The United States should unequivocally oppose any revision of the Franco-German frontier. (*Mr. Warburg spent several weeks in the area during the summer of 1946; the French at that time had been there for just 1,103 years since the Treaty of Verdun.*)

2. The United States must insist upon a reopening of the question of Germany's eastern frontier. (*Subsequent events have made this somewhat of an academic question.*)

3. The United States should move for the immediate carrying out of the various provisions of the Potsdam Agreement for treating Germany as an economic and political whole, and for the elimination of interzonal barriers. (*The Russians, with normal perversity, would immediately oppose this on general principles.*)

4. No later than January 1, 1948 the four occupying Powers should formally terminate the Period of Occupation and enter upon a Period of Observation and Control. (*Mr. Warburg's proposal places upon the German people the responsibility for their own future, which is fair enough, but the time element will cause some doubts.*)

5. There should be a revised and simplified Level-of-Industry Plan, with a definitive understanding on the nature and amount of reparations. Unborn generations of Germans should not be reduced to an artificially limited standard of living and a sort of second-class European citizenship. (*All men of good-will will share this hope.*)

6. The occupation should terminate when the treaty of peace is signed, but not until there is a " complete cure " of the German people. (*There is plenty of evidence to show at the current writing that, far from being " completely cured ", many Germans are beginning to find fault with the American Occupation, its " naïve " system*

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of reëducation, its bungled de-nazification, and its "comic-book culture".)

The appendix gives a useful compilation of historical documents, indispensable for the student of recent German history. With more vanity than good judgment, however, Mr. Warburg includes among such vital documents as the Atlantic Charter, JCS 1067, the Yalta Declaration and the Potsdam Agreement, three documents of his own memoranda and proposals which are good examples of inter-office correspondence but scarcely of historical importance.

LOUIS L. SNYDER

THE CITY COLLEGE OF NEW YORK

Decentralize for Liberty. 2nd Edition. By THOMAS HEWES. New York, E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1947.—238 pp. $3.00.

Concentration is, and has been, a characteristic of the national economy. Concentration with regard to space is seen in the large populations in small areas—cities. Concentration with regard to ownership has been part of the rise of the great corporations, controlled by a comparatively tiny group of people and maintained by the great majority of people who are caught in the dilemma of working to live and living to work, and who are more and more pushing up their standard of living by spending all they make and surrendering their liberties in exchange for the insurance of a minimum security—if and when they live longer than their usefulness or jobs continue.

The trend initiated by the introduction of the machine into the process by which people convert the materials of the earth into products they need to sustain themselves shows that excessive specialization, dense populations, dominating big unions, and an ever-expanding central government have all intertwined in the growth of big business based on the factory system.

To reverse this trend, the creation and enforcement of a free market is deemed to be the major and probably the only proper rôle of the federal government in the national economy. That is the primary thesis here presented. The Plan of Action which the author describes in detail is conceded to be a first draft.

The objective of the decentralization here proposed is to develop the largest number of wholly or partially independent people. The author's plan is a comprehensive one. For instance, in the federal government, the Departments of Labor, Agriculture, and Commerce would be abolished because they represent special interests. The various federal security agencies would be useless because

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the majority of people would be striving for their own security through productive work. Only those functions of the regulatory agencies that are indispensable for enforcing a free market would be continued under a Department of Economics.

Government would leave Washington and go back to the state capitals, county seats, cities, towns and villages. What remains of government after that long trek would be within the bounds of understanding and within the limits of administration of the American citizen. The search for security would again take the form of work, business activity, and forsake the form of waiting in line for interviews by tax-paid security administrators. Production would replace rationing.

Population would be spread throughout the United States, not concentrated in 246 counties. Ownership of business would be more local and more widespread. Labor would be represented on each firm's board of directors. Each state would abolish many of its useless job-making functions and enter the field of encouraging small businesses and home ownership through revolving loan funds and public authorities guided by unpaid boards or commissions. Quicker bankruptcy procedures, revision and reduction of taxes through a reduction of government activities, establishment of a sound dollar, restricted immigration, foreign trade of a goods-for-goods variety, systematic reduction of national debt, codification of federal and state statutes, and the establishment of an Economic Court with 48 divisions for economic litigation—all these are included in the plan so that "the largest possible number shall have economic independence, viz., shall own their own homes; own all or part of a productive business in which they are engaged; have savings; have a trade or skill."

It is urged that general economic disturbances will be felt less and even a defense against atomic bomb attacks will be provided by this economic and physical dispersion.

The aim of the author is thoroughly in the classic "American tradition". The message is a timely one. But the "Plan of Action", however admirable in its daring and in its force, seems impractical for at least one reason. After describing this present American economy as the summation of a long trend, the author underestimates the opposition to his plan. A poll of the wishes of the majority would probably reveal no such desire for the work that a restoration of real liberty would necessarily entail. Long-term trends in a community of millions of people are not subject to quick reversion. The reason is simple. A majority of the voting population has a stake of some kind in the economy as it stands; and

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that stake is not easily sacrificed in the immediate present for gaining a political ideal in the future.

Mr. Hewes's Plan of Action, though morally good, fails to take account of the complexities of these interests. Nevertheless he has challenged America to consider why we do not seek the salvation of liberty, democracy, and the betterment of our individual and collective lot within, rather than without, the bounds of our political heritage.

New Haven, Connecticut JOHN J. GRAHAM

The New Economics: Keynes's Influence on Theory and Public Policy. Edited by SEYMOUR HARRIS. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1947.—xxii, 686, ix pp. $6.00 Trade; $4.50 Text.

Professor Harris is amply justified in calling this book on Keynesian economics *The New Economics.*

It is often pointed out that the men who laid the foundations of modern English and American economic doctrine—men like Smith, Ricardo, Malthus and Mill—were deeply interested in questions of economic policy. Their conception of their discipline is indicated by the term *political economy,* and their principles of political economy were directed to the vital socio-economic problems of the day. Throughout the latter part of the nineteenth century and the first part of the twentieth, economic theory developed on these foundations, but as it was extended and refined it became increasingly scholastic and particularistic and less concerned with policy problems. This was due partly to the fact that the theory was concerned largely with the working of impersonal economic (market) forces, and to the general acceptance of the proposition that economic progress and welfare would be maximized if such forces were left to work freely, "unimpeded by man or his organizations." Thus conventional economic theory based on the work of the English political economists tended to serve as a system of apologetics for laissez faire capitalism while the institutions of capitalism were evolving ever farther from the assumptions of the theory.[1]

John Maynard Keynes did more than anyone else in the twentieth century to revitalize economic theory, to stimulate discussion and research along new lines, to influence economic policy, and finally to discredit the doctrine of the inherent automatism of competitive capitalism. Naturally his work has provoked voluminous controversy.

[1] Of course Marxian economic doctrine, primarily concerned with attacking capitalism, evolved from the same roots.

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There are few areas in non-Marxist economic thought, however, in which the Keynesian influence has not been felt. Considering its wide ramifications, it is astonishing that the "Keynesian Revolution" could have occurred in only twelve years, since the publication, in 1936, of *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money.*

The New Economics brings together essays by twenty-six leading economists, dealing with Keynes and his work, the development of Keynesian thought, and the Keynesian influence in various fields. Although the announced purpose of the book is to present an analysis of Keynesian economics, it is not a systematic exposition of Keynes's thought, but rather a series of views from many angles.

The book is organized in ten sections. Four of the sections deal with Keynes as an economist, the broad issues of Keynesian economics, Keynesian postulates and analytical tools, and the development of Keynes's economic thinking. Four sections deal with particular areas: international economic relations; economic fluctuations, trends, and fiscal policy; money and prices; and effective demand and wages. The ninth section is comprised of reprints of some of the earlier discussions provoked by the *General Theory,* and the tenth is a bibliography of Keynes's writings which, evidencing his prolificness, fills twenty-two pages. For the most part the writers are sympathetic; there are no attacks on fundamental postulates such as are still being waged by the die-hard doctrinaires of laissez faire persuasion, nor criticisms of the fundamental concepts of Keynesian methodology, like those which have been made by Dr. Arthur F. Burns of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

There are several tantalizingly brief biographical sketches which indicate what a fabulous figure, in the range of his interests and accomplishments, Keynes was. Not only was he the leading economist of the twentieth century, a highly successful business man, and the statesman who did more than anyone else to promote the post-war international monetary organizations, but he gained repute as a mathematician and logician, masterful writer of prose, bibliophile and patron of the arts.

Keynes's greatest influence, of course, stems from his theories of unemployment and instability which emphasized the crucial importance, for economic activity in the money economy, of money spending. His conclusions as to the inability of the capitalistic economy automatically to maintain optimum levels of spending led naturally to proposals for fiscal and monetary controls. He is popularly associated with government spending policies and policies to raise the general level of consumption, but these were prescriptions

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for depression. Periods of inflation, he emphasized, called for very different measures.

To the doctrinaire laissez faire advocates, Keynes's misgivings about the automatism of the competitive enterprise system were and are rank heresy. His less scrupulous detractors have made invidious comparisons with Marx, and it is true that in some respects Keynesian and Marxian analyses are somewhat similar. But ideologically Keynes was as far as possible from Marxism, and, in one of the most interesting essays in *The New Economics*, Dr. Paul Sweezy takes Keynes to task for the narrow historical (non-Marxist) perspective in which he thought and wrote.

Despite his break with conventional doctrine, Keynes's primary concern was to maintain the capitalistic system in good working order; in communism he saw little merit. In a passage from his *Essays in Persuasion*, quoted in Professor Paul Samuelson's article, he says: "How can I adopt a creed which, preferring the mud to the fish, exalts the boorish proletariat above the bourgeois and intelligentsia who, with all their faults, are the quality of life and surely carry the seeds of all human advancement?"

The New Economics is the most comprehensive and interesting volume on Keynesian economics yet to be published. It will be most useful to those who already have some idea of the main issues involved, but there is much of interest to anyone having even a tangential concern with modern economic thought.

LYLE C. FITCH

WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY

The Elements of Economics: An Introduction to the Theory of Price and Employment. By LORIE TARSHIS. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947.—xii, 699 pp. $4.50.

Professor Lorie Tarshis has performed a pioneering task and made a considerable contribution to the teaching of an elementary course in economics. He starts with the premise that the introductory course in economics should give the student an understanding of the economic problems of the day, in order to prepare him to participate intelligently in determining the economic policy of the country. This the author accomplishes admirably and there is definite justification in the claim of the editor of the Houghton Mifflin economic series that the "book contains the best that the expert economist has to offer regarding the economic problems of our times, and in particular, the over-all problem of full employment and the optimum functioning of the system. . ." (Preface, p. vi).

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The book starts out with a descriptive presentation of the structure of our economy in which the latest available statistics are utilized. This is followed by the traditional analysis of price determination and output of the individual firm and the operations of the financial sector of the economy.

Part Four covers more than one third of the volume, and deals with the determinants of national income and employment. It attempts "to give a simple account" of Keynes's *General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money.* In Part Five, the author then applies to international trade the results of the discussion on national income and employment. The final section of the text treats some special problems concerning distribution.

Like most pioneering works, *The Elements of Economics* is subject to some shortcomings from a pedagogical point of view. In parts it is difficult for teaching at an elementary level. It appears that the book will need considerable revision before it will satisfy the needs for a text in introductory economics. Occasionally, Professor Tarshis presupposes considerable knowledge on the part of the students of the subject matter discussed. Thus, in the discussion of means for maintaining full employment, a knowledge of shifting and incidence of taxation is assumed.

In the introduction to Part Four, "The National Income and Employment", the author quotes from Keynes's preface to the *General Theory*: "The ideas which are here expressed so laboriously are extremely simple and should be obvious. The difficulty lies, not in the new ideas, but in escaping from the old ones, which ramify, for those brought up as most of us have been, into every corner of our minds." The quotation applies to Part Four of the *Elements* as well. The necessity of introducing the marginal concept and the mathematical calculations at an elementary level in the analysis of the determinants of income is open to question.

On the other hand, the departure from the conventional approach is refreshing and most helpful in teaching. The treatment of distribution is particularly outstanding. The illustrative material of price determination is also helpful in presenting a realistic picture of the operations of the economy rather than ideal abstractions into which elementary economics courses too frequently fall.

In spite of the shortcomings listed above, *The Elements of Economics* is highly recommended for consideration in selecting a textbook for an introductory course. The difficulties the student may find in struggling through some sections of the book will be rewarded by obtaining a recognizable description of our present-day economy.

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The text is particularly suitable in economics courses which are preceded by a contemporary civilization or similar course, where the student has mastered an elementary knowledge of the functioning of the economy before he takes the first course in economics.

SAR A. LEVITAN

ASSOCIATED COLLEGES OF UPPER NEW YORK
SAMPSON, N. Y.

Argentina at the Turn of 1946/47. By WALTER P. SCHUCK. Buenos Aires, Argentine Financial Service, 1947.—132 pp. Pesos 60.00.

Revolution before Breakfast: Argentina, 1941-1946. By RUTH AND LEONARD GREENUP. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1947.—xiii, 266 pp. $4.00.

General Perón's "economic revolution" now going on in Argentina is the subject of two recent books. Dr. Schuck's is "an annual analysis of Argentine business and finance", a very useful survey prepared by the editor of a financial newsletter formerly published in Buenos Aires. Renamed "Atlantic Financial Service", it is now being written from Montevideo where the noted German-born economist and critic of Perón's régime prefers to work because there nobody is peeking over his shoulder. The book contains compilations of valuable data on almost all economic activities. There are also brief descriptions of the different parts of Perón's Five Year Plan as well as of the earlier measures by which he obtained almost complete control of the nation's economy in order to carry out this newest experiment in totalitarian state capitalism.

The Greenups deal with the same subject in a lighter vein. American journalists employed by English language papers and press services in Buenos Aires, they worked there from 1941 to 1946 and describe in a delightful way how they lived through the "neutrality" of 1941-42, the "operetta revolution" of 1943, the fear-filled state of siege of 1943-45, with people disappearing overnight in Perón's dungeons, and the surprisingly honest elections of 1946. They report how it felt to have their meager salaries increased and their rents decreased by Perón's decrees, how the average Argentine reacted to the régime's policies, how Perón—with Braden's tough talk without action unwittingly helping him—won the elections, and how the British are liked and the Americans disliked. They wax lyrical in their reminiscences about Argentine beef and the abundance of food, are still perplexed at their having lost face with their apart-

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ment-house doorman by carrying their own groceries, and sarcastically comment about the military's blundering attempts to fill offices they know nothing about, and about the democratic façade Perón is using to disguise his dictatorship. Unlike the typical journalists, however, they have grasped and competently analyzed the social and economic structure of the country and the significance of Perón's totalitarian efforts at refurbishing the economic setup and creating a more balanced economy. Their statistical data are accurate. In their last chapter they write justifiedly indignant about the inconsistency of our policy toward Perón and warn that by now helping him with armament or capital equipment we cannot purchase his everlasting good will. "Perón can be counted on to act in his own self-interest in any given situation", the authors conclude. "Perón will not honor any 'deal' he has made with any one, if it later proves unsuited to his own interest." It took American business men a long time to learn that one should not do business with Hitler. Yet, at present they are falling over each other to do business with the still small neo-Hitler of the western hemisphere.

FELIX J. WEIL

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NEW YORK, N. Y.

Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939. Edited by E. L. WOODWARD and ROHAN BUTLER. Second Series, Volume I. London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1946. Distributed in the United States by British Information Services, New York.—xxxvi, 603 pp. 21s.; $5.50.

The book under review is the first volume of the great enterprise which was announced several years ago, namely the publication of the British Foreign Office documents of the inter-war period. When complete, the whole publication will consist of two series of volumes, the first covering the period from 1919 to 1929, the second one reaching from 1930 to the outbreak of the Second World War. This is the first volume of the second series, for which Professor E. L. Woodward signs as responsible editor.

The opening of the Foreign Office Archives of the period before World War I was a stirring and stimulating event for historical scholarship in the twenties, and it is natural to compare the present publication with these earlier publications and to expect from it something of the same effect. But the reader should be immediately warned that the present series is of a somewhat different nature. When Mr. Eden, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, announced the plan in 1944, he stated that "His Majesty's Government in the United

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Kingdom have decided to publish the most important documents in the Foreign Office Archives relating to British foreign policy between 1919 and 1939". The editors have kept strictly within this mandate; indeed, one might say that they have limited the mandate even more. In choosing "the most important documents" they have been guided by the idea that "since the first business of British diplomacy has long been the maintenance of peace, the course of events between 1919 and 1939 may be described more specifically from a diplomatic point of view as the breakdown of the machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes." One may regret that the editors have adopted so narrow a view of their task. In reviewing their product, however, it is only fair to judge it on the basis of their declared intention.

If one takes this yardstick, certain editorial decisions, which may seem doubtful, become at least comprehensible. The editors have elected, for instance, to compromise between chronological arrangement of documents and arrangement by subject. This is a rather weak way out of the dilemma, but, considering that the whole publication will in any case focus on selected crucial issues, the method of arrangement, on which the editors have decided, is reasonable. It is regrettable that the editors decided to omit the printing of Foreign Office minutes on incoming despatches and telegrams, because the reader is given no intimation of differences of opinions in the Foreign Office nor of diverse views affecting ultimate policy decisions. Here again, however, it can be said that a publication which will hit only the high spots can limit itself to the executive decisions without documenting their origin.

This is really as far as one can go in justifying the editorial methods of the publication. With regard to the questions of annotation and selection of documents, I must join the chorus of the sharply critical voices which have already been raised in England and in this country. On the question of the annotations, the editors admit the necessity of providing crossreferences within the Collection and short summaries of dispatches and telegrams referred to, but not included in the Collection. One wishes that this principle had been carried out with that punctiliousness which such an important publication deserves (such crossreferences, for instance, are lacking in nrs. 202 and 208). But such annotations are certainly not enough. A minimum demand would have been to indicate which documents have been previously published, and where for the first time. A very great amount of the material, concerning the London Naval Conference, has already been published in the United States State Department volumes on the *Foreign Relations of the United States*, and this should have been carefully noted. Again, the editors might have included

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notes to indicate which reports, here included, can be checked by reports in other collections.

The editors explain the scarcity of footnotes by the "need to economize space". If economy was a serious consideration, then the selection of documents presented here is astounding. There are many documents which, because of previous publication, or of limited significance, could have been omitted and briefly summarized instead of printed in full. I think, for instance, of such previously published documents like Briand's "*Mémorandum sur l'Organisation d'un Régime d'Union fédérale européenne*" (nr. 186), of the memorandum on a conversation between the chairman of the American delegation and the chairman of the Japanese delegation (nr. 133), of the exchange of memoranda with the French Ambassador in December 1929 and January 1930 (nrs. 123 and 136), or of the "Manifesto to the German People", which the German government issued after the evacuation of the Rhineland (nr. 308). Several of the reports from Berlin are nothing but summaries of German newspaper articles (nrs. 307, 312, 325). The inclusion of such material is all the more incomprehensible in view of the omission of documents of greater interest. Perhaps the most startling omission is a general survey of the international situation by Sir Robert Vansittart, referred to in footnote 5, page 501, but not printed.

The brief period covered by this volume and the arbitrary nature of the selection of documents included make it difficult to draw any general conclusions about the inter-war diplomacy. It seems premature to make any statements about the quality of British diplomacy in this period; there seems to be a startling lack of direction, but this impression may be the result of having printed more reports than instructions. It would also appear that private letters, which have not always reached the archives, played a great rôle. It seems likely that this publication will strengthen the number of those who doubt that foreign office archives can still be considered to contain the whole story of foreign policy in our era. In this volume, certain aspects remain rather shadowy because of affairs having been concentrated in the hands of the Prime Minister. One receives the strong impression that Ramsay Macdonald exerted a dominating influence, that Henderson and the Foreign Office played a rather subordinate rôle and were sometimes not quite in the picture. This impression may be misleading since the chief part of this volume is devoted to the London Naval Conference in which Macdonald took a special interest. For the history of this Conference, the book is certainly very interesting and will have to be carefully studied. The other materials printed in this volume—like the British reaction to Briand's proposal of a

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European Federation and the reception of the formation of the Bruening government in Germany—will appear in their full significance only if more material on the European diplomatic situation will have been published in later volumes.

Despite unquestionable technical weaknesses, there remains enough in this volume that is highly significant and interesting. The decision of the British government to undertake the publication is highly welcome. Nevertheless, if one applies the same strict criteria that Professor Woodward himself—in his study of the Anglo-German naval rivalry and in his autobiography—applied to the pre-war German documentary series, one is forced to conclude that this first volume is scarcely adequate.

FELIX GILBERT

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE

Studies in the Background of English Radicalism, with Special Reference to the French Revolution. By M. RAY ADAMS. Lancaster, Franklin and Marshall College, 1947.—vii, 330 pp. $3.75.

This is an extraordinarily fine and peculiarly useful book. It is fine because it is unusually well written, temperate, and the result of detailed, exhaustive and scholarly research. It is peculiarly useful for two reasons: first, because it provides scarce material for building a much needed bridge between the stateman, the economist and the political scientist on the one hand and the man of letters on the other; and, secondly, because of a certain novelty of approach adopted by the author, helpful to all students of history as well as to those of literature.

Professor Adams very modestly makes no pretense of writing a history of British radicalism at the end of the eighteenth century but has chosen, after a very brief introduction, to let a group of contemporary writers speak for themselves. More than that—he has deliberately avoided the foremost champions of British eighteenth-century radicalism, Godwin, Paine and Wollstonecraft, for the specific reason that we already know a great deal about them, and he has confined his book to the less well-known writers of the period, thus tremendously increasing the intellectual burden which he voluntarily assumed but at the same time giving a note of freshness and clarity to what has become now a very old subject.

Out of a great list of possible writers the author has selected nine for intensive examination, and critical essays on these nine comprise the content of his book. His method of selection is both logical and interesting. Four different groups or categories of writers are noted.

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The first comprises that of political romanticists, "passionate individualists, not revolutionists in the Marxian sense." In this category he places Joel Barlow, Mary Hayes, Mrs. Mary Robinson, Robert Lovell and George Burnett. The second group is termed the political controversialists, and as their representative he selects James Mackintosh, author of *Vindiciae Gallicae*, called by Coleridge "quondam patriot, reformer and semi-revolutionist." His third group is that of the dissenters and his choice as spokesman for them is Joseph Fawcett. And finally there is the fourth group, that of "the milder radicals or the Whig liberals," and of these he picks out for separate study George Dyer and Samuel Parr.

The three women studied in this book may be passed over lightly, not because they are insignificant, but because any one steeped in the writings of Godwin and Wollstonecraft will find little but a reflection of the ideas and ideals of those two luminaries. Concerning Joel Barlow's later life the author has dug up much fresh material and proves his point that "it is time that historians of American literature should more generally recognize Joel Barlow as something more than a writer of good doggerel." As for Lovell and Burnett, the intimate association of those two most altruistic and idealistic radicals with the poets Southey and Coleridge, in their dreams of a pantosocracy on the banks of the Susquehanna, amply justifies their inclusion in this book.

Of the remaining writers the two most useful for our purpose are Fawcett and Parr, the former at one time heartily praised by Wordsworth but later to be violently scorned, the latter dubbed in this book "The Whig Johnson".

Fawcett, Sunday evening lecturer in Old Jewry, should be held in loving memory for one thing, if for no other—"He had Paine's *Rights of Man* and Burke's *Reflections on the French Revolution* bound up in one volume and said that together they made a very fine book." The author is at his best in his long essay on Fawcett, doing full justice to that much abused poet and literary critic who incurred the wrath of Wordsworth and who was pilloried by him as "The Solitary" in his long poem, *The Excursion*. The main difference between the two poets with respect to their character may have been simply that Fawcett stuck to his radical guns, whereas Wordsworth abandoned his.

Finally there is Samuel Parr, educator of note and friend of Samuel Johnson. Parr, like Fawcett, found good in both Burke and Paine, and did not hesitate to say so, an act of courage at the end of the century, and an act of intelligence as well. Parr doubtless was somewhat wordy, sententious and didactic, but that does not imply that

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he deserved the scathing comment of De Quincy, a " sonorous smithy of words, dark and pompous."

Professor Adams throws out a life line to this Whig Johnson, shows him to have been courageous, intelligent, and that " his political thinking still retained considerable fluidity," this despite a violent break with Godwin whose notions of the perfectibility of mankind Parr had come to detest.

I have omitted Mackintosh, seemingly an undesirable act for a review for the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, since he alone represents political theory. The omission has been deliberate and intentional. It is due to my conviction as a political scientist that we have much to learn from literature in the narrower sense of that word and that to write of Mackintosh would be but to carry coals to Newcastle, since it is to be assumed that political scientists are already familiar with him.

WALTER PHELPS HALL

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

Abigail Adams. By JANET WHITNEY. Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1947.—xv, 357 pp. $4.00.

New Letters of Abigail Adams, 1788-1801. Edited with an Introduction by STEWART MITCHELL. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947.—xlii, 281 pp. $5.00.

Abigail, daughter of the Reverend William Smith, was a " delicate " child. She never attended school a day in her life. At 20 she married a young lawyer, John Adams, and for the next 35 years of her life was closely linked to the fortunes of her native land. The girl who never went to school became one of the best educated and most interesting women of her time. The sickly child developed into a young lady with the strength of will and body required to stand up against the strains of a long war, during which her husband was away from home and in danger for long periods of time. She bore five children and raised four of them to maturity, and she traveled in Europe, not an easy experience in those days.

Mrs. Whitney has written of her subject with a good deal of understanding and sympathy. It is apparent that she has done some thorough research, especially in manuscript sources. The picture that she presents of Abigail Adams as young girl, wife and mother is warm and life-like. Yet this unusual woman was so often counselor or confidant to her husband and son, that it is impossible to write the story of her life and ignore the political forces that whirled about her family.

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It is in this sphere of the political, this attempt to place Abigail against the background of those stirring times in which she lived, that this volume is distressingly deficient. Mrs. Whitney has John Adams losing "that strong parochial feeling engendered by close living in one place" as early as 1765 (p. 39). Actually it was not until after he went to Philadelphia in 1774 that he began to lose his provincialism. We are told that Mercy Otis Warren was the "brilliant daughter of James Otis" (p. 29). It is her brother James, rather than her father of the same name, who is remembered today. There is a lack of understanding in regard to the election of 1800 (pp. 295-96). Worst of all, the author believes John Adams was always right, his opponents always wrong, dishonest or unpatriotic. The characterizations of Franklin (see pp. 156 and 161), of Hutchinson (p. 68 n), and of Jefferson (especially on pp. 311 and 318-19) are distorted to the point of viciousness. The bibliography is incomplete and is a curious mixture of scholarly and second-rate literature.

This biography does contain valuable material, often quoted from manuscript sources. There is considerable insight into the personality and character of Abigail Adams. The author is a good storyteller; her narrative is smooth-flowing and interesting. It thus becomes the best biography we have of a very interesting and important woman. It is regrettable that it is not so good as the subject deserves.

Stewart Mitchell, former editor of *The New England Quarterly* and at present director of the Massachusetts Historical Society, has edited an interesting series of letters by Abigail Adams. His volume contains 141 previously unpublished letters, written by Abigail to her elder sister, Mary Cranch, between 1788 and 1801. Ninety-five of these were written while Abigail was "First Lady of the Land". The letters deal with a wide cross section of political, economic and social conditions, as well as with more personal matters. One of the letters contains Abigail's comment that "My Letters to you are first thoughts *without correction*" (p. 182).

Dr. Mitchell's careful comment on the careless editing of previously published letters of Abigail Adams is in marked contrast to their uncritical acceptance by Mrs. Whitney. The editing of these letters is characterized by thorough scholarship and accuracy. Neither editor nor publisher has spared any pains in providing every aid that a reader might desire. Both for the light these letters throw upon the mind and character of their writer, and for their insight into the political and economic forces of the period, these letters are a valuable addition to our historical literature.

RALPH ADAMS BROWN

CORTLAND STATE TEACHERS COLLEGE

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BOOK NOTES

In *Thoughts on the Constitution* (London, New York, Toronto, Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1947; xi, 166 pp. 8*s*. 6*d*.) Mr. L. S. Amery offers his ideas about the British constitution not as a scholar—he modestly disclaims any pretension to that rôle—but as one who for a long time has had a share in working the machine of British government. His intimate acquaintance with politics and public affairs began more than fifty years ago, and nearly thirty-five years spent in the House of Commons, about half of them in governmental office also, have given him an insider's knowledge of the British constitutional system. Some of this knowledge he places before his readers in this little volume which reproduces with some additions the Chichele Lectures recently delivered by him at Oxford. Mr. Amery does not indulge in much philosophizing, but in a brief introduction he tells us that in reviewing his own experience and trying to find some pattern underlying the kaleidoscope of politics, he has often been impressed by the influence of chance and the importance of the rôle of individuals in shaping the course of events. Believing that the years immediately ahead will bring an acceleration of change which will subject the governmental system to increasing strain, he is deeply concerned with the problem of preserving parliamentary government and makes a number of proposals to that end, most of them not original. As Secretary of State for the Colonies, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs (the first incumbent of this office, 1925-29), and Secretary of State for India and Burma, Mr. Amery has been personally and officially involved in important imperial developments, and in his concluding chapter, which has to do with the evolution of the British Commonwealth, he rises to the dignity of a primary historical source, notably in his discussion of the Imperial Conference of 1926.—R. L. SCHUYLER, Columbia University.

The second edition of Sir Gilbert Campion's *An Introduction to the Procedure of the House of Commons* (London, Macmillan & Co., Ltd.; New York, The Macmillan Co., 1947; xvii, 346 pp.; 18*s*.; $4.50) should, like the first edition of 1929, prove to be of great value to students and teachers of constitutional history. Written primarily as a guide for members of the House of Commons, it contains more explanatory and illustrative material than the official *Manual of Procedure* but is much briefer and thus more suitable for purposes of

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ready reference than the standard treatise on procedure, Erskine May's *Parliamentary Practice.* As Clerk of the House of Commons and editor of *May's Parliamentary Practice,* Sir Gilbert Campion is eminently qualified to write this book. The material is presented in nine chapters, the first of which deals with the history of procedure from the earliest Parliaments to the contemporary period. This chapter, wherein the development of procedure is related to the development of both Parliament as a whole and the House of Commons, should be of general interest to students of English history. The law and machinery of the House, the procedure of the session and of daily sittings, rules of debate, procedure on public and private bills, committees and their composition, rules and powers, and procedure on finance are discussed in the remaining chapters. The material included has been brought up to date through the summer of 1946. Appendix IV contains information on modifications of procedure during the war years. The second chapter, on parliamentary law and machinery, contains (pp. 86-98) a brief description of the various categories of Parliamentary Papers. Those who have occasion to make use of such records in the course of research will find this section helpful. Chapter viii, entitled " Finance in the House of Commons ", deserves especial mention as a lucid account of a highly complex subject. Here are discussed the system of estimates and appropriations, the ordinary money bills like the Consolidated Fund and Appropriation Acts, and the work of the Committees of Supply and Ways and Means. The author is to be congratulated on the itemized table of contents and the excellent index.—CATHERINE STRATEMAN SIMS, Agnes Scott College, Decatur, Georgia.

The Constitution and Civil Rights (New York, Columbia University Press, 1947; x, 254 pp. $3.00), by Milton R. Konvitz, discusses the historical development and recent status both of the rights of persons to employment and public accommodations, and of the privileges and immunities of citizens. This applies especially to federal and state legislation in matters of racial discrimination. The book offers an impressive account of the fight, ever since the Civil War, for a broad interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. This factual account makes very clear that some of the basic issues today are still the same ones which were argued at the time of the Civil Rights Cases of 1883. The lack of unmistakable protective provisions in the federal constitution against violations of civil rights by individuals, and the insufficient protection by the states of the victims in many such cases, remain crucial problems today. It is frustrating to be

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reminded that federal antilynching legislation has been unsuccessfully attempted ever since 1891, and that court decisions have been characterized by divergent views and frequent dissents for eighty years. On the other hand, comparative freedom from federal interference has given a number of individual states an opportunity to adopt legislation of a more progressive nature than could be expected to materialize on a federal scale for quite a while to come. We might add that the actual progress in race relations during recent years has been greater than the legislative score would seem to indicate. Dr. Konvitz' book is a welcome contribution to the current discussion on the implementation of civil rights. It ends with a warning against minimizing, in the laissez-faire tradition, the effects of formal legislation in this field. More generally, it supports Myrdal's views on the causes of racial discrimination. The value of the book is increased by an extensive collection of documents, which includes a reprint of several model bills now before Congress and of existing civil rights legislation in New York, New Jersey and some other states; and also a list of the numerous state laws, compelling or permitting segregation. Perhaps the most impressive effect of this documentation is to underline the fantastic lack of consistency in racial relations. How many people know that five of the states with school segregation do permit *blind* whites and Negroes to attend the same schools? That one state law requires separate telephone booths for Negroes? The growth of civil rights depends to a great extent on the spread of knowledge about them, and all those interested in it will find the present book a valuable help.—ALBERT LAUTERBACH, Sarah Lawrence College.

A recent addition to the biographical writing on the author of the famous *Short History of the English People* is W. G. Addison's *J. R. Green* (London, Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1946; xi, 96 pp. 6*s*.), a little book that seems to owe its existence to its writer's belief that Green, the liberal and democratic social historian, has been rehabilitated as a result of the outcome of the late war. To the public in England and the English-speaking countries Green has always been a man of one book, though he was the author of other historical works, and his collected papers fill several volumes. His intimate friend Edward A. Freeman was of the opinion that his best critical work in history was to be found in papers written in his very early days, when his name was still quite unknown. According to the testimony of those who knew him well, Green was a person of extraordinary mental alertness and fertility, of the broadest human

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sympathies, and of altogether remarkable conversational powers. In the judgment of James Bryce, another intimate friend of Green, "Such talk has rarely been heard in our generation, so gay, so vivid, so various, so full of anecdote and illustration, so acute in criticism, so candid in consideration, so graphic in description, so abundant in sympathy, so flashing in insight, so full of color and emotion as well as of knowledge and thought." Not an easy and simple subject, evidently, for a biographer, and Mr. Addison ought not to be blamed too severely if he has not quite succeeded in making Green come fully to life before us.—R. L. SCHUYLER, Columbia University.

In *The Russians Came to Korea* (Seoul, Korea, and Washington, D. C., Korean Pacific Press, 1947; 212 pp. $3.00), Dr. Henry Chung, for many decades an advocate of Korean independence, has written an eloquent plea for more energetic American support of Korean unity and self-rule. A bitter attack on Soviet rule in northern Korea is followed by a mild censure of American military government, particularly its earlier absence of clear purpose and its ignorance of Korean background. The book shows no evidence of its author's having been in Korea for many years. Dr. Chung sketches in broad outline the present condition of Korea, divided at the thirty-eighth parallel, and analyzes the devices by which the Soviet government has entrenched a puppet régime in the north, preparatory to taking over in the south. While it is clear that balance of responsibility for continuing partition rests with Soviet policies, there is too little evidence now available to conclude that American policy has always been wise and blameless. Incidentally, the U.S.S.R. was not a signatory to the Potsdam Declaration on Japan (p. 103), although it adhered to it in declaring war. In view of the scarcity of exact information about Korea, this study would have served the Korean cause far better if it had given less space to Soviet policy in Hungary and Latvia and more to a concrete analysis of Korean needs and prospects. Why are there two hundred parties and organizations in southern Korea (p. 97), and what are the prospects for stable self-rule? To what extent are Koreans now manning the higher ranks of the bureaucracy and the economic system? If Korea should be obliged to continue for some years in a state of partition, what are the prospects of southern or northern Korea becoming self-sustaining? To these and similar questions of immediate significance in helping Americans to form an estimate of the nature and scope of the Korean problem Dr. Chung's plea gives no answers.—PHILIP E. MOSELY, The Russian Institute of Columbia University.

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Das neue ländliche Bodenrecht der Schweiz (St. Gallen, Verlag der Fehr'schen Buchhandlung, 1946; 400 pp.), by Dr. Otto K. Kaufmann, is a treatise on the New Agricultural Real Property Law of Switzerland. The term *Bodenrecht* indicates that it is based on a functional rather than conceptual approach. It embraces the private as well as the public law, as far as it is related to agricultural real property. Although the treatise is mainly concerned with the law of Switzerland, it contains ample material with regard to comparative laws of other European countries, including Great Britain and Russia. After an interesting historical and philosophical introduction, the book deals with important developments which were brought about in Switzerland's agricultural law by the impact of the economic crisis and of two World Wars which isolated Switzerland from her ordinary sources of supply and compelled her to make the utmost of her limited soil and indigenous resources. It is interesting to see how under the stress of this situation a country changed from a completely liberal conception of property to an increasing stress on its social function. In line with this development, measures were taken to insure farms of a size capable of providing a livelihood for the farmer's family, to control farm enterprises, and to restrict the right to purchase farms to those who are capable of running them efficiently. Under the new law, farmers who do not manage their farms in accordance with regulations may even be compelled to yield management to more efficient operators. The main purpose of these regulations was to induce the Swiss farmer to change from mere dairy farming to the production of both dairy foods and grain. The law of inheritance was changed to the effect of preventing a testator from dividing farms into undersized holdings, and also of permitting the best qualified among several heirs to take over the farm at a moderate price. These and many other problems of *Bodenrecht* are dealt with in Dr. Kaufmann's book with great clarity.—JOSEPH KASKELL, New York City.

The second part of the important project "A Study of the Economics of a Tropical Dependency", undertaken by the Colonial Sub-Committee of Nuffield College, has recently appeared. It has been prepared under the editorship of Margery Perham. It bears the title *Mining, Commerce, and Finance in Nigeria* (London, Faber and Faber Limited, 1948; xxv, 348 pp. 35*s*.) by Miss P. A. Bower, Dr. A. J. Brown, Dr. C. Leubuscher, Mr. J. Mars and Sir Alan Pim. The volume is extremely technical in its presentation, a fact that may serve to discourage the general reader whom, it would appear (p. xxv), the editor

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would like to interest. It is important that accurate information be made available with respect to the colonies if Britain is to find a solution for her present difficulties. For one important area at least this need has been met. The authors, each well known in his field, deal independently with such important matters as the mining industry, the extent and organization of external trade, the monetary and banking system, and public finance. Quite apart from an analysis of the economic problems mentioned above, the book sheds considerable light on a number of interesting political and social questions. Nigeria in common with other dependent areas has experienced the stirrings of a nationalistic movement. This to a large degree would appear to grow out of the economic situation. Despite the fact that the native has retained possession of his land and has been protected in many ways, he has not escaped entirely the impact of European intrusion. The penetration of European firms into retail buying and selling in the bush, for example, has eliminated the old generation of African traders. A "back-to-the-ports" movement, in the opinion of Mr. J. Mars, would be beneficial. He regards with favor, also, the growing practice of Africanizing the higher paid jobs. There is general agreement among all the people who have contributed to the volume that a comprehensive scheme of economic development should be formulated by the business interests working in coöperation with the Nigerian Administration. It is clear enough that Nigeria today offers a formidable challenge, that many mistakes have been made, and that the general level of prosperity is still too low. Despite all of this, the reviewer finds himself in accord with the conclusion that, in comparison with other areas in the tropics which have been brought under European control, "Nigeria is one of the least unhappy."—Arthur N. Cook, Temple University.

Can one write a genuine sociological treatise in a dancing rhythm that from time to time, forced by the logic of its own movement, inevitably bursts into song? Every pedant in the country will say no, automatically. But if a sociological treatise is not an endeavor to interpret as exactly as possible the spirit of a society, what is it? If that spirit can be expressed in an algebraic formula or a statistical table, so be it; but suppose there are phases of it that inescapably bubble into poetry—is that any less an expression, or any less accurate? Howard W. Odum undertook to convey, in *The Way of the South: Toward the Regional Balance of America* (New York, The Macmillan Co., 1947; vi, 350 pp. $3.00), the clearest attainable comprehension of the spirit of the society existing in the region bounded roughly

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by the Potomac and Mississippi rivers. He has not hesitated to employ any means that seemed likely to serve his purpose; and if he frequently ceases speaking and begins to chant, what of it? He is still trying to convey an exact impression. Naturally, he is not altogether successful, for he has set himself an impossible task; but few readers will fail to gain from it some conception of tremendous emotional forces that frequently break to the surface in forms incomprehensible to one who knows nothing of the tidal impulse behind them. It is therefore valuable as an interpretation, certainly to sensitive minds. In addition to that, however, it is delightful reading by the fireside as well as at a desk.—GERALD W. JOHNSON, Baltimore, Md.

In his political autobiography, *You're the Boss* (New York, The Viking Press, 1947; x, 244 pp. $3.00), Edward J. Flynn, Democratic boss of the Bronx, has provided an unusual commentary on urban politics. It is seldom that one so successful in running a machine is also capable of writing about it with such clarity or is willing to be so frank. Although he is but dimly aware of their theoretical significance, Mr. Flynn discusses most of the issues raised by the academic students of politics. Because of its scope, *You're the Boss* may be examined on a variety of levels, all of them important as well as fascinating. Primarily, of course, Mr. Flynn's book is an exposition and defense of the "good" political machine, which he defines as one that represents the majority of the voters, who are the real "bosses". Mr. Flynn, in a quiet, straightforward way, shows exactly how he attained and holds his control over the Democratic party in the Bronx—a party which has been in power for a quarter-century under his calm leadership. Since he has been the real ruler in the Bronx, Mr. Flynn's book is a study in local government and the spoils system. Smarting under frequent attacks, the author sharply criticizes the "reformers" as unrealistic or hypocritical. He defends the spoils system as a legitimate carrying out of the voters' mandate. Here, however, he reveals a profound lack of understanding of the function and value of a technically skilled governmental bureaucracy that is maintained in spite of the changes effected on the policy-making levels by the electorate's preference for one or the other of the major parties. Finally, *You're the Boss* may be considered as another "I-knew-FDR" essay. The Roosevelt that emerges from Mr. Flynn's account is the gifted, practical, Democratic politician, a facet of the late President's many-sided personality that is as significant as those traits stressed recently by Frances Perkins, Henry Morgenthau and

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Elliott Roosevelt. On whatever level it is taken, *You're the Boss* makes absorbing reading. Not a little of its interest and documentary value derives from the fact that Mr. Flynn is not always aware of the full implication of his remarks and rationalizations.—MORROE BERGER, Columbia College.

Future historians on military occupations will find valuable information on the genesis and first phase of the American Military Government in Germany in a recent book by Harold Zink, *American Military Government in Germany* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1947; 272 pp. $4.00). As a participant in the early schools of military government and as editor of the *Handbook for Military Government in Germany*, Dr. Zink could draw upon first-hand experience, which he supplemented by further study. The first half of the book is a running account of American efforts from the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department to the formal establishment of the American Military Government. The following chapters deal with the major American policies, such as denazification, reëducation, democratization, and economic reconstruction of Germany. A careful evaluation of the rôles of the State Department and of the Navy in military government and of the reactions of the German people concludes the study. In examining the various policies, the author takes great pains to present the data in favor of the military government. Yet he cannot escape the conclusion that the record of the first two years is not impressive. Conflicting lines of policy, excessive paper planning, shifting of organizations, bungling in administration, continuous rotation and inefficient selection of personnel have been outstanding features of military government. They have given rise to "the charge that we failed in Germany." To improve the present situation, the author presents four suggestions: work out a long-run program for American military occupation; replace the military by a civilian administration which should be responsible to a new and independent agency in Washington; recruit a well-trained staff on a permanent civil service basis; introduce a training program for replacement of temporary personnel. In the meantime, the government has refused to release the military from its governmental function in Germany. Yet a long-run program for Western zones is gradually evolving. Many additional improvements will be necessary, however, before the American Military Government will be ready to discharge its new assignment under the Marshall Plan.—ARTHUR SCHWEITZER, Indiana University.

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Once again Walter H. Mallory's *Political Handbook of the World, 1948* (New York, Harper & Brothers for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1948; 214 pp. $3.50) has made its welcome and eagerly awaited appearance. This twenty-first edition of the work records an unusually large number of governmental changes, reflecting such major 1947 political developments as those in India and Pakistan, in Siam and Burma, and in the states of eastern and central Europe which have come directly under Soviet tutelage. The descriptions of the occupational setups in Germany, Austria and Japan are exceptionally clear and helpful. The section on the United Nations contains an amazing amount of reference information in seven pages and ranges from a précis of the Charter to a listing of the names of the judges of the International Court of Justice. As in previous issues, the volume contains names of the leaders and the platforms of all major political parties throughout the world, and convenient summaries of recent political events or constitutional changes in a score of the more important countries. The information on the ownership and circulation of the world's chief newspapers is, as always, extremely interesting and handy. For anyone who wishes to be intelligently informed on the political status of the world today, this handbook is literally indispensable.—WALTER CONSUELO LANGSAM, Wagner College.

Interoceanic communication through Mid-America was the dream of centuries. Its successful achievement marks one of the great epochs of the history of the western hemisphere. Many, either participants or others, have essayed to tell the story. Captain Miles P. DuVal, Jr., in the Preface to his *And the Mountains Will Move: The Story of the Building of the Panama Canal* (Stanford University, Stanford University Press, London, Oxford University Press, 1947; xvi, 374 pp. $5.00), states: "The entire story of the Panama Canal has never been told. So stupendous is its history that it can never be fully told. The best that can be done is to present a few high lights along the four hundred years from the conception of the idea to the opening for traffic in 1914, to depict the main crises encountered on that way, to describe the parts played by some of its leaders in arriving at the great decisions, and to trace the development of its government and the evolution of the plan for the ultimate Canal." Hence with his advantage of four years' residence in the Canal Zone as Captain of the Port of the Pacific, he only endeavors to follow the precept set forth and to present high points of the modern saga. He has limited this second volume of his trilogy to a history of the work of construction as carried out by the French

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and the Americans. Beginning with an account of the building of the Panama Railway and the discussions of the Paris Conference of 1879, he gives first a picture of the struggles and accomplishments of the French under De Lesseps and others, which finally ended with the collapse of the French efforts. Passing over the events which brought the United States into active participation, he then details the program, the problems and the work of construction accomplished by the Americans up to the date of the opening of the Canal in 1914. With reference to the French régime, Captain DuVal is of the opinion that the accomplishments were really much greater than the credit usually given and that this work afforded a useful basis for the American task. In the treatment of the American period he ascribes the credit due not only to those who planned and directed the efforts but also to the thousands of others who made their more humble contribution to the completed waterway. For the French period the *Panama Star and Herald* is a prime source, while for the American era much use was made of records in the Archive of the Panama Canal Zone and of governmental and other publications. Many interesting sidelights were acquired from survivors of the canal construction days. Dramatic incidents, not previously recounted in the numerous volumes on the Canal, are included.—Roscoe R. Hill, Washington, D. C.

The following volumes in COLUMBIA STUDIES IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC LAW have recently been published, or are now in press.

538—*The Inquisition at Albi.*
By Georgene W. Davis. *In press*

539—*The Impact of the Undistributed Profits Tax, 1936-1937.*
By George E. Lent. Price, $2.50

540—*American Historians and European Immigrants.*
By Edward N. Saveth. Price, $3.00

541—*The History of Basic Metals Price Control in World War II.*
By Robert F. Campbell. Price, $3.25

542—*The Foreman in Industrial Relations.*
By Robert D. Leiter. Price, $2.50

The entire list is published by the Columbia University Press, New York City; and in Great Britain and India by the Oxford University Press, London and Bombay.

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